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Abstract 
At the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century the concept of 
nature assumes a new visibility. I argue that this visibility, which takes the form of an 
anxiety about 'the end of nature', can be linked to a sense of crisis surrounding the 
possibility of life in late capitalist society. 
An understanding of the 'end of nature', I suggest, can best be achieved by 
returning to the work of Theodor Adorno. In particular, the figure of the constellation 
seems to offer a effective mode of analysis for addressing the complexities contained in 
this cultural phenomenon. The cultural texts I have chosen to juxtapose are drawn from 
a series of seemingly unconnected areas of cultural life: a parkway, a utopian novel, an 
exhibition of chimpanzee paintings, a dystopian novel, a series of popular films and a 
number of philosophical essays and cultural commentaries. I say seemingly unconnected 
because my thesis attempts to show how the general sense of 'the end of nature' 
emerges in different ways in these different discursive forms and representational arenas. 
What emerges from this constellation of elements is an image of nature as that 
which holds and conceals the irreducible contradictions ofliving in consumer society. 
The image makes visible how things like landscapes, animals and human bodies, become 
marginalized and/or reduced to commodities sometimes even in the very act of trying to 
conserve them. 
What also becomes evident in the phenomenon of the end of nature is an 
inflation in the value of the concept of 'nature'. If in some ways, the new value acquired 
by nature seems simply to repeat an earlier movement, in which reified nature becomes 
the desired alternative to the degraded landscape of industrial production, this 
interpretation does not sufficiently account for the extent and intensity of recent 
interest in nature. This inflation in the value of nature is not only a tum away from 
history. It also involves recognizing something about the agency of what is not human. 
Nature returns as a sign of loss and of value not only because of real environmental 
concerns, but also because, in a lived condition of increasing abstraction, it contains the 
promise of something outside. 
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Introduction 
The Problem of the Remainder 
Mammoth. - ... The more purely nature is preserved and transplanted 
by civilization, the more implacably it is dominated. We can now 
afford to encompass ever larger natural units, and leave them 
apparently intact within our grasp, whereas previously the selecting 
and taming of particular items bore witness of the difficulty we still 
had in coping with nature. The tiger endlessly pacing back and forth 
in his cage reflects back negatively, something of humanity, but not 
the one frolicking behind the pit too wide to leap .... The fact 
however that animals do really suffer more in cages than in the open 
range, that Hagenbeck does represent a step forward in humanity, 
reflects on the inescapability of imprisonment. It is a consequence of 
history. The zoological gardens in their authentic form are products 
of nineteenth century colonial imperialism. They flourished since the 
opening-up of wild regions of Africa and Central Asia, which paid 
symbolic tribute in the shape of animals. The value of the tributes 
was measured by their exoticism, their inaccessibility. The 
development of technology has put an end to this and abolished the 
exotic. (Adorno 1978: 115-116) 
The Possibility of Life 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, the concept of nature enters a new moment 
in its history. It enters the imagination of an emerging global culture as something which 
is ending. Whatever the literal truth of such a claim might be, if indeed such a claim can 
be measured in literal terms, it holds considerable rhetorical force. This is in part because 
nature, variously defmed, has, in the history of western political thought, always acted 
1 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
pe
 To
w
in some way as a measure of the 'good life.'l It has designated a reference point outside 
human society against which norms and customs might be held so as to establish their 
relative values. Whether distance from or proximity to nature was considered desirable 
depended on geographical location and politics but the independence of something which 
went by the name of nature remained unchallenged. 2 
In the late twentieth century nature assumes a new visibility. Approximately 
two hundred years of cumulative transformations to the material landscape wrought by 
industrialization and modernization confront a new global culture which is profoundly 
divided over what might constitute the' good life.' Nature enters this culture as a fragile 
and enigmatic concept, one with a protean ability to change its shape to fit every 
different context and yet to always leave a remainder. In its metabolic interaction with 
global culture it is both that which is totally dominated and that which is left over, what 
eludes domination by the very fact of its being merely a remainder. 
The extract from Theodor Adorno quoted above begins with a reflection on the 
discovery of a well-preserved dinosaur in the state of Utah, the remains of a creature 
whose existence points to a moment which precedes human domination. The popular 
fascination with the monstrous, with unimaginably huge creatures such as the dinosaur, 
reflects, Adorno suggests, an attempt to assimilate the 'monstrous total state,' (perhaps 
now in the early twenty-first century, the monstrous global system), something which 
in its sheer scale defies human experience. But the impulse to imagine primeval 
creatures goes beyond this. Adorno argues that: 'the desire for the presence of the most 
ancient is a hope that animal creation might survive the wrong man has done it, if not 
man himself, and give rise to a better species, one that finally makes a success oflife' 
f.J (1978: 115). The 74th aphorism of Minima Moralia, 'Mammoth,' provides a fitting 
starting point for this thesis which attempts to unravel some of the complexities of the 
concept of nature in late twentieth and early twenty-first century culture. 
The use of the complex terms 'nature' and 'culture' requires qualification. Both 
are 'already inhabited', to use Bakhtin' s suggestive formulation, by many different 
1 The phrase comes from the very origins of western philosophy in the respective discussions and 
descriptions of the task of philosophy as the search for the good life. See, for instance, the various 
discussions of eudaimonia in Plato's Republic,(1955) and Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics (1985). 
See also discussion on 'well-being' in Bernard Williams (1985: 30-53). 
2 See discussion in Raymond Williams 'Ideas of nature' in Problems in Materialism and Culture (1980), 
and The Country and the City.(1973) Also Kate Soper's discussion of Williams in ...u..!.""""-'~="'-= 
(1995). 
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voices, many contradictory impulses.3 In the context of this investigation the tenn 
'culture' offers itself more easily to explanation. It is tempting to rewrite the earlier 
sentence, to write that this thesis focuses on the place of nature in late twentieth and 
early twenty-first century Western culture. In some ways this is accurate since the texts 
it engages with are predominantly European and American. Yet living outside of both 
these locations makes it very clear that what is essential to 'western culture' is its 
refusal to remain tamely within the borders of the 'west'. Since the days of colonialism 
certain aspects of European culture have been aggressively imposed on other cultures, 
and in the late twentieth century, as Fredric Jameson has noted, popular culture has 
become one of America's largest exports.4 This thesis then begins to address the new 
'global culture,' while acknowledging that this concept defines something which does 
not, as yet, exist, or which exists only as an imagined totality, the imagined 
disappearance of anything that has not been touched, restructured and reordered by the 
compelling logic of late capitalism. 
By using the tenn 'global culture' I want to draw attention to the fact that 
'culture' at the end of nature is inescapably a global concern both because the way oflife 
in first world countries has a direct and often overwhelming impact on the lives of 
everyone else, but also because attempts to rethink life on the earth in a more ethical and 
sustainable way frequently draw on traditions which are not western. The 'culture' I 
attempt to engage with in this investigation is thus not conceived of in a way which 
presumes homogeneity; it consists rather of fragments and incomplete narratives that 
mark moments in which certain aspects of the current anxiety about the possibility of 
life on the planet have become crystallized. 
Historically, I take the Second World War as a significant reference point and the 
texts I focus on are predominantly those produced in the second half of the twentieth 
century. This is not to suggest simply that the war itself had a transfonnative impact on 
people's conception of nature, although the development and use of the nuclear bombs 
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki clearly escalated the possibility of the destruction of the 
world in previously unimaginable ways. Rather the war offers a manifestation of 
concentrated violence, a material and psychical disruption which in the intensity of its 
3 Bakhtin (1981) writes language 'is not a neutral medium that passes freely into the private property of 
the speaker's intentions; it is populated - overpopulated - with the intentions of others ' (quoted in 
Higgins 2001: 93). 
4 See discussion in 'Marxism and Postmodemism' in Jameson (1999). For an incisive overview of 
Jameson's positions see Perry Anderson (1999). 
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trauma, opens up aspects of Western culture which were previously hidden. It reveals, 
among other things, the intractable centrality of technology to human relationships. 
I am not suggesting that in the period after the war anything like a coherent and 
unitary response to nature emerges. I recognise that there are significant differences 
between the modes of imagining nature in the atomic age, and those of the environmental 
movement of the 1970s and 80s, and the technotopian or dystopian visions of the 90s 
and early twenty-first century associated with the new technologies of genetic 
modification. Yet all of these cultural responses seem to me to have something in 
common - an overwhelming sense of something called 'nature', although defined and 
described in subtly different ways, which is fragile, disappearing and fmally lost. 
The war is significant because afterwards the material and social landscape is 
altered but it is, as is always the case with historical markers, an imagined and imaginary 
boundary. What happens in the second half of the twentieth century to the way nature 
is imagined in 'global culture' is part of a tradition which begins in the nineteenth 
century and which is inextricably interwoven with the trajectory of modernity. The tenn 
<,v 'nature' is defined, and redefined in relation to the colonial project, the 'opening up of 
wild regions of Africa and Asia', and the resulting zoological gardens with their barred 
cages are concrete manifestations of a particular relationship to nature, one in which, as 
Adorno argues, nature retains the power to disturb. The pacing tiger 'reflects back 
negatively, through his bewildennent, something of humanity. , With Hagenbeck and the 
redesign of zoos in the early part of the twentieth century to create an approximate 
simulation of freedom, this power to confront and disturb is lost. 5 Preserving nature, the 
designation of purely natural spaces, Adorno suggests, indicates the fact that nature has 
been relentlessly and successfully dominated more clearly than any destruction. 
The focus of this investigation is on 'nature' as it enters imagination after its 
domination. Hagenbeck's zoo in 1907 marks a small shift in thinking about nature. The 
impulse to lessen the suffering of captive animals is not only a shift towards a more 
humane treatment it is also a sign of the position 'nature' occupies in society. The 
animals, no longer threatening and different, become merely interesting. They enter the 
entertainment industry as commensurable elements to be kept as happy as is possible 
under the circumstances so that they are able the better to perfonn their function. As 
5 Carl Hagenbeck (1844-1913) was a German animal dealer and zoo owner who developed a new system 
for displaying animals, using moats rather than barred cages, which gradually spead to other zoos around 
the world. 
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representatives of what is wild and outside of culture they become entirely absorbed 
into culture. 
After the war, this process of assimilation accelerates. Not only animals, but the 
human body, and even natural spaces become delimited as signs of themselves, as what 
was substantial about them, their resistant materiality is reordered and brought under 
ever greater control. As various 'side effects' of modernization emerge in the form of 
environmental crises, 'nature' assumes a new significance. It enters the imagination as 
something which is lost or which is in the process of being lost. What exactly is lost, 
although concrete in its particulars - forests, species, the ozone layer - remains at a 
general level, enigmatic, like the word nature itself 
One attempt to define what the general implications of this loss might be can be 
found in cultural critic and environmentalist Bill McKibben's book, The End of Nature, 
published in 1990. In it he documents how at a rnateriallevel, nature, defined as that 
which is external and independent of human existence, has been destroyed through the 
practices of industrial society. Nothing remains untouched by human activity; 
everything is to a greater or lesser degree altered. This book had a significant popular 
impact and was translated into a number of different languages. 
There are a number of problems with McKibben's account, not least of which is 
the way he describes as 'human', behaviours, practices and attitudes which are in fact 
American.6 Many people have also taken exception to his definition of nature as that 
which excludes humans, pointing to its history as part of the romantic American 
tradition from which Native American engagement with the land has been erased. 
Viewing nature as external nature, and seeing human engagement as always negative, it 
has been argued, makes imagining a more positive relationship with the environment 
difficult. 
Yet despite these drawbacks the book remains useful to this project because it 
articulates some of the inchoate unease surrounding the possibility of life in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century, and how this unease is bound up in material 
and psychical ways with something which is not so much defined as gestured towards in 
the term 'nature'. It is useful not so much for its analysis, although it provides 
interesting details about the far reaching and often hidden consequences of human 
actions, but for the way the text reveals, in its struggle to express what has been lost, 
6 A criticism which he acknowledges is fair. Conversation with the author, San Francisco, 2003. 
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)( something of the opacity of the concept of nature. 7 
The book, written from the standpoint of McKibben's personal experience, 
attempts to bring together the immediacy of the everyday with the almost ungraspable 
complexity of the global system. Its endeavour, the anxiety it expresses and the 
conclusions it comes to reveal precisely the problem of the apparently autonomous 
subject who finds in his life, his interpretation of that life and his attempt to express 
himself that he has nowhere to go. McKibben is not alone in articulating this sense of 
unease, and suggesting that 'nature' has something meaningful to offer beyond the 
consumer culture of contemporary America which is rapidly if unevenly expanding to 
incorporate the world. Nature has become the new catchword to signify value in 
innumerable different contexts, from the New Age movement, to advertising, to deep 
ecology, to academic research.s My own use of the phrase 'the end of nature' is, 
therefore, not quite the same as McKibben's. I use it less to express something about 
the material world, than as a short hand to describe the anxiety and dis-ease of which 
his book is one preeminent example. 
Minima Moralia 
Central to the argument of this thesis is my claim that the writing of Adorno provides a 
useful new approach to the phenomenon of nature which begins to emerge after the 
Second World War and which finds direct expression in this dis-ease which I am calling 
the end of nature in the 1990s and beyond.9 In making a claim for the relevance of 
Adorno's work to the analysis of contemporary modernity, I am following the lead of 
Fredric Jameson who suggested in 1990 (the same year that McKibben proclaimed the 
end of nature), that Adorno, though writing from the 1930s to the 1960s, may turn out 
to be, presciently, the best analyst of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. 
7 Raymond Williams traces some of the history and complexity of the concept in 'Idea of Nature' (1980). 
8 The New Age movement's fascination with nature is discussed in the intriguing first chapter of Andrew 
Ross' Strange Weather: Culture, Science and Technology in the Age of Limits (1 991).The urgency of 
this concern is indicated by the quantity of research into questions relating to people's relation to nature 
in the human and social sciences in the last 10 years. It has become the focus for a large number of 
interventions in a wide range of disciplines, sociology (Dickens 1996; Simmons 1993), politics (Bennett 
& Chaloupka 1993), woman's studies (Plumwood 1993), social geography (Gregory, Martin & Smith 
1994; Wilson 1992), anthropology (Clifford 1988) and literary studies (Ross 1991; Kerridge & 
Sammells 1998) . This represents a very small sample in a rapidly expanding field. 
9 Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) ,was a German intellectual and member ofthe Frankfurt Institute for 
Social Research. He went into exile in the United States during the Second World War and returned to 
Gennany to teach at the University of Frankfurt in 1949. For interesting intellectual biographies and 
discussions of his work see Buck-Morss (1977) Rose (1978) Jay (1984) and Jameson (1990). More 
recently also Varadharajan (1995) ,Nicholsen (1997) and Bernstein (2001). 
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As Jameson suggests: 'there is some chance that he [Adorno] may turn out to have been 
the analyst of our own period, which he did not live to see, and in which late capitalism 
has all but succeeded in eliminating the final loopholes of nature and the 
Unconsciousness, of subversion and the aesthetic, of individual and collective praxis 
alike, and with a final fillip, in eliminating any memory trace of what thereby no longer 
existed in the henceforth postmodern landscape' (1990: 5). 
Jameson argues that Adorno's critique of positivism translates with peculiar ease 
into a critique of postmodernism, despite the fact that the glossy outward 
manifestations of the postmodern are apparently so different from the nineteenth 
century petty-bourgeois philosophy of science out of which contemporary consumerist 
society emerges. Positivism becomes postmodernism, Jameson suggests, after it has 
fulfilled its own logic, one aspect of which is the abolition of the subjective the 
'hesitations, deliberations and civilities' (Adorno 1978: 40) that form the material of 
subjective engagement. 
In particular he suggests that in the contemporary culture of political 
despair/quietism in which the logic of global capital appears inescapable, Adorno's 
insistence on theory - of tracking through the concrete experience of the everyday the 
minute movements of domination and oppression which indicate towards the compelling 
yet invisible totalizing logic of the global system - provides a highly significant model of 
engagement. 
If in the early twenty-first century postmodernism - at least in its more 
celebratory aspects - no longer seems an adequate formulation to encompass the 
complexity of the world system, this is because its tendency toward the hollowing out 
of everything to leave nothing but the skin or surface is now partially countered by a 
new interest in authenticities, of which I would argue, the inflated interest in nature is 
one manifestation. This rejection of the postmodern, in some cases, articulated as a 
rejection of post structuralism, (or sometimes the rejection of theory as such) locates in 
@ nature a new realm of authenticity. Nature appears as an opening for the immediate, the 
concrete and the subjective as well as contradictorily for a new grasp on the certain and 
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the objective. lO 
Adorno's writing, I argue, provides a particularly useful way of engaging with 
the phenomenon of nature as the realm of the authentic not only because of his rigorous 
and stringent critique of the 'jargon of authenticity' but also because of his thoughtful 
and delicate tracings of the subjective, its impulses and its impossibilities. A 
characteristic of all his writing, it is perhaps best exemplified in Minima Moralia, in the 
short crafted elaborations of moments, thoughts, experiences from which emerge 
intangible glimpses of what Adorno sometimes calls 'life', the trace that escapes 
domination in the fabric of domination itself. 
In the dedication to Minima Moralia, he writes: 
The melancholy science from which I make this offering to my friends relates to 
a region that from time immemorial was regarded as the true field of philosophy, 
but which, since the latter's conversion into method, has lapsed into intellectual 
neglect, sententious whimsy and finally oblivion: the teaching ofthe good life. 
What the philosophers once knew as life has become the sphere of private 
existence and now of mere consumption, dragged along as an appendage of the 
process of material production, without autonomy or substance of its own. 
(1978:15) 
Adorno's description of his project makes it clear that what he is attempting goes 
beyond simply an analysis of the conditions of everyday existence. He is concerned not 
only with the possibilities of life, but the possibilities of an ethical life, the ways, albeit 
limited, in which the subject can live, can engage with the world and understand his or 
her own deformations. He insists on the subjective and the validity of experience while 
warning in the same breath that they cannot be trusted. It is this aspect of his writing, 
this attempt to articulate the relationship between the subject and the world, between 
the materiality of domination and the equally material if ephemeral moments in which 
something escapes, not life perhaps, maybe only the residue oflife, but something 
." At the 2003 ASLE (Association for the Study of Literature and the Environment) conference in Boston 
one participant remarked that post structuralism had run its course and it was now time to return to 
biology as the basis for understanding human nature, and therefore, as the basis for the interpretation of 
cultural texts. Compare Eagleton'S recent views, in The Illusion of Post modernism, on Nature in 
postmodern culture: 'It is indeed remarkable how the epoch ofpostmodernity has been characterized at 
once by a veering away from Nature and a sharp swing towards it. On the one hand everything is now 
cultural; on the other hand we must now redeem a damaged Nature from the hubris of civilization. These 
opposed cases are in fact secretly at one: if ecology repudiates the sovereignty of the human, culturalism 
relativises it anyway' (1996: 70). 
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important nevertheless, that seems to me to make Minima Moralia so relevant to the 
recent discussions of natnre. Not only does he address the question of natnre directly in 
several of the segments, he does so without reducing nature to the any of the forms 
through which it might be captnred - the biological, the romantic, the economic, or the 
psychoanalytic. 
In this thesis, I make use of an extract from Minima Moralia as the starting point 
for each chapter. Each one provides both an oblique entry point into the aspect of the 
contemporary phenomenon of nature I wish to discuss, and a model of a mode of 
engagement which avoids reducing things to their concepts.!! They suggest the 
possibility of an approach which would not seek to define 'natnre' and its various uses, 
but rather might permit it to emerge in all its incoherence as a manifestation of precisely 
the contradictions which capitalism imposes not only on the structnring of the social 
but on the substrate, the material landscape, itself. 
For Adorno, the domination ofnatnre is not something separate from other 
forms of oppression. In this he departed from the more established marxist tradition in 
which 'material progress' constitutes one of the preconditions for revolution.!2 Instead, 
in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno argue that the process of 
enlightenment, while it increases the power of human beings over natnre, does so only at 
the cost of their own alienation. They write that: 'Natnre, stripped of qualities, becomes 
the chaotic stnff of mere classification, and the all-powerful self becomes a mere having, 
an abstract identity.' (2000 [1947]: 6) The domination of nature cannot be separated 
from the domination of human natnre, from the transformation of the subject herself into 
an object. 
Natural Capital 
Adorno and Horkheimer's comments predate the sense of environmental crisis that 
becomes part of the public imagination in the 1960s and 70s, but they remain peculiarly 
apt. They describe the beginning of a process of reification which results in the 
II In Negative Dialectics, Adorno writes: 'The name dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that 
objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come to contradict the 
traditional norm of adequacy. (1973: 5) 
12 Ted Benton suggests that the role of 'material progress' is one of the concepts that requires revision in 
the' greening of marxism', its rethinking in the light of the new politics of the environment. (1996: 10) 
See also Joan Martinez-Alier "'Environmental Justice" (Local and Global), and David Harvey 'What's 
Green and Makes the Environment go Round' both in Jameson & Miyoshi (eds.) (1999: 312-326; 327-
355). 
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translation of nature into commodity. The concept of 'natural capital' developed by 
bourgeois ecological economists to ascribe market prices to ecological resources 
represents a total assimilation of nature to the logic of exchange. Ecological resources 
tend to refer to external nature, to raw materials, and ecosystems used or acted upon by 
industry. But the process of reification, already evident in the treatment of animals, and 
in the uses of the human body, in the early twenty-first century is extended, at least in 
the imagination, to subjectivity, to the reorganisation of what constitutes the 
possibilities of subjectivity itself, to the reorganisation of what constitutes the 
possibility of subjective engagement, the genetic codes and chemical balances believed to 
influence, if not determine, thought, emotion, intelligence, health. 13 
Marxism's engagement with environmental concerns emerges in response both to 
the growth of environmentally-based political movements and to the practical effects of 
environmental damage on the workings of capital. For some, the announcement of a 
global ecological threat was seen to represent a further elaboration of an ideology of 
nature, one designed to protect bourgeois privileges. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, in his 
early critique of ecology, writes that: 
the ecological movement has only come into being since those districts that the 
bourgeois inhabit have been exposed to those environmental burdens that 
industrialization brings with it. What fills their prophets with doom is not so 
much ecological decline, which has been present since time immemorial, as its 
universalization. (Enzensberger 1996: 25) 
Yet even he admits that the inescapablity of damage suggests not merely a quantitative 
increase but a qualitative shift which cannot be ignored. The notion of natural limits is 
not only ideological; it exists also as a material reality, one with profound impact on the 
structure of contemporary capitalism. 
So profound is this impact that certain theorists have suggested that it 
constitutes a 'second contradiction' of capitalism which works in a way analogous to 
the first contradiction between the forces and relations of production. 14 This 'second 
13 The international trafficking in human organs seems to represent yet further evidence of the ultimate 
fungibility of the human body, its translation into a collection of saleable parts. See Lawrence Cohen 
(1999) and Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1996) on the tmfficking of human organs and the ethics of organ 
transplantation. 
14 This idea was first elabomted by James O'Connor in 1988. The article, 'Capitalism, Nature, 
Socialism: A Theoretical Introduction', was initially published in Capitalism. Nature. Socialism 1 Fall 
23; and was reprinted in Benton (1996: 197-221). 
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contradiction' is between the forces (and relations) of production and the conditions of 
production and also tends towards the generation of crises. James O'Connor suggests 
that: 
Examples of capitalist accumulation impairing or destroying capital's own 
conditions, and hence threatening its own profits and capacity to produce and 
accumulate more capital, are many and varied. The warming of the atmosphere 
will inevitably destroy people, places, and profits, not to speak of other species 
of life. Acid rain destroys forests lakes, and buildings and profits alike (1996: 
207). 
If the first contradiction gives rise to crises of overproduction and results in the labour 
movement, the second contradiction gives rise to a crises of underproduction which in 
tum gives rise to social movements able to limit capitalist accumulation and potentially 
transform the mode of production. 
Yet what seems remarkable about capitalism in the twenty-first century is both 
its capacity to ignore environmental damage through exporting industry to third world 
countries and its protean ability to tum even the damage of nature into an opportunity 
for profit. Not only do projects of environmental restoration generate profits 'S, but in 
the sphere of consumption, a huge market is opened up for goods which purport to 
restore health, or harmony with nature. Part of the phenomenon I am calling the 'end of 
nature' is its startling return in the form of commodities, organic foods, natural fabrics, 
not to mention natural health products of various kinds. '6 This is not to argue that such 
products are not (in most cases) genuine attempts to restore the damage done to the 
human body by modem conditions of existence. But the fact that such acts of 
restoration take the form of products, that healing the damage caused by consumer 
society requires further consumption indicates the peculiar power of late capitalism to 
absorb elements of opposition. The fact that such products are also invariably more 
expensive not only turns access to 'nature' into a middle class privilege, it also points to 
the peculiar way in which nature operates as a sign of value. 
This is not to argue that the politics of nature in the late twentieth century and 
15 Hans Magnus Enzenberger quotes a newspaper report which claims that 'at least a million dollars is 
pocketed in the course ofthe elimination of three million dollars' worth of damage' (1996: 27). 
16 Andrew Ross describes a special pedestal, known as the Welles Step, which adapts the modem toilet to 
allow people to squat while using it. Advertising for this device suggests this promotes a more healthy 
posture because it is 'nature's way' (1991: 55-56). 
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early twenty-first century is merely about consumption. The name 'environmental 
justice' has emerged to describe political movements which in various ways oppose the 
environmental impact of global capitalism on local communities. Such movements 'draw 
attention to the ways disparate distribution of wealth and power often leads to 
correlative social upheaval and the unequal distribution of environmental degradation 
and/or toxicity' (Adamson, Evans & Stein 2002: 5). 
Environmental justice and the forms of analysis it gives rise to reject what is 
sometimes expressed as 'Nature', the reified concept of nature as wilderness. Instead 
Evans' definition of nature includes 'the entire realm of the actual, living world' (Evans 
2002: 182). This formulation positions 'nature' (with a lower case) as the opposite of 
the abstract, dead world of the commodity, and sees it instead as a place of engagement. 
Nature remains a signifier of value - the value of the actual and the living, of that which 
resists commodification. 
What is at stake in these conflicts over definition? Why is it that nature holds 
such a central place in the global imagination? One answer to this might be that 'nature' 
has come to occupy a position as a measure of the material estrangement or alienation of 
people under late capitalism. Whether this measure is set up in individual and spiritual 
terms as the lost wilderness (of middle-class male America), or in material terms as the 
damaged health or livelihoods of peripheral communities in toxic environments, nature 
strangely becomes the sign of freedom, of what might escape domination, the subjective 
condition of being alive, of escaping the abstract identity of 'mere having'. 
Nature and Interpretation 
In the contemporary context, when the domination of nature extends beyond simply the 
commodification of external nature, beyond even the manipulations of animals and the 
human body, into the realm of subjectivity itself, can the term nature retain any sort of 
oppositional force? Bill McKibben's most recent book, Enough (2003), focuses on 
developments in technologies of genetic engineering and nanotechnology and suggests 
that, if such technologies become widely used, the analytic force of the concept 'nature' 
might be lost altogether. He expresses anxiety about what might happen to people's 
understanding of themselves when unnaturalness and artificiality are no longer 
meaningful designations. 
In some ways the problems of genetic technology, of engineering more 
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intelligent, healthier, stronger children appears a remote one, distant from the everyday 
concerns of the majority of the world's population. The laments of McKibben (2003) 
and Fukuyama (2002) over the loss of a defining humanness appear strangely naive 
given the particularly shifting nature of the term 'human', which has historically often 
facilitated the exclusion of anyone whose gender, race, or class did not match that of 
those controlling the definition. 
Yet I would argue that the question of genetic engineering is a particularly vital 
one although not precisely in the ways described by McKibben and Fukuyama. It is 
vital because it forces a confrontation between different interpretations of human nature. 
Feminists, and post structuralist theorists more generally, have argued against 
essentialist notions of human nature, suggesting that what is described as 'human nature' 
is the result of social rather than natural processes. 17 What genetic engineering promises, 
(with what justification it is at this point impossible to establish), is that, in a 
particularly alarming way, this might become literally true. Subjectivity itself might be 
formed by social determinants, not through the process of socialization but through the 
break down of subjectivity into market-related commodities so that moods, likes, 
dislikes and abilities might become so many units of modification permitting better 
social adjustment. The 'inescapablity of imprisonment' means that the subject must be 
reconstituted to recognise this imprisonment as freedom. 
The complexity of the relationship between genotype and phenotype, between 
genetic material and its manifestation in traits and behaviours suggests that the 
technotopian vision of a completely reconstituted human subject is not imminently 
realisable. Yet the very fact that such a vision exists as a goal of scientific research 
signals that the end of nature is intimately bound up with the problem of the subject. 
Psychoanalysis, which Adorno calls 'the last grandly-conceived theorem of 
bourgeois self-criticism' (1978: 66) had, of course, already explored the relationship 
between the subject and nature conceived of in biological terms. Sigmund Freud's 
famous declaration, that anatomy is destiny, marked a particular moment in which the 
11 For some examples of critiques of essentialism see Judith Butler (1990), and Foucault (1978) For 
direct criticism of sociobiology see Ruth Bleier 'Science and Gender' in Sneja Gunew (1991 :249-256). 
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subject's relationship to nature appeared fixed at least on the axis of gender. 18 Yet what 
is interesting about the work of Freud is not so much his systematic formulations of the 
complexes which form human animals into social subjects but his observations about 
those disruptive moments in which the precariousness of the subject is revealed. If at 
the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century Freud no 
longer seems applicable, this is perhaps because the body is no longer permitted to 
register the signs of distress and resistance that were the material of the practice of 
psychoanalysis (Adorno, 1978: 58). Yet psychoanalysis, I argue, remains an important 
reference point precisely because it documents so carefully both the discomforts of the 
social body and the healing effects oflanguage. My use of Freud's writing is less an 
application of psychoanalytic principles than the introduction of some of Freud's 
insights as significant elements in the constellation of concepts which surround the 
concept of nature in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Culture at the End of Nature 
This thesis examines texts from four domains in which people enter into relations with 
nature. First, the domain of external nature in the spaces that surround them; second, the 
interface between people and animals, specifically the imagined kinship with apes, and 
the proximate relations with dogs; third, the nature and culture of the human body; and 
finally the concept of human nature. I have selected texts not with any intention of 
providing an exhaustive survey, anyway an impossible task for a field of study of this 
magnitude, but rather because I observed in them particularly fascinating elaborations of 
the the phenomenon I am calling 'the end of nature.' The cultural texts that I have 
chosen are drawn from a series of seemingly unconnected areas of cultural life: a 
parkway, a utopian novel, an exhibition of chimpanzee paintings, a dystopian novel, a 
series of popular films, and number of philosophical essays and cultural commentaries. I 
say seemingly unconnected because my thesis attempts to show how a general sense of 
IE The phrase appears in 'Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex' first published in 1924 and forms part 
of his discussion of penis envy. The phrase in context reveals something of the fascinating complexity 
of Frcud's thinking: 'Here the feminist demand for equal rights does not take us far, for the 
morphological distinction is bound to find expression in differences of psychical development. 'Anatomy 
is destiny', to vary a saying of Napoleon's. The little girl's clitoris behaves just like a penis to begin 
with; but, when she makes a comparison with a playfellow of the other sex, she perceives that she has 
come offbadly and feels this as a wrong done to her and as a ground for inferiority' (1986: 399).The 
relation between anatomy and psychical development described here moves between detemination and 
interpretation, between the objective facts of anatomical difference and the girl's subjective interpretation 
of what these differences might mean. 
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'the end of nature' emerges in different ways in these different discursive forms and 
representational arenas. It takes as its starting point the fact that although 'the whole is 
false' (Adorno 1978: 50), global culture represents the attempt to articulate a totality, 
although one which, as Jameson suggests, is becoming increasingly difficult to 
conceptualize. '9 Part of this difficulty, I argue, has to do with the increasingly 
problematic status of nature as an external reference point. An adequate understanding 
of the concept of nature in contemporary society, I suggest, can only be reached through 
detailed reflection on its representation in diverse elements brought into productive 
juxtaposition. 
The first chapter, 'Theoretical Reflections,' examines Adorno's use of the figure 
of the constellation as an approach which enables such a productive juxtaposition. For 
him, the act of defming a concept is inherently a limiting and reducing process, one 
which frustrates rather than enables the depth of comprehension required for dealing 
with complex terms. Instead he proposes drawing the concept into a series of 
relationships with others so that in the moment of juxtaposition the whole forms a 
temporary but illuminating constellation. The first part of the chapter investigates some 
of the theoretical elements of this approach; the second focusses on a specific example 
of a constellation, 'Man and Beast,' one of the longer notes appended to Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. My analysis of 'Man and Beast' serves two purposes: firstly, it 
enables me to investigate in some detail the structural elements involved in setting out a 
constellation; and secondly, it provides an interesting foregrounding of some of the main 
thematic concerns of this thesis. 
Chapter two examines in some detail McKibben's claim that the end ofthe 
twentieth century coincides with the end of nature and explores some of the ways in 
which 'nature' in his criticism of modern America comes to stand for a lost value. I 
contrast his dystopian vision, which precludes any possible reconciliation, with the 
socialist vision of William Morris, a hundred years earlier.20 Morris's utopia involves 
not only the abolition of an economy based on exchange but also the undoing of 
modernity, the removal of all industry which damages the natural landscape. Althougb in 
some ways naively optimistic, Morris' account provides a useful indicator of what can 
no longer be thought in the late twentieth century - utopias in the late twentieth century 
19 This point is made in Jameson (1990:especially 52-54). 
20 William Morris' (1890) novel, New From Nowhere, through describing an imagined future utopian 
society provides an in interesting critique of ninetenth century industrial culture. 
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and early twenty-first century take the form of technotopias, as if a positive 
reconciliation with the material world, an unestranged condition, is no longer conceivable 
without a thorough reconstitution of the human subject. 
This chapter takes as its starting point the American countryside at the moment 
at which the expansion ofthe system of roads undertaken by the Federal Highway 
Programme begins to transform the land into a landscape glimpsed from the window of a 
moving car. In particular, the Blue Ridge Parkway, a road through the Appalachian 
mountains, becomes one of the first examples of the preservation of the nature and its 
transformation into a sign of itself. The Parkway, established in the 1950s, created 
around the road a vista of restored indigenous vegetation and significantly excluded from 
view any signs of poverty or work by screening out evidence of the local inhabitants. 
The second part of the chapter briefly traces some of the history of the different 
uses of the term nature and the way in which shifts in usage can be linked to shifts in the 
organisation of the social landscape within Western Europe and America. I discuss the 
profound way in which paradigms developed during the scientific revolution of the 
seventeenth century structure the possible ways in which people's relation with nature 
can be thought what Horkheimer and Adorno characterize as the 'amputation of the 
incommensurable' and the introduction of 'universal mediation,' the subordination of 
everything to the logic of exchange which finds its most recent elaboration in the concept 
of 'natural capital'. 
My third chapter discusses the figure of nature as it is manifested in imagined 
relations with animals. It takes as its starting point an unusual exhibition held at the 
Institute for Contemporary Art in London in 1957. 21 Arranged by biologist Desmond 
Morris, this exhibition presented a series of paintings done by two young chimpanzees, 
Congo from the London zoo where Morris worked, and Betsy a chimpanzee from a zoo 
in Baltimore. This exhibition, I argue, is particularly interesting because it represents a 
moment of intersection, when the boundaries between 'science' and art become blurred. 
If the shift from the pacing tiger to the one 'frolicking behind a pit too wide to leap' 
provides evidence of the increasing assimilation of nature, the progress of apes in the 
period after the Second World War suggests an intensification of this process which 
11 Paintings by Chimpanzees Exhibition Catalogue, Tate Gallery Archivcs, London. For an ironic 
review of this exhibition see Anthony Powell's 'Chimpism' in Punch October 2 1957. A more serious 
discussion of Desmond Morris' work, 'Y oung Man at the Zoo', appeared some years later ( Punch 
February 7 1962). 
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leads ultimately to a point at which the concept of nature becomes altogether displaced. 
I use Donna Haraways's (1989) influential text on the history of prima to logy in 
the twentieth century, Primate Visions, to discuss the shift that occurs in the 
paradigmatic framing of apes in the period after the Second World War. While before the 
war apes acted as the measure of the naturalness of humans, modeling the apparently 
'natural' structures of dominance and hierarchy, after the war the focus gradually moved 
to a model based on 'communication networks,' on apes being seen as 'natural-technical' 
objects within complex systems. 
Yet at the same time as apes (and other research animals) are losing their status 
as natural and becoming merely components within the modem systems of capitalist 
research technology, apes are also perceived as intermediaries in another way. Projects 
to teach apes Ameslan (American sign language) suggest a desire to fmd in apes people's 
lost connection to nature. Animals, displaced by technology from the everyday life of 
most people in developed countries, become objects of a peculiar fascination, both 
abstractly through an attempt to establish a kinship with apes, and actually in the 
practice of keeping pets. 
While the first half of the chapter focuses on apes, the second explores in some 
detail the position of dogs in the global culture of late capitalism. In this context I 
discuss Russell Hoban's dystopian novel, Riddley Walker, which was published in 
1980. 
In chapter four I move on to representations of the body as that which 
constitutes what is 'natural' or biological in people. In particular I focus on the idea of 
adaption, and the way stress emerges in the second half of the twentieth century as a 
way of interpreting people's relation to their environment. 
Environmental justice movements have drawn attention to the side-effects of 
modernity, the consequences of ever expanding industrial production. In particular, 
they focus on the impact such practices have on the bodies of those who live or work in 
proximity to toxic environments generated by production processes. This impact can 
only partly be registered in the objective language of science, in the irreducible facts of ill 
health and disease. In telling their own stories, people bear witness to the devastating 
effects of capitalist industry.22 Subjectivity is regained through the experience of 
22 For an excellent example of this see Adriana Petryna's (2002) investigation of the impact of the 
Chemobyl disaster on people's lives. 
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suffering, as if only the damaged body can speak the truth which otherwise cannot be 
articulated - the real violence of the system which insists that material abundance and 
the freedom to enter the market economy are the universal standard of the good life. 
Only in the body's damage, its inability to adapt to its environment, can the actual 
effects of a culture of consumption be registered. The subject's sickness points to a 
limit, a disruption of the body's capacity for life. 
This chapter focuses not on the speaking subject of environmental activists but 
on the muted body that makes its appearance in popular cinema in the 1980s. It 
examines the representation of a particular kind of body in popular action films which, I 
argue, exteriorize some of the contradictions of the body's relation to the environment. 
These bodies, I suggest, also articulate something of the damage done to the human body 
in the culture of late capitalism but they do so covertly, in the same way as hysterical 
bodies can use symptoms both to express and conceal an awkward truth. I take as 
exemplary the muscular bodies of film stars Arnold Schwarzenegger and Jean Claude 
Van Damme which, in their aggressive representation of the body's invincibility 
indicate, I argue, a profound insecurity not only about health, about the possibility of 
adapting to a damaged environment, but also about the status of the body in a world 
dominated by technology. 
The fifth and final chapter looks more closely at the philosophical implications 
of the 'end of nature' and the possibilities of being 'at home' in a world in which the 
domination of nature has been extended to the modification not only of the body, but of 
subjectivity itself. 
This chapter discusses two recent critiques of genetic technology, Francis 
Fukuyama's Our Posthuman Future (2002) and Bill McKibben's Enough (2003) and 
sugges~s that they are limited by their inability to conceptualize the relationship 
between nature and history. I argue that Adorno's (1932) lecture, 'On the idea of natural 
history' provides a useful way of approaching the complex interactions between nature 
and history in a way which avoids the reduction inherent in debates around definitions 
of what is human and natura1.23 
What is at stake in the definition of 'nature' and 'the human' is always in some 
sense the world itself, the way it might be mapped, interpreted and ultimately 
13 This speech, addressed to the Kantgesellschafl in Frankfurt, was never published by Adorno. (Buck-
Morss 52). It was published in English translation in Telos vol.60 1984: 111-124. 
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controlled. Adorno's approach wishes to avoid reiterating the deformations of 
positivism, and instead allows back into the complex equation, the living creature, the 
subject of experience. But this subject of experience is not the autonomous subject who 
uses reason to apprehend the world in its totality. 
At the end of Mammoth, Adorno suggests that: 'only in the irrationality of 
civilization itself, in the nooks and crannies of cities, to which the walls, towers and 
bastions of the zoos wedged among them are merely an addition, can nature be 
conserved. The rationalization of culture, in opening its doors to nature, thereby 
completely absorbs it, and eliminates with difference the principle of culture, the 
possibility of reconciliation' (1978: 116). Adorno's comment draws attention to the fact 
that the act of conservation is always also an act of control. What is conserved is 
unavoidably drawn into the culture of commensurability, assigned a value within a 
system of values which does not permit the recognition of remainders. This is not to 
argue that in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century projects to protect 
environments from the expanding reach of global capitalism are unimportant. Instead it 
suggests that to abandon nature to its reified existence in reserves would be to miss the 
way in which the remainder returns to trouble culture. The phenomenon I am calling the 
'end of nature' is, I argue, part of the twentieth century's complex and contradictory 
response to that remainder and this thesis is an attempt to trace some of the strange 
constellations through which culture manifests these contradictions. 
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Chapter 1 
Theoretical Preliminaries 
The constellation illuminates the specific side of the object which to a classifying 
procedure is either a matter of indifference or a burden. (Adorno 1973:162) 
This thesis aims to investigate what figure of nature emerges in the cultural domain of 
the second half of the twentieth and early twenty-first century. Its project is not to 
classify and define the term 'nature' and its various uses, but rather to discover, through 
the placing of certain concrete cultural texts in relation to each other, what image of 
nature might become visible. The word 'image' colonized by photography tends to bring 
to mind the idea of a direct and accurate representation of a segment of the real, a 
reflection. But the word 'image' also has an earlier meaning, associated with painting 
the idea of a likeness. A likeness exists not in the photographic accuracy of the 
representation but rather in the way various concrete elements placed together in a 
particular relationship capture the object and make it visible in a new way. 
Theodor Adorno often uses the term 'constellation' or 'configuration' to describe this 
approach and his work provides the conceptual framework for this investigation.24 The 
main body of this introduction is a discussion of what constitutes a constellation and a 
survey of the forms of argument peculiar to it. Before embarking on that, however, I 
will provide a brief outline of some of the elements of the particular constellation of this 
thesis. 
What elements does nature draw into its field at the tum of the twenty-first 
24 Adorno discusses the theoretical approach described by the figure of the constellation in his inaugural 
lecture, 'The Actuality of Philosophy' [1931]. It was never published in his lifetime. An English 
translation is included in The Adorno Reader, (Ed.) Brian O'Connor (2000: 32-36). The later essay, 
'The Essay as Form' [1958], also included in the Reader, contains a further elaboration of Adorno's 
thoughts about the relation between form and content (2000: 92-111). 
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century? And when considering them in relation to each other, when placing them in a 
spatial juxtaposition, in a constellation, what figure emerges? What surprises one in the 
imagined lines that link the elements together? One element that nature draws into its 
field is simply the concept of outside. This is not simply external nature or landscape, 
but also that which might be defined as outside of culture or outside of the administered 
world, that object which, in the condition of post modernity appears to become harder 
and harder to locate. Outside also refers to lost matter or materiality, the redemption of 
which has become the subject of 'thing theory' and Judith Butler's work on bodies 
which matter.25 The body too occupies a position which is at least partly outside, 
although in some way it operates like a skin, the contested, fought over border between 
what is inside and what is out. Nature in this historical moment cannot escape a 
connection with the breath of fresh air which, Adorno suggests, authentic artworks step 
toward in his aesthetic theory. 26 
Tracing the figure in the opposite direction, nature draws into its field what is 
inside, inescapable yet enigmatic human nature itself whose authority is derived almost 
solely from the fact that the level of its abstraction makes it possible to encompass 
almost anything. Calming this 'nature' within is the domestic space, home, which in 
setting itself as the very antithesis of what is wild, invites in certain elements of nature 
to maintain its impression of health and goodness and vitality. From here a short line 
runs to concepts of moral or ethical judgment, those concepts of goodness which are 
associated with health, and even with the concept of life itself. 
This provides a preliminary sketch, some faint lines indicating the paths I wish 
to follow through the complex force field surrounding the concept of nature. I have 
chosen the form of the constellation rather than a more conventional discursive form 
because of the demands of the object under investigation. This is not to say that useful 
and interesting work has not been done in defming the concept of nature. Kate Soper's 
classic text, What is Nature? serves as an excellent example of the fruitfulness of what 
25 See Judith Butler (1993) and Haraway (1997). On Thing Theory see Bill Brown (2001). See also John 
Noyes review of Gender Trouble, 'The Utopian Subject: Judith Butler's Gender Trouble' (1995:227-230) 
and Karen Barad's discussion of Butler, Haraway and others in 'Posthumanist Performativity: Towards 
an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter' (2003: 801-831). 
26 Adorno writes: 'Authentic artworks, which hold fast to the idea of reconciliation with nature by 
making themselves completely a second nature, have consistently felt the urge, as if in need of a breath 
of fresh air, to step outside themselves. Since identity is not to be their last word, they have sought 
consolation in first nature ... The extent to which this taking a breath depends on what is mediated, on the 
world of conventions, is unmistakable. Over long periods the feeling of natural beauty is intensified with 
the suffering of the subject thrown back on himself in a mangled and administered world .. : (1997:63). 
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might be called the classificatory mode of approaching the question of nature. My 
project, however, is different. The aspect of the object that I wish to investigate is not 
that which can be located in the various discursive moments when the concept of nature 
can be held still long enough to define. Instead I am interested in the concept of nature in 
its instability, in its formlessness and changeability. I wish to approach not by way of 
existing definitions, but through finding the way in which concrete social and cultural 
experiences in their particularity repeatedly project and disturb the image I am trying to 
see and to make visible. The form of the constellations makes it possible to avoid 
hierarchies and the assumption of relationships between things in advance. 
My use of the conceptual form of the constellation does not mean that I will 
avoid a more discursive method of argumentation altogether. Rather the constellation 
describes the project of the thesis as a whole; within it different aspects will lend 
themselves to different kinds of argnment and discussion. 
This rest of this introduction will consist of a discussion of constellations and 
the significance of form in Adorno's analysis of contemporary culture. The first part 
investigates the concept and his method at a more abstract level, while the second 
focuses on a particular piece of writing 'Man and Beast', one of the notes attached as it 
selection of notes appended to Dialectic of Enlightenment (2002 [1947]: 203-212). This 
piece not only provides an exemplary instance of writing which takes the form of a 
constellation, but also addresses many of the central questions of this thesis. I have 
chosen to discuss it in some detail both in an attempt to unravel some of the 
complexities ofthe dialectical method and because it provides a historical image against 
which my own figuring of nature, sixty years later, might be read. 
Constellation 
In order to understand Adorno's approach it will be useful to consider a number of 
different elements. Firstly, the figure ofthe constellation itself. This complex figure 
needs to be brought into sharp focus before the precise sense in which it is used in 
Adorno's writing can be established. Secondly, the constellation needs to understood in 
relation to its constituent parts, the concrete elements which make up the individual 
stars or groups of stars within the figure as a whole. It also would not be possible to 
fully grasp the workings of the constellation without some sense of Adorno's implicit 
theory oflanguage. Finally, the constellation as a deliberate departure from more 
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conventional modes of analysis reflects not a theoretical position to be imposed on 
phenomena from without but rather a response to the demands of the object itself and 
reflects a considered reaction to the particular historical situation in which both 
interpreter and object are located. This final point will be touched on only briefly here. 
This relation between subject and object forms a central concern of my investigation as a 
whole and it is one I will continually return to throughout the thesis. 
A constellation, literally a combination or coming together of stars, refers to a 
pattern discovered in the myriad fragments oflight emitted by cosmic bodies. As such it 
implies a particular viewpoint, seeing a pattern in a group of stars which, after all, only 
from earth appear in a that particular relationship. What makes a constellation is 
precisely the suspension of the depth of field, the bringing of stars into a relationship on 
an imaginary flat celestial surface. 
Constellations are both markers in space, modes of dividing up the visible 
universe and mythological images, the concrete signs of archaic narratives. Finding the 
image in the arrangement of stars is not simply a matter of perception. The stars mark 
only the bare bones of an image which must be reconstructed by the eye. The eye must 
try and see a figure whose lines were first traced in a context remote from our concerns 
and cultural formation. Thomas Kuhn writes that: 
Many of the constellations used by modem astronomers are named after 
mythological figures of antiquity. Some can be traced to Babylonian cuniform 
tablets, a few as old as 3000 B.C. Though modem astronomy has modified their 
definitions, the major constellations are among our oldest traceable inheritances. 
How these groups were first picked out is, however, still uncertain. Few people 
can 'see' a bear in the stars of the constellation Ursa Major; other constellations 
present similar problems in visualization; the stars may therefore originally have 
been grouped for convenience and named arbitrarily. But if so they were very 
strangely grouped ... (1985: 14) 
Constellations, therefore, provide an interesting figure for the analysis of phenomena. 
They contain images which are not not simply visual outlines, but rather are likenesses 
in the broadest sense of the term, fleeting impressions that are in no way comparable to 
the photographic image. The way they are 'picked out' is not unequivoca1. They are 
between 'convention' and 'resemblance', both arbitrary and mythologically determined. 
They are linked through history to astrology and although in Stars Down to 
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Earth Adorno unequivocally dismisses modem astrology as 'commercialized occult' 
incompatible with modem forms of rationality, this does not mean that the astrological 
aspect of constellations is irrelevant?7 Constellations have always been interpretative 
devices with a bearing on human actions; they have always been about modes of making 
both the natural and the social world legible, and mediating their relationship. Adorno 
writes: 'People always wanted to learn from occult signs what to expect and do; in fact 
superstition is largely a residue of animistic magical practices by which ancient 
humanity tried to influence or control the course of events' (1994: 37). 
The term constellation contains a divinatory residue. It is a word already 
inhabited and although the fateful aspect of the constellation is certainly not part of 
Adorno's use, constellations are in his formulation of them, in a different way, 
interpretative tools - figures which readjust perception so that new possibilities are 
opened which ultimately relate in some way, if not in the direct way of the oracle, to 
changes in the way things might be done. 
In her useful study, Susan Buck-Morss divides Adorno's method into two 
stages: the first a 'conceptual-analytic' stage in which phenomenal elements are broken 
down, and viewed as a language or code which might be deciphered by using 'key 
categories' from the conceptual language of Marx and Freud; the second, the stage of 
'trial combination' in which the elements of the phenomena 'fall into a figure'. This is a 
moment of stillness, not because all antagonisms have been overcome but because certain 
contradictions have been illuminated (1977: 102). 
The idea of the constellation as a form through which phenomena might be 
understood originates with Walter Benjamin and is first articulated in The Origin of 
Tragic Drama.28 Brian O'Connor writes that: 
Benjamin's theory posits the idea of constellations, a metaphor which expresses 
the practice of philosophical truth. In this practice the subject mediates 
phenomena, striving to arrange them in such away, in 'constellations,' that they 
27 Adorno writes: 'It should be stressed that in fonner periods, superstition was an attempt, however 
awkward, to cope with problems for which no better or more rational means were available at least so far 
as the masses are concerned. the sharp division between alchemy and chemistry, between astrology and 
astronomy, is a comparatively recent achievement. Today, however, the incompatibility of the progress of 
the natural sciences, such as astro-physics, with the belief in astrology is blatant' (1994:37). 
2& In a letter to Adorno in July 1931 Benjamin comments on Adorno's description of the task of 
philosophy: 'I subscribe to this position. Yet I could not have written it without referring to the 
introduction of my book on Baroque Drama, where this entirely unique and, in the relative and modest 
sense in which such a thing can be claimed, new idea was first expressed' (1999: 9). 
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might reveal their idea. Importantly ideas are neither generalizations nor 
subjective reconstructions in that they are the very intelligibility and truth of 
phenomena .. .In a constellation particular phenomena are not subsumed under 
universals. Rather the meaning of any phenomenon can emerge only when the 
phenomenon is understood as configured with certain other phenomena. (2000: 
4) 
What is significant about Benjamin's conceptualization of the constellation is its 
emphasis on an arrangement of phenomena which avoids hierarchical ordering. The 
particular is never simply an example of a general rule. Phenomena instead become 
intelligible only in relation to other phenomena. The constellation allows seemingly 
incommensurable things to be placed alongside each other without reducing them to a 
relationship of equivalence. It makes visible the contradictory aspect of the real; 
introduced awkward material complexity into the smooth logic of any systematic 
organization. 
Constellations of phenomena, unlike stellar constellations, are always 
provisional. The elements are constantly rearranged until the moment when the image 
emerges. It introduces what Fredric Jameson refers to as a 'pseudo-totality'. He writes: 
Pseudo-totality: the illusion of the total system is aroused and encouraged by the 
systematic links and cross references established between a range of concepts, 
while the baleful spell if the system itself is then abruptly exorcised by the 
realization that the order of presentation is non-binding, that it might have been 
arranged in an utterly different fashion, so that, as in a divinatory cast, all the 
elements are present but the form of their juxtapositions, the shape of their 
falling out, is merely occasionaL This kind of Darstellung, which seeks 
specifically to undermine its own provisional architectonic, Benjamin called 
configuration or constellation ... (1990: 50) 
In Adorno's formulation in 1931, he favours the term 'historical image' over Benjamin's 
notion of the 'idea' (Buck-Morss 1977: 102). Historical image emphasizes both the 
contingent and the material quality of whatever might emerge from the constellation as 
well as the fact that the image itself is not intuitive or metaphysical but rather produced 
by human subjects through analysis. Adorno links the emergence of the constellation to 
the process of riddle-solving. In 'The Actuality of Philosophy', Adorno suggests that in 
a constellation those contradictions which precipitated or gave form to the riddle 
question have been illuminated in such a way as to liquidate the question, to make it 
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irrelevant. Adorno describes the process in these tenns: 
Just as riddle-solving is constituted in that the singular and dispersed elements of 
the question are brought into various groupings long enough for them to close 
together in a figure out of which the solution springs forth, while the question 
disappears - so philosophy has to bring its elements, which it receives from the 
sciences, into changing constellations, or to say it with less astrological and 
scientifically more current expression, into changing trial combinations, until 
they fall into a figure which can be read as an answer, while at the same time the 
question disappears. The task of philosophy is not to search for concealed and 
manifest intentions of reality, but to interpret unintentional reality, in that, by 
the power of constructing figures, or images, out of isolated elements of reality it 
negates questions, the exact articulation of which is the task of sciences, a task to 
which philosophy always remains bound, because its power of illumination is 
not able to catch fire otherwise than on these solid questions. (2000 [1931] : 32) 
According to Adorno, the task of philosophy is preeminently the task of interpretation. 
He contrasts this with the idea of research, which he argues; is the task of science. (2000 
[1931]: 31) The two are intertwined since, as he asserts in the extract quoted above, 
philosophy cannot separate itself from the materiality of life as it is presented to 
consciousness both through experience and through the fmdings of scientific research. 
What in science is regarded as a conclusion, becomes an element to be placed in relation 
to other elements, to be interpreted through the fonn of the constellation. What 
philosophy takes as its object, however, is not the discovery of the hidden 'intentions' 
of reality, the identification of a concealed meaning or order, but rather the analysis of 
overlooked moments of reality. Adorno refers to these unguarded moments as 
'unintentional reality. ' 
The phenomenal elements which make up the constellation are, Buck-Morss 
suggests, 'codes' or 'ciphers' of social reality, seemingly insignificant things like a 
popular song, fleeting events such as a concert and easily overlooked details such as 
certain fragments, images or metaphors in a philosophical text. In themselves, she 
explains, such phenomenal elements have no fixed value. They might be judged positive 
in one constellation, negative in another (1977: 99). They become meaningful/intelligible 
only in relation to the other elements in the constellation. 
In this thesis, to the codes or ciphers mentioned above I would add 
advertisements for cars, exhibitions, the bodies of film stars, the imagined lives of 
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certain animals, the historical development of roads, tourism, the human genome project, 
ecological movements, a concept of the human. These phenomena are some of the 
concrete elements which present themselves to an investigation of the figure of nature at 
the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century. They represent 
the fragments of 'unintentional reality' which brought into productive juxtaposition 
might allow a new image of nature to emerge. 
A constellation is perhaps best seen as an attempt to articulate something for 
which there is no communicative language. This is not because the phenomenon is, in 
principle, inexpressible but because it is, in practice, historically new and has not yet 
been brought within the traditions and forms of established discourse. Shierry Weber 
Nicholsen describes this well by saying that for Adorno: 
... a philosopher who wants to express a new truth a truth appropriate to the 
current historical moment - can neither express it directly in the old, inadequate 
words nor explain it by means of those words. Rather, as we saw, his only hope 
is to "place these words around the new truth in such a way that their 
configuration alone yields the new truth." And as we saw, this "configurative 
language" effectively altered the words used, creating a "unity of concept and 
thing that is dialectically intertwined and cannot be disentangled through 
explication." The kind of unity created is thus analogous to that in a work of art. 
(1997:91) 
A constellation or configuration, therefore, results in a particular kind of truth, one 
which it is not possible to express in another form. To understand fully the implications 
of this position, it is useful to consider Adorno's understanding of language as a 
complex object. 
Nicholsen suggests that: 
A central tenet of Adorno's implicit theory oflanguage is that language has two 
distinct but inseparable dimensions. One of these he refers to as the 
communicative dimension and the other as (among other terms) the poetic or 
expressive dimension. A second tenet of the implicit theory is that a historical 
process of deterioration has taken place in which the communicative dimension, 
through its involvement with social domination, the market, exchange and other 
processes loosely associated with the development of capitalism, has overrun or 
colonized the poetic dimension, so that for instance, in the twentieth century 
Borchardt is dealing with 'a language devastated by commerce and 
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communication, by the ignominy of exchange' (,Borchardt,' 194). (1997: 66Y9 
Communicative language, and the discursive explication that it favours, are for Adorno, 
fundamentally implicated in principles of commercial society. This is not to say that 
poetic or expressive language escapes this altogether but rather that it works against the 
processes of abstraction and 'identity-thinking' characteristic of the language under the 
spell of exchange. 
Alfred Sohn-Rethel, a contemporary of Adorno, Benjamin and Bloch, argues that the 
'commodity abstraction' has a direct relationship with the form of thought which 
emerges in societies based on the principle of exchange. It is not possible here to go into 
Sohn-Rethel's argument in depth but one point seems particular significant to an 
understanding of the constellation as a form which attempts to work against the 
'commodity structure' and its associated forms of thought. 30 
F or Marx the commodity abstraction is about the labour which is embodied in 
commodities and which determines their value. Sohn-Rethel approaches the question 
from a slightly different angle because he wants to examine the epistemological 
implications of Marx's argument. If, he asserts, we accept Marx's premise that social 
being determines consciousness, then the abstraction of thought can be argued to 
originate within society, with real human interactions. These, he suggests, are the 
interactions which take place in the acts of using and exchanging. In a society based on 
exchange, the act of exchanging interrupts use. It must be kept entirely separate from use 
and this separation 'has assumed the compelling necessity of an objective social law' 
(1978: 25). He writes: 
There, in the market-place and in shop-windows, things stand stilL They are 
under the speU of one activity only; to change owners. They stand there waiting 
to be sold. While they are there for exchange they are not for use. A commodity 
marked out at a definite price, for instance, is looked upon as being frozen to 
absolute immutability throughout the time during which its price remains 
unaltered. And the spell does not only bind the doings of man. Even nature 
29 Adorno discusses the work of Rudolf Borchardt ,a German poet and writer, in'Charmed Language: 
On the Poetry of Rudolf Borchard' (1992). Adorno is particulalrly fascinated by Borchardt's relation with 
language: 'In everything he wrote he made himself an organ oflanguage ... Language murmurs and rustIes 
through him like a stream' (Adorno 1992: 193). 
30 In the preface to his book, Sohn-Rethel remarks on his obssesive desire to unravel the relationship 
between the commodity structure and the 'transcendental subject'. He writes: 'Only a few isolated spirits, 
outsiders like myself, had kindred ideas in their mind, and none more sympathetically so than Adorno, 
who in his own manner was on the same track. We checked up on this together in 1936' (1978:xiii). 
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herself is supposed to abstain from any ravages in the body of the commodity 
and to hold her breath, as it were, for the sake of the social business of man. 
Evidently, even the aspect of non-human nature is affected by the banishment of 
use from the sphere of exchange. (1978: 25) 
What Sohn-Rethel describes here is the process of reification but the specific terms in 
which he does so are interesting. In a very concrete way objects described in this extract 
are arranged in a spatial relation to each other. In the market-place or shop they are in a 
particular configuration yet they are entirely isolated from each other. They can only 
enter into a relationship through the mediation of money. Through prices they enter a 
relationship of equivalence in which each object, however, materially different can stand 
in for another. For Sohn-Rethel, the act of exchange imposes a particular form on 
relations between people and things. It dominates not only the physical relationship but 
also the way in which things can be thought about. 
It is perhaps noteworthy that when Ferdinand de Saussure describes the 
structure of language in the early part of the twentieth century he uses money as an 
analogy. De Saussure argues that all systems of value involve both something dissimilar 
for which the coin or word might be exchanged, (an object or idea respectively) and 
something similar to which the coin or word might be compared (another coin or word). 
He writes of a word that: 'Its value is therefore not determined merely by the concept or 
meaning for which it is a token. It must also be assessed against comparable values, by 
contrast with other words. The content of a word is determined in the final analysis not 
by what it contains but by what exists outside it. As an element in a system, the word 
not only has meaning but also above all- a value' (de Saussure 1983: 114). 
F or de Saussure what is important is the systematic character of language For Adorno, 
in contrast, what both language and money do is hide the real incommensurability of 
objects. As systems each draw in only that portion of the object they can represent, and 
what is outside the system becomes invisible. 
The form of the constellation is about making visible, or perhaps more 
accurately, making intelligible, what cannot be represented by the system. As the 
quotation at the beginning of this introduction suggests it is concerned with that part of 
the object which 'to a classifYing procedure is either a matter of indifference or a 
burden.' It does this in a number of different ways which are best elaborated through a 
detailed discussion of a text, such as 'Man and Beast', which approaches its object using 
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the form of the constellation. In the exposition which follows both structural and 
thematic aspects will be examined so as to come to some understanding both of the 
workings of the constellation as a mode of analysis and of the particular relation 
between subject and object which, within Adorno's writing as a whole, the object of 
nature demands. 
'Man and Beast' 
Jameson argues that' ... if virtually alone among Western Marxists the Frankfurt school 
has a meditation on the domination of Nature and can be counted among the 
philosophical ancestors of the ecology movement, it also made its contribution to animal 
rights. The long note on 'Man and Animal' appended to Dialectic of Bnli ghtenment ... is 
surely one of the central 'constellations' of that work .. .' (1990: 96) The note 'Man and 
Beast' though centrally concerned with animals and their place in human society, does 
not closely resemble more conventional contributions to writing on animal rights. Its 
tone is polemical but its form prevents any simple movement from theoretical 
understanding to practice. Instead it is precisely the difficulty of praxis, the 
indissolubility of contradictions that emerges.3! Deliberately avoiding the 'objective' 
tone of discursive writing, it is nevertheless rigorously about the object. The structure is 
in flux so that there is no commanding and central authority which would situates the 
reader in relation to the text. Instead the elements shift in relation to each other as the 
text shifts, not aimlessly, but always with a specific end in view the discovery of an 
ethical and liveable position in relation to a world which at every turn appears to 
preclude such a possibility. 
At first reading 'Man and Beast' appears random and disorganized since it 
proceeds not by way of linear argument but through provocative or suggestive 
juxtaposition. In fact the text strenuously resists any attempt to systematise its various 
elements. However a close reading does reveal three main topics. Firstly, Horkheimer 
and Adorno address the question of 'the animal' in the Western philosophical tradition. 
Secondly, with no obvious causal link, they discuss the history of the association 
between woman and nature in Western thought. Thirdly and finally they look at 
elements of resistance, those moments when dominated nature is not entirely occluded 
31 In Marx, praxis is 'understood as transformative action on the world'. It is discussed in Marx's 
'Theses on F euerbach', which includes their urge to praxis in Thesis 11: 'Philosophers have only 
understood the world in various ways. The point is to change it' (Marx 1977:158). 
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but becomes visible in its broken form. What links the diverse elements both within each 
topic and across topics is less thematic content than a mode of analysis in which familiar 
and apparently insignificant objects become illuminated by their relations with others. 
'Man and Beast' begins with an antithesis, one of the founding oppositions of 
Western thought - the definition of human through its opposition to animal. Yet its 
object is not to resolves this antithesis. Instead it leads the reader through a number of 
elaborations on this theme, a number of propositions and reversals until it reaches a 
point where the initial opposition is no longer relevant, where its founding logic can no 
longer exert a controlling influence and limit the possibilities of thought. 
The relation between 'man' and 'beast' is, in the initial opposition, an 
abstract one. It concerns the defmition of categories through their relation to other 
categories. But as the section quickly makes clear such categories can never free 
themselves entirely from the particulars which they claim to subsume. Instead at each 
point the particular returns to trouble the clarity or definition of the concept, pushing it 
in different directions. The concrete elements are arranged and rearranged so that each 
figuration demands a new perspective, a new mode of looking or apprehending. 
The first set of concrete elements introduced to trouble the manlbeast 
opposition are those surrounding behaviourism, not because behaviourism itself rejects 
that opposition but because it appears to do so. The claim of behaviourism, that both 
people and animals can be brought to react mechanically to stimuli, apparently nullifies 
the opposition between 'man' and 'beast,' drawing both into a subordinate relation with 
what is outside, the stimuli which through repetition and reward produce a particular 
result. In the text, Horkheimer and Adorno here shift away from abstract categories. In 
their narrative man and beast at this point enter into a concrete relation to each other in 
the space of the laboratory. The laboratory is one moment of confrontation, one 
location in which abstract categories find themselves in actual and literal opposition. The 
'expert' and the 'bound victim' confronting each other in the space of the laboratory, 
Horkheimer and Adorno suggest, produces only a relation of mutilation and violence. 
Furthermore, they argue, the knowledge generated in this particular engagement can 
only ever reflect the conditions of its production. Expert and victim come to resemble 
each other, both conditioned by the form of experiment into 'mechanical, blind, 
automatic' gestures. But the expert performs these acts voluntarily, while the animal can 
only respond to what is acted upon it since its one true impulse which would be to 
31 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
flight is prevented. 
What becomes invisible, Horkheimer and Adorno argue, is 'the actual life of 
animals' who exist outside the various paths of human reason. What this might be 
remains enigmatic but at least in this first elaboration, it is contrasted to the lives of 
humans who in their domination of nature have inadvertently divided themselves from 
any such experience. It is certainly not something which can be made available to 
consciousness through psychology, despite the fact that psychology takes human life as 
its domain. As a mode of explanation, human psychology is described in 'Man and 
Beast' as either 'impertinent' when applied to others or 'sentimental' when applied to 
oneself. These terms refer psychology back to a relationship between people; they are 
words which draw into the field social judgments and the specificity of actual 
interrelationships. 'Impertinent' in particular acts rhetorically to reduce psychology's 
claim to authoritative, scientific knowledge, suggesting the incongruity of supposing the 
other to be open, explicable, without any private or hidden life at all. 
If human psychology in this formulation can only explain human behaviour once 
they have already been reduced to objects, 'animal psychology, meanwhile, has lost 
sight of its object; engrossed with the chicanery of its traps and labyrinths, it has 
forgotten that to speak of and acknowledge a psyche or soul (Seele) is appropriate 
precisely and only in the case of animals' (2002: 204). This controversial claim becomes 
explicable if we refer to an older inflection of the term 'soul' which refers not to 
something which survives life but instead to the quality of being truly alive, of 'animate 
existence.' This is precisely what is lost in humans living under conditions of modernity 
who no longer have access to this sort of being. Ontology, Adorno argues elsewhere, 
becomes irrelevant, when humans no longer have the power of thought to grasp the 
totality of the real, when existent being is no longer accessible (2000 [1931]: 111). 
Yet the next paragraph makes clear that this is no simple celebration of 
unreason and the unthought life against the alienation of a reasoned one. If on the one 
hand animal life is the life of the soul, truly animate life which is lost to humans in the 
deforming context of commercial society and something to which humans might wish to 
aspire, on the other, it is insubstantial and 'dreary' because animal's lack concepts and 
language. Horkheimer and Adorno at this point describe the relation between 'man' and 
'beast' as it is articulated in a Walter Benjamin in 'On Language as such and on the 
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Language ofMan.,32 In the tradition Benjamin describes, the muteness of nature is 
initally a blissful one and the relation between people and animals is one defined by the 
act of naming. After the fall, however, something happens to language. It no longer has 
the power to name things. Walter Benjamin describes the process in these terms: 
After the fall, which, in making language mediate, laid the foundation for its 
multiplicity, it could be only a step to linguistic confusion. Since men had injured 
the purity of name, the turning away from that contemplation of things in which 
their language passes into man needed only to be completed in order to deprive 
men ofthe common foundation of an already shaken language-mind. (1978: 328) 
It is in the context of this reduced language that the muteness of nature becomes 
something painfuL Benjamin writes that: 'Now begins its [nature's] other muteness, 
which we mean by the deep sadness of nature. It is a metaphysical truth that all nature 
would begin to lament if it were endowed with language' (1978: 329). This 
representation of animal's relation with language is included in 'Man and Beast' without 
comment but it placement in relation to the previous and following paragraphs and the 
very structure of the exposition mean that it enters the narrative in a particular way. In 
this context it is enigmatic and this very quality requires the reader to regard it critically. 
One of the reasons why this is the most puzzling section of the constellation 
is that it contains almost no concrete elements. The discussion of animals and their 
relationship with language and time remains almost entirely at the level of generalities. 
The blankness of the animal's world viewed from this perspective is mirrored in the 
blankness of the text itself which is also without specificity. The text speaks with a 
strange authority of the experiential life of animals without providing any reason beyond 
the absence of the concept for these conclusion. To say of animals, 'to escape the 
gnawing emptiness of existence some resistance is needed, and its backbone is language,' 
appears as a direct contradiction to the previous comment about the the lives of animals 
as animate existence. (2002: 205) Auimals appear to be located in an existential 
emptiness, which suggests not simply that they are without language but rather that 
language has been lost to them. Their muteness is not 'natural' but indicates instead that 
the power of expression has been taken from them. 
The referent of the term 'animal' here appears strangely opaque. Does it 
32 For a critical discussion of Benjamin's essay see Jacques Derrida (2002) the whole essay but 
particularly 387-389. 
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refer to domestic animals as opposed to wild animals, or to all animals in which case, 
and perhaps most importantly, does it include humans, or at least obliquely gesture 
toward the conditions of human animals who have in modem society lost the power of 
expression. 
In this opposition between language and silence or speech and muteness, 
muteness is associated with an almost uncanny horror. Transformation into an animal, 
in the realm of fairy tales, is Horkheimer and Adorno argue, a 'recurring punishment' 
(2002: 05). They write: 'every animal recalls to them (humans) an immense misfortune 
which took place in primeval times.' Once again the operation of memory predominates. 
Animals act as reminders, bring back into consciousness something which has been 
forgotten. Its proximity to the previous comment about language suggests a connection ~ 
that animals stand in for a kind of amnesia, the forgetting of language and reason, which 
in tum makes them into blank forms for humans to act on and interpret according to 
their own 'pitiless paths' of reason. Or is it humans themselves who have suffered this 
fate alongside the animals whom they sought to dominate? 
The essay at this point makes an interesting shifts away from the life of 
animals to the position of women in Western civilization. The pivot which links these 
two elements is domesticity, the household which at least at one time included the 
unreasoning animal. Women, Horkheimer and Adorno argue, excluded from the realm of 
production, occupy an significant position in the relation between man and beast. In 
fact, the 'man' of man and beast turns out in this new configuration not to be the 
genderless representative of humanity but the gendered representative ofa patriarchal 
order. 
The following three paragraphs outline by now familiar arguments about the 
complex power dynamic at work in woman's association with nature, yet they do so 
with an interesting inflection. Written in the 1940s, they represent an early elaboration 
on what was to become a central theme of feminism's critique of patriarchy in the 
1970s and 1980s. 33 
The first of these paragraphs focusses on the church and the suppression of 
the matriarchal or mimetic stage of development, the second looks the dynamics of 
woman's association with nature in bourgeois culture. Horkheimer and Adorno here 
33 See for instance another reflection on the process of naming in Denise Riley's Am I That Name 
(1988) which describes the history of feminism and its resistance to the processes through which women 
come to be named as 'women.' .. 
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draw on a category from Freud to interpret the historical development of the notion of a 
particularly 'feminine' virtue and modesty. A 'reaction-formation' is a defensive 
procedure (usually associated with obsessional neurosis) in which a disturbing, 
instinctual element instead of being repressed is allowed to be present but only in a 
distorted form.34 The disturbing element appears as the over investment of energy in its 
opposite. This whole paragraph is concerned in some way or other with these sorts of 
formations, with a series of reflections and masks in which what is mirrored back is 
always a distortion of the object. Woman's defeat appears as spontaneous submission; 
her 'violated heart' as 'the loving breast'. The violence of the suppression of woman and 
nature, their existence in 'broken form', is masked by the forms through which they are 
represented. Art, morality, sublime love provide 'the gift of speech', but what has been 
excluded can only return in a distorted form, as its opposite. The expressive image at the 
centre of this section is that of the serpent: 'beauty is the serpent which displays the 
wound where once the fang was implanted' (2002: 207). 
What becomes clear is that for Horkheimer and Adorno, nature itself cannot be 
represented. It can only be referred to obliquely through making visible what has 
happened to it - its mutilation. The serpent is an interesting image because of its place 
in religious history - its role in that moment of intimate and fateful communication 
between woman and beast. Showing its wound, it shows not only nature defused but 
also perhaps its own punishment for being a talking animal. 
Broken nature, Horkheimer and Adorno argue, is concealed in the planned 
cultivation of beauty. In consumer society, one form this takes is the rational subjection 
of the body, particularly but not exclusively, the woman's body to a regime of skin care 
and hygiene. Significant concrete elements here are lipstick and powder which seem to 
take on a life of their own. The products themselves act, 'rejecting their origin among 
courtesans', to enter the flattened world of universal advertising where all things enter 
into a relation of equivalence, of commensurability. Things move and in their movement 
not only seem more life like than those who use them, but also shift their meaning. From 
being signs of autonomous sexuality, powder and lipstick become signs of assimilation 
into patriarchal culture and even the meaning of sexuality itself shifts so that both 
34 The entry in Laplance and Pontalis describe 'reaction formation as follows: 'Psychological attitude or 
habitus diametrically opposed to a repressed wish, and constituted against it. ... From a clinical point of 
view, reaction-formations take on a symptomatic value when they display a rigid, forced or compulsive 
aspect, when they happen to fail in their purpose or when - occasionally they lead directly to the result 
opposite to the one consciously intended (1973: 376-377). 
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modesty and promiscuity become at different historical moments demonstrations of a 
'subordination to the dominant reason' (2002: 207). 
If this paragraph is dominated by a sense that 'nothing can escape', in the 
following one elements of resistance emerge. These are in no way outside the 
administered world but through their refusal of or inability to enter into its consolations, 
they act against it and bear its distortions visibly. The fIrst is, signifIcantly, a kind of 
woman named after an animal, 'the shrew'. 
Horkheimer and Adorno comment that: 'the oppressed woman as Fury has 
outlived her time, continuing to display the grimace of mutilated nature in an age when 
domination is molding the well-trained bodies of both sexes, in whose uniformity the 
grimace has been effaced. Against the background of such mass production, the scolding 
ofthe shrew, who at least retained her own distinguishing face, becomes a sign of 
humanity, her ugliness a trace of spirit.' (2002: 208) The grimace, the furrowed brow, 
the face marked by experience, is of particular signifIcance for Adorno. It is what is 
effaced as commercial interests work to assimilated the human body completely into 
consumer societ)?5 . 
For Horkheimer and Adorno, although the shrew reflects a trace of life, she 
cannot fInd a direction for her resistance but is drawn instead to the occult, to 'rackets, 
sects and hobbies.' Although she expresses a legitimate anger, the paths open to her 
dissipate the force of the resistance channeling it into institutionalized morality, 'good 
works' and the irrational. In the place of the animal protection league, exemplary 
domain of good works, Horkheimer and Adorno place the Pekinese: 
whose distorted visage, now as in early paintings, remind us of the physiognomy 
of the court jester left behind by progress. Like the hunchback's ungainly leaps, 
the little dog's features still represent mutilated nature, while mass industry and 
mass culture have learned to prepare the bodies of breeding bulls and humans 
according to scientifIc method. (2002: 208) 
The body of the Pekinese represents broken nature, the intersection between nature and 
history. It is a body marked by centuries of selective breeding but it differs from the 
35 In Minima Moralia ,Adorno returns to the idea of the moulded human body. The expressive body is 
lost. Health becomes possible because ill-health with which the body indicated its discomfort, its failure 
to adapt, has been prevented. He writes: 'the inner health of our times has been secured by blocking the 
flight into illness without in the slightest altering its aetiology' (1978:59). Adorno's position, and 
suppression of the body in consumer society more generally, is discussed in detail in Chapter four of this 
thesis. 
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moulded body of late twentieth century people and animals not only because it is not a 
product of 'scientific method' but also because the it is marked by a different historical 
context. The form of the dog is decorative not efficient, part of an older tradition of 
contact between man and beast, centered in this case around the Chinese court as far 
back as the eighth century. The animal, like the court jester, reflects back a different 
relationship with nature, one in which it is not entirely subjugated. The Pekinese is a 
manifestations of distorted nature which, like the shrewish woman, does not fit 
comfortably into the standardized form of consumer society. If by the end of the 
twentieth century, in the world of breed shows, the Pekinese has been thoroughly 
transformed into product, this does not entirely efface its origins in an entirely different 
context, the historical residue it carries although in another constellation (one concerned, 
for instance, with breeds, industry and display) it might indicate something completely 
different. 
The second last paragraph deals most directly with contemporary conditions 
and brings a new set of elements into play. One of these elements is the culture 
industry itself and its effects on the possibility of expression. Language, Horkheimer 
and Adorno argue, is being reduced to its purely communicative function: 
In this society there is no longer any sphere in which domination can profess its 
contradictions, as it does in art; there is no longer any means of duplication by 
which the distortions might be expressed. But in earlier times such expression 
was called not only beauty but thought, intellect, language itself. Today language 
calculates, designates, betrays, initiates death; it does not express. (2002: 209) 
This description of the flattening of art into the mass produced images of the culture 
industry leads to the next element which is the notion of adaption. In a sense this is a 
continuation of the earlier point about the conditioning of the human body only this 
time its is human behaviour which is at stake. The film star, described as an 'expert,' 
becomes the embodiment of what appears as natural behaviour, the model of what 
gestures might animate the moulded and preconditioned body. Adaption indicates 
modification to particular conditions; the conditions in the particular case described here 
are those of fascism and the gestures are all those to do with domination and submission. 
The reference to 'earlier times,' a phrase which occurs relatively frequently as 
a contrast to contemporary conditions, is a significant part of Horkheimer and Adorno's 
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understanding of the present. Its lack of specificity suggests less a nostalgic view of a 
historical period free of domination but rather that, at least in once sense, the progress of 
domination had been incremental and that the present represents a state of extreme or 
crisis. What was different about 'earlier times' was that domination was localized; it 
extended over a particular domain. Beyond the boundaries of state or feudal manor or 
city was a space which escaped or was simply neglected by domination, and even 
within those limits, the body of the subject was only ever partially controlled. 
Domination resulted in painful distortions but those distortions were visible and in them 
the contradictory and precarious nature of domination was revealed. 
In the contemporary world, Horkheimer and Adorno argue, the spaces which 
escape or are neglected by domination are disappearing. In the context of fascism, whose 
project is total control, what is distinctively human, our relation with animals, our 
'animate existence,' becomes precisely that which is regarded with horror: 'The 
distinctive human face, which humiliatingly recalls our origins in nature and our 
enslavement to it, irresistibly invites expert homicide. The caricature of the Jew has 
always relied on this, and even Goethe's aversion to apes marked out the limit of his 
humanity' (2002: 210). To become specialists in death is to appear to exert control over 
it; to reduce it to a matter of technological and administrative expertise. 
The final paragraph perhaps most directly addresses the question of praxis, 
of adopting a position from which to articulate a concern for animals when certain 
oppositions appear already immutably established. On one side the support of Goring, 
racism and the fascist folk-lore lovers, on the other, behaviourism and vivesection. Like 
the shrew, the intellectual who wishes to avoid these choices, is in danger of being 
diverted into sects and petty rackets, utopian, anarchist or spiritualist. Perhaps at the 
centre of this section is the claim, presented as incontestable fact, that 'the real is 
rational. ,36 Both in its form, the uncompromising assertion of identity and in its content, 
this declaration perhaps represents for Horkheimer and Adorno most completely, the 
shuttting down of thought which characterises the administered world, the exclusion of 
36 The source of the phrase is Hegel's Elements of the Philosophy of Right, though the standard 
translation differs. Hegel writes: 'What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational' (1991: 20). For 
useful comments see Allen Wood, 'Editor's Introduction' in Hegel (1991: viii-ix). 
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the possibility of contradiction.37 
Conclusion 
The final sentences of 'Man and Beast' attempt to articulate precisely what is lost by 
formulations such as that one quoted above, «the real is rational '), which insist on the 
reduction of things to a single identity: 
Nature in itself is neither good, as was believed by the old Romanticism, nor 
noble, as is believed by the new. As a model and goal it signifies anti-
intellectualism, lies, bestiality; only when apprehended as knowledge does it 
become the urge of the living towards peace, the consciousness which, from the 
beginning, has inspired the unerring resistance to Fuhrer and collective. What 
threatens the prevailing praxis and its inescapable alternatives is not nature, with 
which that practice coincides but the remembrance of nature. (2002: 211-212) 
As a conclusion these final sentences both fulfil and fail to fulfil the function of closure. 
They begin with a form which suggests summing up and final clarification, 'Nature, in 
itself, is ... ' but the definitions are only negative, what nature is not. In the place of 
identity, Horkheimer and Adorno leave the reader with a remembrance. The word 
remembrance suggests something more active than memory, more implicated in the 
present. It includes both the act of recalling and the object as reminder. 
Throughout 'Man and Beast' things move in and out of memory, in and out of 
visibility as each arrangement of concrete elements either clarifies or blurs the emerging 
image. The series of oppositions with which the section begins - man and beast, reason 
and unreason, mechanical object and animate life, language and silence, man and woman 
form a series of overlapping and sliding definitions which cannot be mapped onto each 
other. Instead each one partially overlays the previous one so that the similar and 
diverging lines start to form something entirely different. 
In a discussion about Benjamin and the working of memory in Proust, J.M. 
Bernstein suggests a distinction between 'factual remembering' and 'involuntary 
memory' (2001: 119). While factual remembering involves, he asserts, a fixing of the 
past in the past, involuntary memory bring the past back into the present. In The 
37 Varadharajan writes that: 'The irreconcilability of concepts and reality enables one to penetrate the 
reified appearance of reality while questioning the adequacy of concepts which capture reality. the real 
cannot coinincide with the rational in thought unless an objective reconciliation of social contradictions 
can be foreseen. The principle of non-identity reveals itself in the process of thinking that enacts what 
Adorno calls a "logic of disintegration'" (1995: 62). 
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Remembrance of Things Past, the taste of the madelaine 'becomes a promise (and site) 
of happiness' (Bernstein 2001: 120) in which the past, in the form of memories of 
childhood, intrudes to touch with life an otherwise alienated existence. Perhaps the 
remembrance of nature operates in a similar way. What Horkheimer and Adorno reveal 
in 'Man and Beast' is precisely the impossibility of experiencing nature in its 
immediacy. Instead, they suggest, it can only be 'apprehended as knowledge.' This 
formulation, I would suggest, refers not to knowledge of nature as system but rather 
nature mediated by thought, specifically mediated by the kind of thought presupposed 
by the constellation. Bernstein writes: 'Only the 'shock' of the fragment which breaks 
the uninterrupted flow of lived instants can synthetically produce the experience of the 
loss of experience' (2001: 120). Although this ending leaves the question of praxis open, 
it does suggest that any realization of the utopian potential of nature needs to recognise 
that broken nature cannot simply be made whole again. The involuntary memory or 
remembrance of nature brings back to mind the memory of a different relation between 
subject and object and so makes possible a recognition of the limits of human 
instrumental rationality, and the conceptualization, however tenuous or threadbare, of 
what might be outside the totalizing effects of the administered world. 
Of course it may be as with so many acts of remembrance that they come 
into focus only at the edge of disappearance as the memory image comes to replace the 
things remembered. It is the deepening dynamics of this disappearance of nature that I 
will be exploring further in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
The End of Nature 
Paysage - The shortcoming of the American landscape is not so much, as 
romantic illusion would have it, the absence of historical memories, as that it 
bears no traces of the human hand. This applies not only to the lack of arable 
land, the uncultivated woods often no higher than scrub, but above all to the 
roads. These are always inserted directly in the landscape, and the more 
impressively smooth and broad they are, the more unrelated and violent their 
gleaming track appears against its wild, overgrown surroundings. They are 
expressionless. Just as they know no marks of foot or wheel, no soft path along 
their edges as a transition to vegetation, no trails leading off into the valleys, so 
they are without the mild, soothing, un-angular quality of things that have felt 
the touch of hands or their immediate implements. It is as if no-one has ever 
passed their hand over the landscape's hair. It is uncomforted and comfortless. 
And it is perceived in a corresponding way. For what the hurrying eye has seen 
merely from the car it cannot retain, and the vanishing landscape leaves no more 
traces behind than it bears upon itself. (Adorno 1978: 48) 
In the introduction I suggested that emerging global culture formulates its anxiety about 
the possibility of life at the tum of the twenty-first century in terms of a crisis in the 
continued existence of nature. The phenomenon I am calling 'the end of nature' 
encompasses a number of complex and contradictory elements, both the material 
destruction of nature, its preservation and commodification in managed units and its 
centrality as a sign of what might constitute the outside, a positive value against which 
to measure life in consumer culture. 
In this chapter I will discuss how these contradictions are manifested in people's 
relationship with external nature. The first part of this chapter, 'Traces of the Human 
Hand,' takes the car as its central point of reference since in the material transformation 
of the landscape it holds such a pivotal position. The car and the infrastructure it 
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demands rearranges the social life of people: on the one hand creating the blank, 
uninhabitable spaces of highways and industrial parks and on the other offering the 
means to escape them into a newly accessible and carefully-preserved nature.38 The car 
generates new relationships with space and over time contributes to the processes which 
result in global wanning. It is a significant factor in the universalization of damage which 
means that such an escape may already no longer be possible. 
This chapter discusses Bill McKibben's anxious vision of 'the end of nature; a 
world in which no place is free of traces of human activity, and compares it with 
William Morris' socialist utopia one hundred years earlier in which worked nature is 
imagined as the defining ground of an egalitarian and rational society. Morris' utopia 
provides an interesting point of comparison both because of his rigorous exclusion of 
technologies which separate people from a sensuous engagement with the world and 
because of his insistence on the value of the worked object and the worked landscape, in 
which traces of the human hand are visible. 
The first part of this chapter looks at a concrete object and the way it acts as a 
link in the various related processes which contribute to the phenomenon I am calling 
the end of nature; the second part traces the history of the relationship between subject 
and object at a more theoretical level. It examines the process of reduction that takes 
place, the stripping away that is necessary to prepare an object for scientific scrutiny 
and the subtle way in which the concept of nature comes to conceal the nakedness and 
the incompleteness of the scientific object and enables its return to the realm of 
experience. 
TRACES OF THE HUMAN HAND 
A World of Things 
Theodor Adorno wrote the extract quoted at the start of this chapter while in exile in 
California. I can imagine him comparing the European landscape with the American 
landscape and refusing the popular interpretation of the difference: the colonial land as a 
3 S See Jane Jacobs 'Erosion of Cities or Attrition of Automobiles'; 'Jane Holtz Kay 'The Asphalt 
Exodus' and Christopher Pinney 'Automonster' all in Wollen (2002). 
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land without history.39 Adorno is struck nevertheless by a real difference, the absence of 
what he describes as 'traces of the human hand or its immediate implement'. The road 
has a long history in human society but the kind of road described here has a particular 
connection to the damaged life Adorno was reflecting upon. 
The project of modernization, with its emphasis on mobility and the breakdown 
of parochial concerns and traditional, settled lifestyles celebrated the road as a means of 
breaking down the barrier of distance, of extending horizons and making everywhere 
accessible. The kind of road that enables this sort of transformation is, of course, not the 
country lane or even the city street. It is the variously named expressway, highway or 
freeway that makes previously unimaginable connections between places possible.40 The 
development of this type of road is linked not so much to the invention of the car in 
the early part of the century as to its increasingly widespread distribution during and 
after the Second World War. Adorno's comments on American roads predate the vast 
Federal Highway Programme which transformed the American landscape in the 1950s, 
but they appear curiously prescient. 
Roads and cars are significant to the discussion of people's relationship with 
external nature for two reasons. Firstly because cars and the infrastructure they generate 
constitute such a significant and lasting transformation of people's experience of their 
environment. In a very direct and immediate way they rearrange not only physical 
landscapes but also the ways in which people can occupy space. Cultural critic, Peter 
Wollen, argues that the car has fundamentally transformed everyday life through a 
'proliferation of side effects - roads and associated construction work, parking lots and 
structures, rising oil prices, geopolitical rivalries, broad-ranging environmental issues, 
industrial manufacturing, life-styles, marketing, population movements, congestion, the 
growth of suburbia, increased levels of travel and tourism, patterns of crime, the 
epidemiology of violence and death' (2002: 11). The car and its side-effects not only 
39 Thomas Cole in 'Essay on American Scenery' comments on this attitude towards the American 
landscape. 'There are those who through ignorance and prejudice strive to maintain that American scenery 
possesses little that is interesting or truly beautiful - that it is rude without picturesqueness, and 
monotonous without sublimity - that being destitute of those vestiges of antiquity, whose associations 
so strongly affect the mind, it may not be compared to the European scenery.' in Harrison, C., Wood, P. 
& Gaiger, 1., (1998: 136). 
40 In describing the changes brought about to New York by Robert Moses, Marshall Berman suggests 
that: ' ... Moses' great constructions [of expressways] in and around New York in the 1920s and 30s 
served as a rehearsal for the infinitely greater reconstruction of the whole fabric of America after World 
war Two. The motive force in this reconstruction were the multibillion-dollar Federal Highway 
Programme and the vast suburban housing initiative of the Federal Housing Administration. This new 
order integrated the whole nation into a unified flow whose lifeblood was the automobile' (1982: 307.). 
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create the shape the world in the second half of the twentieth century, but also 
influences the possible ways in which it might be experienced. 
Secondly, more covertly, cars signify the inextricable implication of most 
societies, particularly in industrialized but also in developing countries, in a lifestyle 
based on fossil fuels and contribute directly to what McKibben argues is the most 
significant indicator of 'the end of nature,' the transformation of the world through 
global warming. 
The car leaves a particular sort of trace on the external world. Through its side 
effects, it draws the lines which describe the specific forms of human habitation and 
social organisation of the second half of the twentieth century and beyond. The first 
part ofthis chapter explores the paradoxical ways in which these lines extend and curtail 
people's relationship with external nature, both allowing people access to previously 
remote 'wilderness' areas and at the same time transforming the experience of nature 
into one of structured consumption. I discuss the way in which McKibben formulates 
his claims about the 'end of nature' and how his formulation relates to the wider unease 
about the manner in which more and more of external nature appears to be drawn under 
human control and management. 
The practical management of nature, its insertion into the economic, social and 
political networks of the emerging global culture, involves, almost exclusively, a 
particular kind of knowledge that developed within the paradigm of Western science. 
In the second part of this chapter I discuss some of the ways in which the concept of 
nature as object of science emerged and the peculiar power this concept has had to 
displace other ways of thinking about the external world. Like cars, such forms of 
abstract thought extend people's abilities to control their enviromnent. Yet both cars and 
the science that enables such technological developments involve a reduction in the 
relations between subject and object, an exclusion of a range of other possible modes of 
engagement. In the second half of the twentieth century, science confronts human 
subjects with an increasingly abstract nature, the contours of which are less and less 
possible to grasp. Nature as an object of science disappears into the proliferating and 
increasingly specialized branches of knowledge which characterise post-modem 
scientific investigation.41 
4' For an interesting discussion of the relation between alienation, the division of labour, and the 
associated divisions between knowledges in see Peter Dicken (1996). 
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In his reflection on American roads, Adorno notes the abstract quality of their 
relationship with the landscape. There are no paths, no marks of foot or wheel, things 
which might interrupt the blankness of the road's surface and situate it in the space it 
occupies. It is almost as if the road itself is merely passing through the landscape like 
the cars which travel on it. Although roads are a human construction, they are built by 
machines and designed to accommodate machines not people. The road constructs a 
landscape which is empty not only of people but even of traces of human use and 
human care. 
Alexander Wilson, an American theorist of the environment, describes the 
immense expansion of road networks in the 1950s as cars became the dominant form of 
transport for most Americans. 'Before the car', Wilson notes, 'most roads took care of 
all manner of traffic. But once the car was in general use, traffic had to be functionally 
separated: trucks and cars from pedestrians and bicycles, local and feeder traffic from 
intercity travel (1992: 29). The right of uninterrupted mobility that the car comes to 
represent takes precedence over earlier rights of way so that pedestrians, bicycles and 
other forms of transport have to give way. They have no place in the logic of the 
freeway. 
The road passing through the uncultivated land represents for Adorno a space 
of extreme discomfort, an expression of the violence of modern life which in its rational 
reorganising of the landscape constructs spaces which people can only occupy 
fleetingly. The violence done to the land by running a road through it as if it were only a 
blank space to be passed through, meaningless in itself, is equalled by the violence done 
to the viewers, who separated by speed and glass from the world outside, find in 
themselves a corresponding blankness. 
Adorno's concern with roads and their place in the American landscape is central 
to the project which he undertakes in Minima Moralia to redirect the attention of 
philosophical investigation to what, he suggests, was in the past its true field: 'the 
teaching of the good life' (1978:15). The neglect of this area of study has to do, he 
explains, with the form life takes in contemporary society. Life, he maintains, has been 
reduced to involvement in the practices of consumption. To understand the 
deformations this imposes, he argues, it is necessary to reflect upon those minute 
details of everyday experience that give form to contemporary life. He writes: 'He who 
wishes to know the truth about life in its immediacy must scrutinize it in its estranged 
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form, the objective powers that determine individual existence even in its most hidden 
recesses' (1978: 15). 
Although the objects of scrutiny here are the 'objective powers', in a sense it is 
the 'hidden recesses' that seem to engage Adorno's attention most thoroughly. He 
explores the neglected and incomprehensible details of everyday life which form the 
surface of day-to-day interactions: the complexities of things like roads, marriage, 
homelessness, gifts, lying and technology, to mention just a few. Adorno's comments on 
technology articulate some of his concerns about living in a world dominated by things: 
'Do not knock. - Technology is making gestures precise and brutal, and with them, men. 
It expels from movements all hesitations, deliberations, civility. It subjects them to the 
implacable, as it were, ahistorical demands of objects' (1978:40). The utter 
transformation of the texture of life in the developed world after the Second World War 
had a lot to do with technological developments, with the entrance of technical devices 
of all kinds into private homes. Historian Eric Hobsbawm (1994) has noted the total 
reformation of the conditions of living brought about by 'plastics' (developed in the 
inter-war period), radios, televisions, synthetic furnishings, commercially produced 
food, domestic electronics and labour saving devices.42 The Golden Age of economic 
prosperity experienced by the developed capitalist countries in the decades following 
the war, he suggests, was fueled in part by technological revolution, by the fascination 
of consumers with technological novelty. 
The new technologies were,' he writes, 'overwhelmingly, capital intensive and 
(except for highly skilled scientists and technicians) labour-saving, or even labour 
replacing. The major characteristics of the Golden Age was that it needed 
constant and heavy investment and, increasingly, that it didn't need people, 
except as consumers (Hobsbawm 1994: 266). 
For Adorno, things, entering into the substance of everyday living, transform 
human communities. They change people's experience of the world at a visceral level, 
adjusting the movements of the body so that the simple acts of opening doors or 
windows, impose a particular interaction with the world. He writes: 
The new human type cannot be properly understood without an awareness of 
what he is continuously exposed to from the world of things about him, even in 
42 See Hobsbawm (1994: 263-268). 
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his most secret innervations. What does it mean for the subject that there are no 
more casement windows to open, but only sliding frames to shove, no gentle 
latches but turnable handles, no forecourt, no doorstep before the street, no wall 
about the garden? And what driver is not tempted , merely by the power of the 
engine, to wipe out the vermin of the street, pedestrians, children and cyclists? 
(Adorno 1978:40). 
The spaces created by a world dominated by a particular type of object, one directed 
entirely towards a specific purpose, are not spaces that promote human communality. 
Civility and the rituals of human engagement, which include 'deliberation' and 
'hesitation' are lost to pure functionality. 
An industrial society, motivated by principles of profit and expansion, creates 
uncomfortable spaces and reduces the habitability of the world.4l This thesis is an 
exploration of some of the dimensions of that discomfort. Discomfort is an experience 
of the body, although it is usually the effect of thought, as well as of physical spaces. 
The subject occupying space feels herself not to occupy that space easi Iy, as if there is 
something difficult in the relationship, in the condition of being in a particular place and 
time. It is in the context of this discomfort, I argue, that the concept of nature become 
charged with a peculiar intensity. Nature, not as a definite object, but rather as a sort of 
wild card, enters as a sign of what is already almost inconceivable - what might be 
outside the system. 
In the comment on technology quoted above, Adorno makes a significant 
rhetorical move. He invites the reader to identify with the experience of the driver, 
(' ... what driver has not...'), frustrated by the remnants of a different ordering of space, 
the slow moving pedestrian, children and cyclists. Yet at the same time this draws 
attention to the fact that the experience of technology is differential. Not everyone 
experiences technology in the same way, and while the driver is intoxicated by the 
power of the engine as an extension of his or her body, the pedestrians, chi Idren and 
cyclists can experience this power as violence. It contains within it a negation of their 
subjectivity, a continuing and in some places frequently realized threat to their ability to 
occupy space at all. 
n This is not to argue that all pre-industrial societies generated comfortable, habitable conditions for all 
of their members. Only that different less deforming or alienated modes of engagement with external 
nature were sometimes possible. It is the loss of this sense of possibility, of a place outside the 
'administered world' that is, I suggest, what chacterises culture at the end of nature. 
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The act of driving implicates the driver in these particular relationships of power even if 
he or she does not give in to the demands and pleasure associated with the exercise of 
power and annihilate all those who occupy the space of modernity in a different way. 
Approximately half a century after Adorno was writing, the dis-ease he 
articulates is expressed slightly differently. If we are no longer concerned about the loss 
of doorsteps, it is because the environmental movement is suggesting that the 
habitability of the world is being threatened on a much grander scale. Although the 
extent of the damage remains a subject of controversy, the sense of unease is 
unmistakable. 
In this context, the sweeping use of the word nature or natural in the world of 
advertising attached to almost any product appears symptomatic. It suggests an 
anxious litany for something that is no longer accessible, a lack which generates desire. 
It is as if nature attaches value to products, as if what has been lost can be regained 
through the acquistion of commodities. The popularity of 4x4s (Sports Utility Vehicles) 
emerges at a time when the roads in most countries where people can afford such luxury 
vehicles have been tarred and most 4x4's never leave the city. Spaces where such cars 
might be useful are also rapidly diminishing. The new fragile nature cannot resist the 
destructive effects of the tyres. Instead it is almost as if the cars come to replace what 
has been lost. They come to stand in for a different way of life, a different relationship 
with the world, and act as potent signs of the rugged terrain which is no longer part of 
everyday life except in the world of advertising. The position of the 4x4 as an icon of 
nature is particularly ironic given the role of the car in the modem environmental crisis. 
Although in the twenty-first century, the internal combustion engine is old technology, 
the car, as I suggested earlier, still dominates the physical landscape, still forms one of 
the major industries world wide and dictates the texture of modern life. 
For Adorno, what is missing from the American landscape is traces of the human 
hand; for McKibben, writing fifty years later, traces of the human hand can only be 
found in nostalgic reconstructions of the past. Compared to the destructive traces of 
industrial technology, they are merely reminders of a now inconceivable way of life. 
These two readings of the American landscape reflect not only the massive 
transformation of the land itself. They also constitute two substantially different ways 
of conceptualizing nature and its relation to the human world. In this chapter I explore 
some of the dimensions of these ideas about nature, their relation to the material 
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transfonnations of the land and the social reorganisation of life after the Second World 
War in an attempt to understand the ambiguous and contradictory place of the concept 
in utopian and dystopian projections about the future . 
Administered Nature 
As mentioned earlier one of the visible traces of the transfonnation of human settlement 
in America is the extension of the network of roads. By the middle of twentieth century 
roads were cutting their way across even the remote mountainous regions of America. 
Some of these, unlike the highways dedicated to mobility in which the landscape is 
inconsequential, were built as part of the new industry ofleisure and tourism, and relied 
on the landscape to provide the motorist with a meaningful and pleasurable experience. 
In response to the unrelated and violent aspect of the road that has no 
connection to the landscape it passes through, the designers of these roads recreated the 
landscape around the road so that it would make sense to the fleeting glance of those 
passing through it. 'These parkways,' Wilson comments, 'are designed to present 
nature to the motorist in a way that sanctifies the experience of driving through it' 
(1992:34). Wilson describes how the parkways constructed nature around the road, 
adjusting it to make it more scenic, removing or screening evidence of poverty and the 
clutter of human settlement. In some areas the parkway administration bought what was 
known as 'scenic easement rights' from local landowners to provide them with total 
control of the motorists' experience of the road. He writes that 'the road allowed no 
trace of commercial society, save for the occasional nostalgic glimpse of a fann or mill, 
the shadow of economies which have given way to the single economy of tourism' 
(1992:36-37). Wilson quotes Stan Abbott, the landscape architect working on the Blue 
Ridge Parkway through the Appalachians as saying that he wanted to create 'a museum 
of managed American countryside'(l992:35). 
Although the 'managed American countryside' in the 1950s still included some 
fanns, already they were viewed nostalgically as traces of an earlier way of life. The 
agricultural population all over the developed world declined steadily after the war and if 
in the 1950s it still amounted to a quarter of the American population, by the 1980s it 
had fallen to three percent.44 
" Figure quoted in Hobsbawm (1994: 289). 
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Blue Ridge Parkway: A Reconstructed 'Natural' Landscape 
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Hobsbawm writes that: 
The most dramatic and far reaching social change of the second half of this 
century, and one which cuts us off for ever from the world of the past, is the 
death of the peasantry. For since the neolithic era most human beings had lived 
off the land and its livestock or harvested the sea as fishers. With the exception 
of Britain, peasants and farmers remained a massive part of the occupied 
population even in industrialized countries until well into the twentieth century. 
(1994:289) 
American agriculture was transformed in the years after the war into agribusiness, a 
highly capitalised industry reliant on technology not people. The farm, like nature itself, 
was rapidly becoming something merely aesthetic, to be preserved in the museum of the 
parkway for the visual pleasure of the motorist. 
Although in the prosperous years after the war little thought was given to the 
environmental damage caused by the massive expansion of industrial production, the 
words of Stan Abbott are prescient. The reconstruction of nature the parkway under 
his supervision undertakes, a reconstruction which included the reintroduction of 
displaced indigenous species, transforms nature into a museum. A museum suggests the 
preservation and exhibition of something already outside everyday experience. A 
museum also constructs its objects as untouchable, available only to be viewed under 
particular conditions. On the parkway, the car' s windows separate the viewer from an 
external nature transformed into something beautiful but inaccessible, not because the car 
could not be stopped and the doors opened but because it is no longer clear what doing 
that might achieve. Hiking and the many other popular 'outdoor sports ' attempt to 
solve the problem of what might be done in nature or perhaps with nature once it has 
been preserved but this only underlines the tenuousness of the connection - external 
nature preserved in this way can only be experienced as part of the regulated leisure 
industry. 
The Blue Ridge Parkway represents an early example of what becomes by the 
end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century the huge 
industry of international tourism. Nature, preserved and packaged in various ways, is a 
central part of this industry, particularly in developing countries where natural 
landscapes and other signs of premodemity become the basis on which such locations 
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are marketed. 45 
The idea that unspoiled nature could provide a refuge from the destructive 
effects of industrialization is not, of course, a twentieth century invention. The 
Romantic movement at the beginning of the nineteenth century in England and slightly 
later in Europe, and the transcendentalist movement in North America developed in 
response to the growing unease inspired by the reorganisation of the social and natural 
landscapes according to the demands of an industrial economy and the damage it 
inflicted on human communities. For a writer like William Wordsworth, nature provided 
a healing space for the rediscovery of human nature undistorted by the dislocated, 
regimented and damaged space of urban life.46 Yet the nature he imagines is very 
different from that contained in twentieth century nature reserves. David Simpson 
suggests that, for Wordsworth, a model environment: 
had to be rural (indeed marginal), sparsely populated by both natural objects and 
other people, and governed by a subsistence rather than a surplus economy. A 
world in which there are few 'objective' elements for attention and distraction 
provides the necessary space and time for the 'second look' that provides the 
opportunity for the correction of improper figurations, and the modification of 
authentic ones .. .' (1987: 60) 
It is not untouched nature but rather worked nature, and the poet, though not labouring 
on the land, is engaged in a particular kind of work - that of finding, through the 
imagination, the proper relationship between subject and object, between the 
ambiguously social and natural subject and socially worked upon nature.47 
Industrialization, Raymond Williams suggests, reformed the category of nature 
to designate wild nature (1980: 77). The new industrial processes generate wealth which 
enables the purchase of estates and country retreats and effectively splits nature into 
unrelated parts, raw materials to be extracted and wild nature to be enjoyed. Williams 
45 Dean MacCannell argues that this fascination with 'nature' can be linked to a desire to get outside of 
history. He writes: 'Postmodernity is itself a need to suppress the the bad memories of Auschwitz, 
Hiroshima and other genocides on which modernity was built. Of course it is not possible to repress the 
past without denying the future. Thus, the central drive of postmodernity is to stop history in its tracks, 
and the central drive of postmodernity is to discover places which seem to exist outside history: 
unspoiled nature and savagery' (1992:26). 
46 See the discussion of Wordsworth and Clare in Williams (1975: 158-174). 
47 Wordsworth was himself very concerned about the extension of the railways and the development of 
tourism in the Lake District because of the particular kind of interaction with the natural world he felt it 
would promote. See his comments in a letter to the Morning Post 'Kendal and Windermere Railway' 
collected in The Prose Work of William Wordsworth (1974: 337-366). 
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comments that: 
The real split perhaps, is in men themselves: men seen, and seeing themselves as 
producers and consumers. The consumer wants only the intended product; all 
other products and by-products he must get away from, ifhe can. But get away 
from it really can't be overlooked to treat leftover nature in much the same 
spirit: to consume it as scenery, landscape, image, fresh air. (1980: 81) 
If there has been an intensification of the commodification of leftover nature in 
the twenty years since Williams made this observation, this is partly because this 
category, usually conceived of as wild nature, is increasingly a scarce resource. This is 
not only because of the direct effects of extending production into more and more 
previously non-industrialized regions. In fact in the developed world, industrial 
production has sometimes retreated as multinational companies move factories to 
developing countries. What have come to appear more significant are indirect effects -
the projected changes to the environment caused by global warming. 
It is these indirect effects which for McKibben represent the end of nature. In 
effect, he argues that there is no more leftover nature, not even in remote and 
inaccessible places, because all places have been affected directly and/or indirectly by 
human forms not only of production but also of consumption - most notably a 
prevailing lifestyle, in most developed and increasingly also in developing countries, 
based on the car. 
Although scientists had long been aware that carbon dioxide was a by-product 
of fossil fuel combustion, and had speculated on the possible effects it might have on the 
global temperature, most concluded that the oceans would absorb any excess produced 
by human activity. In 1957, roughly at the time that Stan Abbott was designing the Blue 
Ridge Parkway, two scientists from the Scripp Institute of Oceanography in California, 
Roger Revelle and Hans Suess published a paper suggesting that, in fact, the oceans 
could absorb only a very small amount of the carbon dioxide being produced. 'Human 
beings,' they asserted, 'are now carrying out a large-scale geophysical experiment of a 
kind that could not have happened in the past nor be repeated in the future' (quoted in 
McKibben, 1990: 10). 
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What is Lost 
This transformation of the world into a 'large-scale geophysical experiment' represents 
for McKibben a significant and irrevocable transformation of the relation between 
humans and nature. In his book, published in 1990, he writes: 'we 
have changed atmosphere, and thus we are changing the weather. By changing the 
weather we make every spot on this earth man-made and artificial. We have deprived 
nature of its independence and that is fatal to its meaning' (1990:54). 
It is perhaps useful at this point to consider some of the elements that cause 
McKibben particular concern. Global warming, he argues, is more important than the 
depletion of the Ozone layer, acid rain and even genetic engineering and it is qualitatively 
different from earlier forms of pollution which, though destructive, were clearly linked 
to specific actions and local in their effect. It is central because it is a global phenomenon 
and it destroys, once and for all, the possibility of there existing on the earth a place 
which is entirely untouched by human actions. The climate defines not only the 
weather, the length and intensity of the seasons, but also the distribution of vegetation, 
the places where specific species are able to flourish. A change in the climate has a direct 
impact on our experience of the world, not only of our day to day interactions with the 
weather but also with the way the world looks and even more so our sense of it as 
powerful, elemental and independent. 
McKibben argues that the greenhouse effect undermines people's ability to 
predict changes in nature based on the past. The knowledge of the weather, for instance, 
developed through experience by farmers and engineers will no longer apply. 'The 
salient feature of this new nature', he suggests, 'is its unpredictability, just as the 
salient feature of the old nature was its utter dependability' (McKibben 1990: 96) 
Although the weather has always been difficult to predict over short time-spans, 
ultimately people could rely on the seasons, on Summer following Spring. On a larger 
scale, the uncertainty created by human intervention into natural processes is evident in 
the numerous different scenarios that scientists have come up with to describe the likely 
changes. No one can predict with any degree of certainty the effects of global warming. 
This uncertainty generates an uncertainty at every level of humans' interaction with 
nature, the effects on the availability of fresh water, the ability to produce sufficient 
food, the possible dangers of exposure to the sun, the rearrangement of the coastal 
landscape due to rising sea water. 
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The predominant response to this uncertainty is what McKibben calls 'the 
defiant reflex', an assertion of the immense potential of human reason to find solutions 
to problems that have come about as a result of the technologies people have devised. 
Unlike the crisis produced by extensive use of DDT documented by Rachel Carson in 
her book, Silent Spring (1962), the current crisis cannot be solved by a similar shift in 
practice.48 The use of fossil fuel is too intimately bound up with the structure of 
industrial society at every level. McKibben writes that, 'at least in the West, the system 
that produces excess carbon dioxide is not only huge and growing, it is also 
psychologically all-encompassing. It makes no sense to talk about cars and power plants 
and so on as if they were something apart from our lives - they are our lives' (1990: 
132). The response of those whose approach favours a 'muscular industrialism' is on 
adaption and adjustment. The earth is seen as a mechanism which needs to be managed 
skillfully in order to sustain the lifestyle developed and supported by extensive use of 
fossil fuels. Central to this strategy is the promise of the new technologies of genetic 
engineering to transform life on earth in as yet unimaginable ways. Genetic engineering is 
the ultimate tool of adjustment, able to alter and reconfigure genetic traits to make life 
forms better adapted to the changing environment. Yet, McKibben argues, the ultimate 
conclusion of this technological response is a world of total control, where anything is 
possible and there are no material limits to constrain human desires. He writes: 'we may 
be able to create a world that can support our numbers and our habits, but it will be an 
artificial world, a space station' (1990: 156). 
Against this instrumental approach to the world, McKibben poses what he sees 
as the radical alternative, the notion that it might be possible for people to change their 
habits. It is clear, he argues, that the logic of economic growth is destructive to the 
natural world. Drawing on the ideas of 'deep ecology', a philosophy that asserts the 
intrinsic value of the natural world as opposed to its value as a resource for human use, 
he argues for a transformation in lifestyle. The rationale for this transformation would 
not, however, be utopian since its aim is not to make people happier and more fulfilled. 
Instead he describes it as an atopia, a place where 'our desires are not the engine', where 
the requirements of the natural world are placed before the desires of people. In the final 
lines of The End of Nature he takes consolation in the mystery and wonder of the stars, 
48 See discussion of Carson and changes in the nature of the environmental crisis since the 1960s in 
Buell (2003: xii, 35, 182-183). 
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a realm still beyond the reach of human intervention. He writes: 
As I lay on the mountain top that August night, I tried to pick out the few 
constellations I could identify Orion's belt, the dippers. The ancients, 
surrounded by wild and even hostile nature, took comfort in seeing the familiar 
above them - spoons, swords, nets. But we need to train ourselves not to see 
those patterns. The comfort we need is inhuman.' (McKibben 1990:200-201) 
The end of nature for McKibben is not an apocalyptic vision of the end of the 
world although he argues that substantial changes to the physical environment are 
imminent. It is rather the end of a particular frame of reference, a particular way of 
understanding people's place in the world. McKibben's use of the term 'nature' to refer 
to wild nature is one with peculiarly North American resonances. The celebration of the 
'untouched land' is part of America's pastoral tradition from the early naturalists like 
William Bartram through Emerson to the predominantly North American deep ecology 
movement. It locates in nature untouched by human intervention a source of value. 
McKibben deliberately directs his arguments at an American audience, a fact 
which tends to be elided by his tendency to universalize the conflict into one between 
'humans' and 'nature'. It is aimed at consumers, which is perhaps why both production 
and work seem to some degree incidental to its arguments. In some ways it participates 
in the form of ecological thinking that has been justly criticized by thinkers on the left 
such Hans Magnus Enzensberger who argue that: 'What fills these prophets with terror 
is not so much ecological decline, which has been present since time immemorial, as its 
universalization. To isolate oneself from this process becomes increasingly difficult' 
(1996:25). Yet the universalization of decline is in itself significant, suggesting a 
moment at which quantative increase shifts into qualitative difference. 
More importantly McKibben's book signals an acute anxiety about ways in 
which the future might be imagined - about the possibility of imagining 'the good life'. 
It articulates a profound discontent about the possibilities of life in consumer society 
which he sees as characterised by a growing sense of the meaningless of being. Yet his 
conclusion is not about changing society. Instead it relies on a personal transformation, a 
change in lifestyle. What is lost ultimately, it appears, is not so much external nature in 
any physical sense but rather meaning, or the ability to produce meaning, the ability to 
occupy a position as subject. 
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Nature's role in this is interesting it comes to occupy the position previously 
held by culture and tradition, as that which establishes and guarantees the 
meaningfulness of the existent. What is lost - predictability, authenticity, a context to 
structure the interpretation of experience - are elements that might appear to exist more 
accurately within the domain of culture. In discussing the question of ontology (in 
1934), Adorno writes that: 'only when reason perceives the reality that is in opposition 
to it as something foreign and lost to it, as a complex of things, that is, only when reality 
is no longer immediately accessible and reality and reason have no common meaning, 
only then can the question of the meaning of being be asked at all' (1984: 112). The end 
of nature can be read in this way, as the end of a moment when reason was able to 
apprehend reality, with nature coming to stand simply for that which has been lost - an 
ordered, understandable reality. 
An Unalienated Life 
It is perhaps instructive at this moment to consider another theorist who almost a 
hundred years earlier articulated some of the same concerns as McKibben. William 
Morris, writing in the 1890s, also attempts to analyse contemporary conditions with 
the view to effecting a transformation of the way in which people live their lives. 
Morris, like McKibben, recognises the destructive nature of what is considered progress 
in modem society. He writes: 
Apart from the desire to make beautiful things, the leading passion of my life has 
been and is hatred of modem civilization .... What shall I say of its mastery of 
and its waste of mechanical power, its commonwealth so poor, its enemies of the 
commonwealth so rich, its stupendous organization - for the misery of life! Its 
contempt of simple pleasures that everyone could enjoy but for its folly? Its 
eyeless vulgarity which has destroyed art, the one certain solace oflabour. 
(Morris 1984: 244) 
Morris's contempt is for an irrational society, a system based on commercial interests in 
which human needs and desires are not considered. The mastery of the natural world by 
mechanical power becomes the rationale for production, technology drives the 
production of things, the system of exchange structures human desires, and the 'simple 
pleasures' vanish. In this context alienated labour can provide no meaningful interaction 
with the world. 
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Morris' socialism provides him with a theoretical framework for a reimagining of 
the world according to what he argued was a more rational organization of society and 
work, one in which the mastery of mechanical power was subordinated to the needs of 
communities. 
His 1894 novel, News From Nowhere. describes a society governed by what Morris 
considered to be the central ideas of socialism: 
a condition of society in which there should be neither rich nor poor, neither 
master not master's man, neither idle not overworked, neither brain-sick brain 
workers, not heart-sick hand workers, in a word in which all men would be living 
in equality of condition, and would managed their affairs unwastefully, and with 
the full consciousness that harm to one would mean harm to all the realization 
at last of the meaning of the word COMMONWEALTH. (1984: 241) 
In Morris' utopian vision 'the smoke-work with their smoke vomiting chimneys were 
gone' and instead a bridge over the Thames combines utility with beauty, an example of 
a form of architecture designed to create spaces of human well-being. In the absence of 
any formal system of exchange each article produced is considered only in terms of its 
use value and its aesthetic value. There is no division of labour and all work, entered into 
freely, is considered its own reward. Meaningless labour is transformed into creative 
self-expression. 
Although set in the future, the model of society is in many ways pre-modern. If 
from the standpoint of the twenty-first century Morris' utopia reads like nothing so 
much as a blueprint for a Disney theme park of traditional English life complete with the 
elimination of such awkward elements as class conflict and poverty, this is at least 
partly because what he describes can no longer in any way attach to a reality. 49 The 
reconciliation with nature, which he sees as central to the project of human liberation, 
requires the undoing of modernization, the refusal of precisely those technologies which 
for McKibben have become such an inextricable part oflife at the end of the twentieth 
century - those based on the burning of fossil fuels. Furthermore, for Morris it is still 
possible to imagine an arrangement of space unaffected by technologies which collapse 
vast distances. Although at the end of the nineteenth century the internal combustion 
49 The free and uninhibited sexual relations in Morris' utopia, unencumbered by institutions such as 
marriage, are perhaps the only element of Morris' vision which might not fit the idea of a the theme 
park reconstruction of the past. 
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engine was new technology and cars were barely invented,s° the railway offered an 
example of how such technologies might transform human communities, and it was a 
transformation Morris prefered to exclude from his utopia. 
For Morris, the pleasure taken in natural beauty is not separate from the 
business ofliving. Work, and in Morris' novel this is physical work, is the central 
element which forges connections between people and between people and the natural 
landscape. Work, the production of use-value, is what structures life. 
Many of the historical events that contributed to the shift from Morris' utopia 
to McKibben's atopia are obvious; the transformation of agriculture through technology, 
massive urbanization, and the Second World War - both the evidence it provided of 
technologies of destruction in the atomic bombs, and the way in which it fundamentally 
disturbed the idea of modernity as progress, undermining confidence in rationality and 
human nature. In the second half of the century this was augmented by a growing sense 
of the irrevocability of environmental damage. These events, along with the collapse of 
the communist economies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries, contribute to 
the difficulty of imagining an alternative to consumer society, of envisioning a rational 
society devoted to the pursuit of the common good. The phenomonon I am calling 'the 
end of nature' emerges, I suggest, partly as a response to this difficulty; the 
hypervisbility of nature serving to eclipse the irreducible contradictions of 
contemporary global history. 
The Haunted House 
If as Fredric Jameson suggests, postmodemism is characterised by a new form of 
interrelationship between time and space, in which the spatial comes to take the place of 
the historical, then it is not suprising that nature as a concept for organising space comes 
to assume particular importance.5! Its material domination, the way in which it is drawn 
through various strategies for management more and more within the control of 
particular global and national administrative configurations goes hand in hand with a 
desire for it to make sense of the blank space which the demolition of the local, of place, 
50 The first four cycle compression engine was produced in Germany in 1876; the first car in 1893 
(Wollen 2002: 10). 
51 Jameson writes' it also seems to be plausible to return to the phenomenon of spatialization already 
mentioned here, and to see in all these varied Utopian visions as they have emerged from the sixties the 
development of a whole range of properly spatial Utopias in which the transformation of social relations 
and political institutions is projected onto a vision of place and landscape, including the human body' 
(1991: 160). 
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has given rise to. Nature becomes a way of talking about a world, which because of its 
scale and the characteristic mode of moving through it, (obviously not only the car but 
also the aeroplane, the underground and other modes of rapid transport), can no longer 
be directly experienced. 
One very significant element in Morris' work and one which cuts us off forever 
from being able to imagine his utopia in the twenty-first century, is this insistence on 
place and locality. Moving through the land takes place only through the human labour 
of rowing or walking or through harnessing the power of the horse. For Morris, living 
the good or moral life means truly inhabiting a place moulding your human life in 
metabolic interaction, to use an expression from Marx, with the natural world.52 It 
involves pleasure in useful action, in the body's power to transform natural resources 
into useful (and for Morris, importantly, also beautiful) artifacts. This is a rational 
mode of existence for Morris because it involves acting in accordance with human nature 
with the rational and positive potential within people which commercial society has 
deformed. Or in the formulation of Marx's early writing on estrangement, it represents 
the fulfillment of man's species-life.53 
If in the 1960s (mostly in America and some other parts of the developed world) 
there is a revival of ideas about, and in some places concrete attempts to, 'return to 
nature', from the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, it appears, it is no longer 
possible to imagine such a return. Instead the referent of the term 'nature' has become 
increasingly difficult to locate. In the texts which I discuss in the following chapters 
there is a definite sense that it is no longer possible to recognise what it would mean to 
live in metabolic interaction with nature. This is not only because climate changes 
resulting from human actions are materially transforming the experience of nature. The 
transformations of modernity more generally construct a way of life inextricably 
implicated in technological practices, landscapes rearranged by technology, freeways, 
complex networks, and uninhabitable spaces. 
Yet nature remains a term which seems to contain some residue of utopian / 
52 Alfred Schmidt (1971) discusses Marx's use ofthe idea of metabolism to describe the relationship 
between men and nature in the The Concept of Nature in Marx. He quotes from Capital vol.l: 'He sets in 
motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body in order to appropriate the material 
of nature in a form suitable for his own needs. By thus acting through this motion on the nature which is 
outside him and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature' (quoted in Schmidt 1971:78). 
53 Marx writes: 'For labour, life-activity, productive life itself, seems to man from the outset to be merely 
a means to satisfy a need, the need to maintain his physical existence. But productive life is species-life. 
It is life-generating life. The whole character of a species, its species character, lies in the form of its life 
activity, and free conscious activity is the species-character of man' (1994:75). 
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promise. It seems to offer a way of imagining the whole, of reintegrating the fragmented 
elements of modem life. Yet nature, like culture, to which it is frequently opposed, is a 
term of immense complexity and ambiguity. In some ways the setting up of this 
opposition between nature and culture masks the fact that the two terms are not 
commensurable. Culture, as a set of human practices which includes the classification 
and demarcation of the world always contains nature as one of its categories. From this 
point of view nature can never escape into pure materiality, and the ways in which it 
has been categorized means that for many theorists, it is too fundamentally implicated in 
the legitimation a variety of oppressive practices to be useful.54 
Despite, or perhaps partly because of its history, for many people the term 
'nature' does still indicate towards something which is outside, at once somatic and 
irreducibly material, the otherness of animals and the human body, and spiritual or at 
least meaningful in a way that escapes the meanings imposed on the world by 
commodity culture. Emily Dickinson writes 'Nature is a haunted house - but Art a 
house that tries to be haunted.' 55 
In the late twentieth century it is the word itself which appears in some ways 
haunted, the ghost of something that has, in at least one of its senses, ended. It is also 
haunted in another way, by the history of its past usages, the ways in which has been 
defined and redefined. The next section of this chapter traces some of the ways in 
which nature came to mean something for modernity, its multiple hauntings. 
NATURE AND MODERNITY 
Contesting the Domain of Nature 
If in the second half of the twentieth century traces of the human hand vanish to be 
replaced by indirect and almost imperceptible, yet damaging, traces of an industrial 
culture, this is only one part of a wider argument concerning nature and its place in 
modem culture. In this section I explore briefly some of the ways in which 'nature,' in 
the second half of th7.entieth century, becomes an extremely visible and contested 
domain: I suggest that the history of the construction of nature as an object of science is 
particularly significant in structuring the ways in which it is possible to think about 
54 This is particularly true of feminist theorists, who have good reason to be wary of it. See discussions 
in Soper (1995: 119-148), Haraway (1991) & Plumwood (\993). 
55 In a letter to Colonel Higginson (Dickinson 1958: 24). 
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nature at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
In contemporary global culture the concept of nature is at the centre of a number 
of philosophical and political debates. McKibben's discussion which finds in the 
disappearance of wild nature a compelling argument for a reorganization of society and 
a decentring of human desires forms part of the wider deep ecology movement. Deep 
ecology forms one strand of the environmental movement that emerged in America in 
the 1970s. Unlike the more utopian sixties, the environmental movement in the 
seventies approached nature as something whose integrity was already substantially 
undermined. 56 
Codified in the work of Arne Naess, deep ecology is a form of moral 
philosophy in so far as it prescribes a certain way of 'right living' and argues for an 
alternative system, based in nature, for the ascription of value. 57 In some ways similar 
to the early nineteenth Romantic critique of industrial society, it insists on the absolute 
value of nature and the degrading effect of human activity. Nature is secure as a source 
of value only in the complete absence of human traces. 
Against those who posit nature as a source of absolute value, a number of 
poststructuralist theorists have framed the disappearance of 'nature' from a different 
perspective. From the point of view of theorists such as Donna Haraway, nature as 
independent arbiter of human actions has a long history of being drawn into the dubious 
role of legitimating particularly oppressive political and psychic regimes. From this 
point of view, the disappearance of nature, or the rethinking of nature as a purely social 
construction can be interpreted as a positive and liberatory move.58 
The social constructivist challenge to the authority of nature has brought it into 
conflict also with another powerful discourse on nature, that of the natural sciences. In 
the 1990s, only five years after McKibben had pronounced the end of nature, the 
concept re-emerged at the centre of a conflict between cultural theorists and scientists, in 
the 'Science Wars' issue of the journal Social Text. The inclusion of the now infamous 
56 Richard White, unpublished paper presented at the Environmental Politics Colloquium, Berkeley, 
2003. 
57 In a critique of deep ecology written in 1985, however, Richard Sylvan suggests that 'Although deep 
ecology was in origin part of a value theory, and basically concerned with environmental values, it has 
also been presented as a metaphysics, as a consciousness movement (and as primarily psychological), and 
even as a sort of pantheistic religion' (1985:2). For a critical discussion of deep ecology see Plumwood 
(1993:165-189). 
58 Soper (1995) has outlined in detail the often antagonistic conversation between what she calls the 
social constructivist approach and the approach of various strands of the environmental movement on the 
question of nature. 
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hoax paper by professor of physics at New York University, Alan Sokal, and the 
subsequent public scandal, indicate that questions about nature, and the authority of 
those who consider it their domain, remain contested. 59 Nature remains unquestionably 
present in discourse, in the debates around science, technology, human health, animals, 
culture, and politics even as the precise outlines of its referent become harder to trace. 
One way of characterizing a form of postmodem condition would be to see it in 
terms of an alteration in the relation between nature and society, encompassing both 
the hypervisibilty of nature and its disappearance as solid ground, as reliable framework. 
Anthony Giddens suggests that the idea of the 'environment' as opposed to that of 
'nature' signifies a substantial transition: 
The environment, which seems to be no more than an independent parameter of 
human existence, actually is its opposite: nature as thoroughly transfigured by 
human intervention. We begin to speak of the environment' only once nature, 
like tradition has become dissolved. (1994: 77) 
Fredric Jameson also speaks of nature in these terms as something which is lost in the 
'homogeneously modem condition'. He writes: 'Everything is now organized and 
planned; nature has been triumphantly blotted out, along with peasants, petit-bourgeois 
commerce, handicraft, feudal aristocracies and imperial bureaucracies' (Jameson 1991: 
31 ).60 His choice of words is interesting. Blotting out suggests not that such things are 
entirely absent but that they are radically altered, no longer distinguishable from what 
surrounds them. What is natural is no longer clearly defined and the class of people 
whose livelihood meant a practical engagement with nature are no longer visible, 
although subsistence and small scale farming persists in most parts of the developing 
world. 
Handicraft too persists, but not as a significant challenge to mass produced 
items. Instead in a saturated market handcrafted objects offer a particular form of value. 
They stand as nostalgic markers of a different and earlier relationship with the world. 
Although the handcrafted object at the tum of the twenty-first century bears a 
resemblance to the everyday objects Morris transformed into art, it no longer expresses 
59 Ziauddin Sardar (2000) provides a detailed and thoughtful discussion ofthe hoax and its 
implications. 
60 For an interesting discussion of Jameson see Paul Bove (1996) who writes that: 'Nature ... has 
disappeared entirely within postmodemism. .. [This] is a basic claim within Jameson's now classical 
theory' (1996: 382), 
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the same utopian promise. Either imported from the developing world as signs from 
'premodern' cultures, or produced in marginal enclaves in industrialised societies which 
reconstruct earlier methods and technologies, it enters the world of exchange in a 
particular way, as a sign of itself. The handcrafted object represents the commodified 
form ofthe 'traces of the human hand and its immediate implements' that have been lost 
in a society of mass production. This extreme form of reification that encompasses all 
things which in an incompletely modernized world remained incommensurable, is, for 
Jameson, one of the defining characteristics of post modernity. It suggests a particular 
relation between people and things, subjects and objects, defined exclusively by the 
place each occupies within a single global system. It implies a particular way of 
apprehending the world, one which has its origins in complex and systematic practices 
of exclusion through which the object was constituted in Western modernity. 
The Book ofthe World 
Although the history of the transition to modernity has been characterized in many 
different ways, in most accounts developments in seventeenth and eighteenth century 
Europe are recognized to have significantly altered people's relationship with the world 
and with each other. The 'wild profusion of existing things' is reordered according to a 
new framework of logic and the relationship between viewer and object is 
fundamentally restructured by new ways of interacting with nature.61 Michel Foucault 
argues that: 
Up to the end of the sixteenth century resemblance played a constructive role in 
the knowledge of Western culture. It was resemblance that largely guided 
exegesis and the interpretation of texts; it was resemblance that organized the 
play of symbols, made possible knowledge of things visible and invisible, and 
controlled the art of representing them. (1970: 17) 
Some time during the seventeenth century, Foucault suggests, a shift occurred in the 
epistemological field, in the conditions of possibility governing the way in which 
knowledge could be constructed. 62 What emerges, he argues, in the fields of natural 
61 This quotation, from Foucault (l970:xv.) is quoted in full and discussed later in this chapter. 
61 Foucault writes: 'what I am trying to bring to light is the epistemological field, the episteme in 
which knowledge, envisaged apart from all eriteria having reference to its rational value or to its objective 
forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, 
but rather that of its conditions of possibility' (1970: xxii). 
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history, general grammar and the analysis of wealth is not simply an accumulation and 
refinement of earlier knowledge but the development of an entirely new framework for 
apprehending the world. 
What occurs when natural histories start to be written, (as opposed to histories), 
is a reduction of the information which is considered relevant to the description of an 
animal or plant. Foucault writes that: 
Until the time of Aldrovandi, History was the inextricable and complete unitary 
fabric of all that was visible of things and the signs that had been discovered or 
lodged in them: to write a history of a plant or an animal was as much a matter of 
describing its elements or organs as describing the resemblances that could be 
found in it, the virtues it was thought to possess, the legends and stories with 
which it had been involved, the medicaments that were concocted from its 
substance, the food it provided, what the ancients recorded of it, and what 
travelers might have said of it. The history of a living being was that being itself, 
within the whole semantic network that connected it to the world. (1970:129) 
It is this semantic network, the language of the animal's being which, Foucault argues, is 
removed as natural histories begin to trace a new taxonomic order in which all plants 
and animals can be tabulated according to a specific set of observations. Aldrovandi, 
writer of a History of Serpents and Dragons, Foucault suggests, 'was neither a better 
not a worse observer than Buffon; he was neither more credulous than he, nor less 
attached to the faithfulness of the observing eye or the rationality of things. His 
observation was simply not linked in accordance with the same system or arrangement 
of the episteme' (1970:129). Aldrovandi's descriptive categories (which include 
epithets, allegories and mysteries, hieroglyphics, coinage alongside anatomy, diet etc.) 
appear strange and chaotic because modern thought follows the seventeenth century 
naturalist Buffon in being shaped by a system of organisation that demands the 
exclusion of fable, legend and the whole semantic network which links the animal or 
plant under consideration to everyday experience. 
The Living Creature 
A parallel development in the investigation of the physical world is articulated by 
Galileo in The Assayer, published in 1623. Galileo suggests the need for a reduction of 
what information about physical objects should be considered relevant to the study of 
'material or corporeal substances': 
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I say that whenever I conceive any material or corporeal substance, I 
immediately feel the need to think: of it as bounded, as having this or that shape; 
as being large or small in relation to other things, and at some specific place at 
any given time, as being in motion or at rest; as touching or not touching some 
other body; and as being one in number or few or many. From these conditions I 
cannot separate such a substance by any stretch of my imagination. But that it 
must be white or red, bitter or sweet, noisy or silent, and of sweet or foul odor, 
my mind does not feel compelled to bring in as necessary accompaniments. 
Without the senses as our guides, reason or imagination unaided would probably 
never arrive at qualities like these. Hence I think: that tastes, odors, colors, and so 
on are no more than mere names so far as the object in which we place them is 
concerned, and that they reside only in the consciousness. Hence if the living 
creature were removed, all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated. 
(Galileo 1954: 719) 
Galileo's statement attempts to define the specific nature of the relationship between 
viewer and object, dividing attributes which are essential to the material or corporeal 
substance from those which are 'mere names' which 'reside only in the consciousness'. 
Imagination and reason, as oppose to the senses, he suggests, require a certain set of 
observations, those involving the establishment of the object's dimensions in geometrical 
space. These, unlike those qualities associated with colour, taste and sound will persist 
even after the removal ofthe 'living creature'. The role of the observer is to record only 
those conditions which will persist even in his absence. 
The living creature, capable of a sensual apprehension of the world, needs to be . 
removed in order for the material world to be known. This represents a cosmological 
shift away from Aristotelian physics which is based on sense perception and which 
takes as its starting point precisely that which Galileo wishes to circumscribe, the 
human experience of the world. 
Galileo's investigation of the movement of objects in space, (in particular the 
trajectory of canon balls), exemplifies this approach. The law of inertial motion 
developed by Galileo, is Alexander Koyre suggests, one of the most basic and 
fundamental laws of modern physics. It states that 'a body, left to itself, remains in its 
state of rest or of motion as long as it is not interfered with by some external force' 
(1943: 334). He goes on to point out that 'the Galilean concept of motion (as well as 
that of space) seems to us so 'natural' that we even believe to have derived it from 
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experience and observation, though, obviously, nobody has ever encountered inertial 
motion for the simple reason that such a motion is utterly and absolutely impossible' 
(1943: 336). Galilean space is not the place of human experience. It is a space empty of 
air, and in outer space, where such conditions prevail, observable objects move in an 
orbital rather than rectilinear fashion. 
If the book of nature previously 'bristles with written signs; every page ... seen 
to be filled with strange figures that intertwine and in some places repeat themselves' 
(Foucault 1970: 27), the new geometrical space requires a more abbreviated notation. 
Galileo establishes, not an empirical description of the world of nature, but a paradigm, 
an allegorical reading of it in which the master narrative is mathematics. Galileo's 
famous claim, 'that the book of nature is written in geometrical characters' introduces 
into the space of nature a new set of signs, ones which reduce the multiplicity of natural 
phenomena to abstract lines, points and intersecting vectors. The observer, either a 
point on the grid of space or absent entirely, plots the movement of material or 
corporeal bodies without reference to their impact on the world through which they 
move or with which they collide. 
Hans Blumenberg, in his analysis of the development of Western modernity, 
Legitimacy of the Modem Age (1983), suggests that the mathematization of the world 
emerges as a response to the recognition of the impossibility of a true or complete 
knowledge o~the world. He writes: 
Counting, measuring and weighing are the specific instruments of human 
knowledge of nature precisely because in their efficiency they simultaneously 
make evident the inaccuracy by whose means the spirit becomes conscious of the 
heterogeneity, in relation to its objects, of the parameters it produces. Arithmetic 
and geometry leave an unrealized remainder in every application to real objects. 
The ideal construction and the real datum are not reducible to one another 
without a remainder; however the difference is not between pregiven ideality and 
given reality but rather between the pretentions of the knowing subject and the 
knowledge attainable by it at any given time. (1983: 357) 
In this description of the operations of counting, weighing and measuring, Blumenberg is 
referring specifically to the work of Nicholas of Cusa in the fifteenth century.63 In order 
63 Nicholas ofCusa (1410-1464) a Gennan theologian, scholar, and statesma n wrote extensively on 
philosophy, theology, mathematics, and astronomy. The ideas are discussed here occur in On Lcarned 
Ignorance (1440). See discussion in Blumenberg (1983:355-360 & 469-585). 
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to justify the 'inquisitive instinct', Nicholas of Cusa makes a distinction between 
knowledge and wisdom. Blumenberg writes: 'The inexhaustibility of the desire for 
knowledge in any stage of realization that it can ever arrive at is the reason why we can 
achieve something more than knowledge, namely wisdom, the knowledge of what 
knowledge still does not know' (1983:356). Wisdom becomes the ability to recognise 
the remainder. 
According to Blumenberg, the unrealized remainder does not result from the gap 
between a Platonic ideal and its inadequate realization in the world but rather enters the 
equation in relation to the knowing subject. Perfect knowledege of the world is 
presumed to be possible but always deferred. For Nicholas of Cusa this meant that in 
every object there was hidden 'the unattainable transcendence of its "precision" , 
(1983:356). But Blumenberg'S emphasis on the temporal nature of this relation, suggests 
that the unrealized remainder could also be understood as the recalcitrance of the object 
in history. In one sense this can be understood in Kuhnian tenns, that at every historical 
moment what is known about a particular object carries a remainder - a space of 
invisibility which is that which cannot be included within the current scientific 
paradigm. 
Yet it can also refer precisely to the historicity of the object, or in other words 
the ways in which any object is situated in history by its relation to the range of human 
meanings which attach it to a heterogenous array of other objects and subjects. 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, science relies on a fonnulation which 
invokes that which is not known yet as the solution for current crises. What begins as a 
modest claim for the limits of knowledge in relation to the world, the ultimate 
unknowability of nature, is transfonned into an immodest assumption in which the 
perfectibility of knowledge in the future comes to displace the role of wisdom, the 
acknowledgement and recognition of what is not known. 
Measuring the World 
In Dialectic of Enlightenment (2002 [1947]) Horkheimer and Adorno argue that the 
failure of the emancipatory promise of Enlightenment reason lies not in some 
exceptional external coincidence of historical factors but is instead intrinsic to the 
process itself. They do this by tracing the history of its fonnation, not simply as far 
back as the scientific revolution but even earlier to the emergence of the autonomous 
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subject out of the chaos of the mythic configuration of the world. This subject, whom 
they interrogate through the figure of Odysseus, perceives himself to be free from the 
irrational demands of a mythic order. In fact Enlightenment reason sets itself up in 
opposition to this unreason of the mythic order. Yet, Horkheimer and Adorno argue, 
this reasoning remythologises the world at the same moment as it is claiming to liberate 
, 
it. They write that: 
The Enlightenment dissolves away the injustice of the old inequality of 
unmediated mastery, but at the same time perpetuates it in universal mediation, 
by relating every existing thing to every other. It brings about the situation for 
which Kierkegaard praised the Protestant ethic and which, in the legend-cycle of 
Hercules, constitutes one of the primal images of mythical violence: it amputates 
the incommensurable. (2002: 8-9) 
This amputation is linked to the emergence of a society governed by the principle of 
exchange in which every object must be fitted into the system, so that everything can 
find its value through its place in the network of relationships that make up the market. 
The abstraction inherent in the exchange principle, they suggest, leads to a particular 
kind of reasoning, one in which what is qualitatively different is forced into an identity 
using a quantitative method. They take particular issue with the way in which modern 
science, in pursuit of knowledge with technical utility, abandons any commitment to 
theoretical understanding. They argue that: 
The reduction of thought to a mathematical apparatus condemns the world to be 
its own measure. What appears as the triumph of subjectivity, the SUbjection of 
all things to logical formalism, is bought with the obedient subordination of 
reason to what is immediately at hand. To grasp existing things as such, not 
merely to grasp their abstract spatial-temporal relationship, but on the contrary, 
to think of them as surface, as mediated by conceptual moments which are only 
fulfilled by revealing their social, historical and human meaning this whole 
aspiration of knowledge is abandoned. (2002:20) 
What is absent from modern science, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, is the ability 
to recognise things in relation to 'their social, historical and human meaning.' The 
incompleteness of knowledge perpetually postpones the need for an integrated theory 
which would depend on a total understanding of nature. In the meantime, greater and 
greater specialization makes the possibility of such an integrated theory unimaginable. 
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In the 1950s, when Thomas Kuhn was writing his Copernican Revolution, it was 
still possible to assert the unity of science. Science acted, he argued, as the modern 
cosmology, a way of understanding the world, of making people feel at home. By the 
end of the twentieth century, this argument is difficult to sustain. Not only because each 
field of knowledge increasingly demands its own methodological approach and 
vocabulary but also because the effects of applied science on the surface of things 
themselves means that nature itself cannot act as that which stabilizes the whole. 
Ambitious Words 
In the preface to The Order of Things, Foucault describes the text that provoked his 
interest in the way in which things are culturally and conceptually ordered in such a way 
as to form a sense of what is natural. He writes that: 
This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that 
shattered, as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought - our 
thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography -
breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are 
accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long 
afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between 
the Same and Other. This passage quotes "a certain Chinese encyclopaedia" in 
which it is written that "animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, 
(b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, 
(h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, G) innumerable, (k) drawn 
with a fine camelhair brush, (1) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water 
pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies. (1970: XV) 
The encyclopedia Borges describes is intriguing because it marks the limits of our 
thought. The' exotic charm' of this other' system of thought' demonstrates what 
Foucault refers to as the 'stark impossibility of thinking that,' the impossibility of 
thinking within these categories. This way of categorizing animals traces the outline of a 
form of thought that is alien to Western thinking. It refuses certain basic tenets of 
classification. It allows into the space of classification both temporal (the animal 
'having just broken the water pitcher') and spatial considerations (animals 'that from a 
long way off look like flies') and refuses to accept an even and stable relationship 
between viewer and object 
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The encyclopaedia is drawn from Borges' essay on John Wilkins.64 In this essay 
Borges discusses Wilkins attempt to construct, in around 1664, a universal language 
which would 'organize and contain all human thought' and in which each word would 
define itself. In order to do this he divided the universe into forty categories, which 
were then subdivided into differences, sub divisible into species.65 Like the 
encyclopaedia tJ:1at caught Foucault's attention, Wilkins' categories are organised 
according to unfamiliar and at times startling principles of identification. Borges goes on 
to explain his interest in these forms of classification: 
I have noted the arbitrariness of Wilkins, of the unknown (or apocryphal) 
Chinese encyclopedist, and of the Bibliographical Institute of Brussels; 
obviously there is no classification of the universe which is not arbitrary and 
conjectural. The reason for this is very simple: we don't know what the universe 
is .... We must go even further; we must suspect that there is no universe in the 
organic, unifying sense inherent in that ambitious word. If there is, we must 
conjecture its purpose; we must conjecture the words, the definitions, the 
etymologies, the synonymies of God's secret dictionary. (1973: 104) 
The term 'nature' is in some sense like 'the universe' what Borges describes as an 
ambitious word. It suggests totality, the containment of the infinite within something 
finite and intelligible and implies the conceptual ability to encompass radical diversity. 
Nature comes to stand in for what cannot be achieved by knowledge; it holds together 
what threatens to diverge completely. Yet in other ways it differs from the universe 
since nature refers not only to an abstract totality. It also implies immediacy and 
singularity, and in its materiality enters into the very substance of everyday life. 
Perhaps part of the appeal of the word, its power, is its ability to link 
apparently disparate elements, the external world, and the inner experience of being. It 
hints at an existing relationship between the world of things, of which it is the sum, and 
the subjective experience of those things. It is also able to imply something more. In 
discussing the complexities in Kant's use of the term, Adorno suggests that although on / 
one level nature is the concern of pure reason, the apprehension of the empirical world, 
(not practical reason which is the realm of freedom), at another level, nature cannot be 
64 The essay, 'The Analytical Language of John Wilkins' is included in Other Inquisitions 1937-1952 
(Borges 1964:101-105). 
65 In Wilkins' language each class was 'assigned a monosyllable of two letters; to each difference, a 
consonant; to each species, a vowel. For example, de means element; deb, the first element, fire; deba, a 
portion of the element of fire, a flame' (1973: 102). 
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excluded from the moral dimension. In fact it sometimes appears as 'the absolute that 
holds sway in us all and is supposed to indicate to us what is good and evil. And these 
indications are themselves equated with the good because they have their origins in what 
characterizes mankind as such, namely his reason' (2001: 93-94). Nature becomes in 
some way the guarantor both of reason and of morality. 
Conclusion 
I have argued, following Foucault, that one of the formative aspects of modernity was 
the way in which, in the emerging language of scientific rationality, what might 
legitimately and authoritatively be said about nature was reduced. One of the significant 
elements of this process was the exclusion of language, both in terms of the narratives 
which bound natural objects to the social world, and in terms of the idea that natural 
elements were signs, that the world was a book which could be read. Instead nature was 
considered to be best represented through the system of mathematics. Nature was 
matter, and although it revealed itself to have complex interlocking systems, these 
systems were organic not linguistic. This was important because, as John Wilkins 
recognised, languagesoid not define themselves. Arbitrary, inefficient, ambiguous, and 
irreducibly social they could not provide an analytic tool which could accurately 
describe the world. 
Yet in the period after the Second World War, language took on a new 
significance in representing nature within the realm of the natural sciences. This took a 
number of different forms. In the next chapter I will look at one aspect of this in the 
renewed interest in the language of animals, especially that of the anthropoid apes. 
Earlier studies of primates had regarded language as being one, or perhaps the defining 
characteristic of humanity, the one which separated it absolutely from all other animals. 
Animals, part of the natural world, shared with it a kind of silence, an exclusion from 
language. Animals, like other elements in the natural world conformed to a set of natural 
laws, and in understanding them it was useful to consider the analogy of the machine. In 
the period after the war, however, the resemblance between nature and machine no 
longer appeared convincing. In the light of theories of quantum mechanics, and of 
genetics, the idea that organic systems behaved in a way similar to those in mechanical 
systems was replaced by the idea that organic systems more closely resembled 
languages, with all the complexities and ambiguities implicit in linguistic systems. The 
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analogy of the book returns although this time the book of nature, imagined as a 
multiplicity of codes is conceptualized as incomplete, as something which it might be 
possible to revise. Yet the justifications for these revisions, the ethics of reconstructing 
. what was previously considered to be complete, remain difficult to ground. 
The phenomenon that I am calling the end of nature thus includes a number of 
contradictory elements, both the domination of nature - its commodification within 
reserves, and its translation into the raw materials and by-products of industry, and its 
elevation as precisely the value that opposes such a system. If the history of nature as 
an object of science has promoted an increasing abstraction, an exclusion of everything 
that might connect it to a human history, at the end of the twentieth century this 
exclusion suddenly appears as a source of concern, a sudden recognition that this 
conceptual exclusion of the living creature, the human subject, might have disastrously 
literal consequences. The problem then becomes how to return the living creature to a 
relationship with the object, how to make it possible for human subjects to continue to 
live in a world thoroughly transformed into product. As a word, 'nature', in the second 
half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century seems to 
acquire both indefiniteness and intensity. In the chapters that follow I try to trace some 
of the ways in which 'nature' as animals, bodies, and essence (or human nature) 
operates variously as a hinge, a symptom, and a screen in this desire to find a new 
relationship with the object. 
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Chapter 3 
The Language of Animals 
The relation of children to animals depends entirely on the fact that Utopia goes 
disguised in the creatures whom Marx even begrudged the surplus value they 
contributed as workers. In existing without any purpose recognizable to men, 
animals hold out, as if for expression, their own names, utterly impossible to 
exchange. This makes them so beloved of children, their contemplation so 
blissful. I am a rhinoceros, signifies the shape of rhinoceros. (Adorno 1978: 228) 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the phenomenon I am calling the 'end of nature , 
encompasses a complex set of interrelated processes. In relation to external nature, it 
involves both the literal destruction of habitats, including human habitats, through the 
globalization of the 'side-effects' of industrial production, the commodification of 
reserves of 'untouched nature', and an inflation of the idea of nature as a sign of value. 
This attachment to nature as value, I suggest, represents a real discontent with the levels 
of estrangement, with the' damaged life' of late capitalism, but also a misunderstanding 
of the way in which nature might still be able to indicate something outside of consumer 
culture. 
In this chapter I am going to look at how similar processes are at work in 
people's relations with animals. Animals, increasingly marginalized from people's lives, 
at least in the developed world and in urban centres world wide, enter into consumer 
society as commodities, most obviously as meat, but also as elements within the 
production of knowledge, as objects of research, and as pets. At the same time, there is a 
corresponding inflation of the idea of animals as valuable, both intrinsically and as 
mediators between people and nature perceived to be lost or extinguished. In order to 
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follow the threads of this argument through the vast and extremely complex field of the 
global cohabitation of people and animals, this chapter will focus predominantly on how 
these processes emerge in people's relations with two species, apes and dogs. I have 
chosen these two because they represent two opposite extremes, one wild and literally 
distant yet perceived to be biologically proximate, the other domestic, proximate yet 
biologically distant. 
APPROXIMATE RELATIONS 
Animals and Their Remainder 
It is perhaps significant that the entry in Minima Moralia on animals quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter comes under the heading Toy shop and relates to the 
relationship between children and the 'damaged life' of capitalist social relations. The 
idea that children have a special connection with animals is not new. One way in which 
they have been linked is through the idea of a natural origin for human culture.66 A 
central element of this chapter is an exhibition of paintings by chimpanzees held in 
1957. This exhibition, organized by biologist and painter Desmond Morris, was result of 
his work with a chimpanzee at the London zoo and marks an interesting moment in the 
history of thinking about relations between between nature and culture. A quotation 
from the exhibition catalogue provides an interesting example of one way the connection 
between animals and children has been articulated. The exhibition catalogue, written by 
Morris, states that: 
The patterns [in chimpanzee paintings] give us an important new source of 
information to help us trace the origins of human art. Much useful knowledge 
has been gathered in recent years from the study of the work of children, the art 
of primitive people, the pictures of the mentally unstable or deficient, and the 
remnants of prehistoric cultures. We now have drawings and paintings by our 
closest relatives the chimpanzees as further guides. 67 
A particular relationship to time marks the narrative that makes possible this particular 
grouping of subjects - children, primitive people, prehistoric cultures, chimpanzees and 
the insane. All of them are, from Morris' point of view, outside of historical time, and 
66 For a discussion of apes and the origins of the human species see Jones (1994:118-136). 
67 Morris, D. 'Paintings by Chimpanzees' Exhibition Catalogue, Tate Gallery Archives, London. 
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contain a trace of that connection with nature which has been lost in modem society.68 
The story of human relations with animals in Western culture since the nineteenth 
century is inextricably linked to the pursuit of secular origin stories.69 Such stories are 
about an imagined past, but they are also about a political present, about identifying the 
truth about human's own nature, their species-life, and imagining a future. 
The connection between children and animals that Adorno points to is quite 
different. For him, both are subjects whose existence cannot be contained within the 
purposes of consumer society. It is not so much that children are like animals, connected 
to some more natural condition, but rather that children perceive in animals something 
that eludes the reduction of things to commodities. Animals confirm children's suspicion 
that everything cannot be reduced to a relation of equivalence.7o 
Adorno suggests that for children all work is perceived to be undertaken for the 
'pleasure of doing' whereas under capitalism all work becomes flattened under the 
pressure of 'earning a living' which 'commandeers all those activities as mere means, 
reduces them to interchangeable, abstract labour -time' (1978: 227). 71 This, he argues, 
has a profound effect on perception: 
68 In his later work, The Naked Ape, Morris revises this opinion suggesting that contemporary 
'primitive' or tribal societies (as studied by anthropologists) cannot provide useful information about 
'natural forms of human behaviour because they represent a failed branches of the human species, ones 
which have 'gone wrong.' (1968:10) The same is true of the insane, the subjects of psychoanalysis. It is 
interesting to note this shift. In 1957, what interests Morris is the possibility of accessing something 
outside the modem condition. In 1968 only apes are left confronting humans as mirrors of natural human 
behaviour. Because of the focus of this chapter on animals, a discussion of the fascinating and troubling 
concept of 'the primitive' and its place in modem art and theories about nature could not included. See 
the thoughtful interrogation of the concept in (Price 1989). 
69 This is predominantly as a result of Darwin's writing and the growing influence of evolutionary 
theory; but John Berger suggests that the idea of animals as mediators between people and their origins is 
even older. He writes: 'What were the secrets of animal's likeness with, and unlikeness from man? The 
secret whose existence man recognized as soon as he intercepted an animal's look. In one sense the whole 
of anthropology, concerned with the passage from nature to culture, is an answer to that question. But 
there is also a general answer. All the secrets were about animals as an intercession between man and his 
origins. Darwin's evolutionary theory, indelibly stamped as it is with the European 19th century, 
nevertheless belongs to a tradition, almost as old as man himself. (1980:4). 
10 For a fascinating comparable discussion of the relations between children and animals see Alphonso 
Lingis' essay 'Bestiality' (Lingis 2000). Lingis suggests that as children we learn to make our feelings 
intelligible through our contact with animals. For example, he writes: 'They [children] pick up feelings 
of smouldering wrath from the chained dog in the neighbor's yard and they try out those feeling by 
snarling when they are put under restraints or confined.(Lingis 2000: 6). 
71 In this he echoes Marx's early writing on estrangement: 'In estranging nature from man and man from 
himself, from his own active function, his life activity, estranged labour estranges the species from man; 
for him it turns his species-life into a means to his individual life. First its estranges species-life and 
individual life, and then it makes the latter in its abstract form into the aim of the former, likewise in its 
abstract and estranged form.' (1994: 75) Adorno's actual reference is to Capital, to Marx's note on the 
'equivalent form'. 
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The quality of things ceases to be their essence and becomes the accidental 
appearance of their value.' Their value, that which marks their place in the 
system of exchange, displaces their quality, which becomes mere appearance, an 
attachment to catch the eye and sell the product. He suggests that: 
'disenchantment with the contemplated world is the sensorium's reaction to its 
objective role as a 'commodity world'. Only when purified of appropriation 
would things be colourful and useful at once: under universal compulsion the two 
cannot be reconciled. (1978: 227-8)72 
Children, Adorno argues, perceive the 'contradiction between phenomenon and 
fungibility that the resigned adult no longer sees' (1978: 228). In other words, they 
recognize that the quality of things cannot be contained within their value as articles of 
exchange. 73 Play, Adorno suggests, is the way in which children refuse to observe the 
rules of commercial society. He writes: 'In his purposeless activity the child, by 
subterfuge, sides with use-value against exchange value. Just because he deprives the 
things with which he plays of their mediated usefulness, he seeks to rescue in them what 
is benign towards men and not what subserves the exchange relation that equally 
deforms men and things' (1978: 228). 
Play permits the child to evade the demand that things are real and useful only in 
so far as they fulfill a particular social purpose. Adorno uses the example of a little truck 
which is moved around in imitation of the actual movement of vehicles yet remains 
outside any real economy, a sort of allegorical fragment of the real. He writes: 'The 
unreality of games gives notice that reality is not yet real. Unconsciously they [ children] 
rehearse the right life' (1978: 228). The utopian promise of animals is precisely of this 
kind - a stubborn existence outside of mediated usefulness. This is not to deny that 
animals have been made useful, incorporated in innumerable different ways into the 
practices of advanced industrial society, as product or image or research object. It is 
simply to argue that what children find fascinating about animals is the fact that they 
cannot be reduced simply to this, assimilated entirely to the purposes of man. 
The following section focuses on some of the various ways in which apes are 
72 This reconciliation is precisely what characterizes William Morris' utopian society, the combination of 
the aesthetic and the useful in things produced outside of any system of exchange, 
73 It is noteworthy that this element in children can itself be drawn into the realm of advertising. In a 
recent Master card advertisement on South African television, a list of children's toys and prices is read 
out while a child is shown ignoring the toys and playing with the a cardboard box they carne in, The 
final line ' ... watching her play with the box instead, priceless. Some things money can't buy, for 
everything else, there's Master card' shows the ability of advertising to attach itself to anything which 
might still be considered a sign of value. 
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drawn into the purposes of man in the second half of the twentieth century - the story 
of people's approximate relation with apes. I use the term 'approximate' both to 
suggest the nearness of this relation but also to draw attention to the inexactness that 
characterizes attempts to define this connection. This exhibition by of paintings by 
chimpanzees is important not so much because, as Morris hoped, it provides insight 
into the origins of human art, but rather because it indicates a particular desire - the 
desire to know something about animals beyond that which can be read on their bodies 
or in observed behaviour. The project, which created the structural conditions for certain 
apes in captivity to paint, indicates an interest in finding a point of intersection between 
the species-life of apes and that of people. The paintings, or perhaps even more so the 
exhibition of these paintings, momentarily position apes as subjects of expression. It 
represents an early articulation of what becomes one of the defIning interests of 
twentieth century primatology - the speaking animal. 
Imagined Relations 
Animals as subjects of fiction speak long before they do as objects of science. Before 
looking more closely at the exhibition of ape art itself, I will look briefly at some of the 
ways in which speaking apes had already been imagined. Franz Kafka's short story 'A 
Report to an Academy,' first published in 1917, provides perhaps the most substantial 
address by an ape to the world of science and I wi1llook at it in some detail. But 
Kafka's story was not the fITst attempt to explore the new possibilities opened up by 
the theory of evolution and the gradual acceptance of apes as human's nearest animal 
relatives. As early as the eighteenth century the resemblance between certain apes, such 
as the orang utang, and human suggested a close relationship. H.W. Janson notes that: 
Those who regarded the orang-outang as human received support from the 
Systema Naturae of Linnaeus (1736), which classified the creature as a species of 
man and assigned it the name of Homo nocturnus of Homo silvestris. Rousseau 
and Lord Monboddo went so far as to place man and the orang-outang within 
the same species, and the latter author even asserted that language was not 
'natural to man' , since the capacity for speech must be inherent in both varieties 
of the species, even though only man happened to develop it to the point of 
actual use. (1952: 337) 
Works such as Thomas Love Peacock's Sir Melincourt published in 1817, interpret 
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kinship in tenns of apes' capacity for humanness, and stress the infinite possibilities for 
transfonnation provided by education. 
Evolutionary theory shifted the meaning of the resemblance between humans and 
apes. In the Middle Ages monkeys as distorted or defective reflections of humans 
mirrored the limitations, follies and vanities of the human condition. They reflected a 
particular aspect of the animal in humans; not the nobility oflions or eagles but the 
mockery of imitation.74 In pre-modern societies animals existed in close proximity to 
people, not only in tenns of physical proximity but also figuratively, in metaphors, in 
the way in which the world was described, in the way in which experience was 
articulated. Foucault describes how descriptions of animals shifts in the eighteenth 
century. He writes that 'the whole of animal semantics has disappeared, like a dead and 
useless limb. The words which have been interwoven in the very being of the beast have 
been unraveled and removed: and the living being, in its anatomy, its form, its habits, its 
birth and death appears as though stripped naked' (1970: 129). This 'naked' animal, 
placed in juxtaposition to other similar or dissimilar animals, fonns the basis of the 
taxonomic project of natural history. In this period, Foucault suggests, 'creatures 
present themselves, one beside another, their surfaces visible, grouped according to their 
common features, and thus already virtually analyzed, and bearers of nothing but their 
own individual names' (1970: 131). 
This shift to the age of classification, in which language and history are 
separated out from the descriptions of animals is followed in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century by another epistemological shift, one which reintroduces time 
into the static frame of the catalogue, but in a very different way. For Foucault, History, 
with a capital H, is the 'fundamental mode of being' of modernity, the fonn which 
makes possible the empirical study of organisms. 
At the same time, biological time, or the time of the organism, emerges in the 
nineteenth century as a time beyond the domain of human history. The age of the earth, 
as posited by geologists such as Charles Lyell in the 1830s, the slow gradual changes 
which made possible Darwin's theory of adaption creates a space for animals, including 
now human animals, to occupy what is at once in time and unconnected with or outside 
74 For a detailed discussion of the iconography of apes in the Middle Ages see Janson (1952: 199-237). 
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of human history.75 Evolutionary time places humans and animals in a temporal relation, 
the relation of descent. In the second half of the nineteenth century, after Darwin's The 
Origin of Species (1859) and the Descent of Man (1871), this relation appears 
startlingly immediate. From being on opposite sides of the mirror, apes shift with 
evolutionary theory to occupy a relation of contiguity.76 
In Kafka's story the ape who narrates the story has reformulated himself in 
order to enter a human way of life, but the path which brought him to this 
transformation is not innocent. Captured on the Gold Coast of Africa, he recognizes that 
to gain any sort of freedom he has to tum himself into a human. He does this through an 
effort of will overcoming with difficulty his revulsion at human behaviour - but the 
physical freedom he gains as a result of his transformation has certain costs as he 
explains in his report. Becoming human means the determined giving up of his origins 
and as he enters further and further into the human world, his memory of his past 
diminishes. Becoming human, the story suggests, is a process of forgetting. In one sense 
Kafka's story foreshadows the work of Freud's theory of repression in Civilization and 
its Discontents (1930). But here the animal life is lost with regret. Humanness is marked 
by the violence it does to other forms of life. They become, the narrative implies, 
literally unthinkable. 
The narrator of Kafka's tale is captured in Africa. The history of the relation 
between apes and western culture is, as Donna Haraway suggests, deeply implicated in 
the historical positioning of Africa in the global culture which emerges in the twentieth 
century. (1989: 18) Africa is the home of many, although not all, of the apes and 
monkeys which become the objects of western science. In 'Report to the Academy' the 
narrator is not destined for the laboratory but he is nevertheless part of the commercial 
trade in apes. He is captured to be sold and his ultimate end as star of the variety stage 
is only accomplished through his act of transformation. The variety stage, as a space of 
performance and illusion, provides a space for the ambiguous, those who do not fit 
easily into the categories of the society they inhabit. 
In response to the Academy's request that he give them an 'account of the life I 
formerly led as an ape' he explains that 'the opening in the distance ... through which I 
75 Sir Charles Lyell (1797-1875) was a British geologist whose notion of 'uniformitarianism' suggested 
that the gradual processes shaping the physical world today, such as erosion, were what had, in the past, 
formed the earth into the shape it is today. 
76 Turning Haeckle's classic statement of evolution around, phylogeny was seen to recapitulate ontogeny 
and so apes were seen as children who with the aid of education attain a similar mature humanness. 
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once came myself, has grown so small that, even if my strength and my will power 
sufficed to get me back to it, I should have to scrape my very skin from my body to 
crawl through.' (1983: 250) Although the ape, known as Red Peter, frames this return as 
a movement through time, he describes it terms of an actual, physical process - one 
which would involve the scraping off of his skin. It is as if the life he led as an ape 
remains inside him but it can only be accessed through a process which physically 
removes his skin, an image suggestive of the process of dissection. His life history can 
only be read in his dissected body, after he has been transformed from a speaking 
subject into an object of scientific knowledge. 
His first word, spoken in a moment of triumph as he overcomes his revulsion 
for schnapps and takes his first drink, decides him on the line he is to follow. This 
process of overcoming revulsion is significant not only because it represents a triumph 
over the body, a subordination of its physical resistance to his will, but also because it 
marks the moment when the ape ceases merely to imitate human gestures of drinking 
and enters into the substance of the activity people are engaged in. The ape enters the 
substance of being human through an act of subordinating the body. His conscious 
decision to be human divides the mind and the body, which must from this time 
onwards always be subjected to his will, controlled and directed according to the 
conventions of human behaviour. 
Red Peter emphasizes the pragmatic nature of his decision to become human. In 
the interest of attaining freedom in human society (and for no other reason) he embarks 
on a project of learning. During this process, he explains, 'my ape nature fled out of me, 
head over heels and away, so that my first teacher was himself almost turned into an ape 
by it, had soon to give up teaching and was taken away to a mental hospital (1983: 258). 
His current life, as star of the variety stage, is a life of comparative freedom. He 
has achieved what he set out to do. Yet he comments: 
When I come home late at night from banquets, from scientific receptions, from 
social gatherings, there sits waiting for me a half-trained little chimpanzee and I 
take comfort from her as apes do. By day I cannot bear to see her; for she has 
the insane look of the bewildered half-broken animal in her eye; no one else sees 
it, but I do, and I cannot bear it. (1983: 259) 
Having acquired human language and a position in human society he recognizes a 
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separation between himself and other apes. The young chimpanzee is an animal 
bewildered by the conditions of a human way of life. Her ape nature has not fled out of 
her, and like the teacher who almost acquired the ape nature by mistake she is marked 
by a kind of insanity. Red Peter himself maintains his sanity only at a cost: 
You have done me the honor of inviting me to give your Academy an account of 
the life I formerly led as an ape. 
I regret that I cannot comply with your request to the extent you desire. 
It is now five years since I was an ape, a short space of time, perhaps, according 
to the calendar, but an infinitely long time to gallop through at full speed, as I 
have done, more or less accompanied by excellent mentors, good advice, 
applause, and orchestral music, yet essentially alone, since all my escorters, to 
keep the image, kept well off the course (1983: 250) 
Within the context of human language, animals are enigmatic even to themselves. In 
Kafka's story, the ape, by learning the language of the academy, loses his connection 
with his own species being, his ape nature. He thus cannot be what the academy wishes 
him to be, a true 'native informant', who can speak from the other side of the 
nature/culture divide, restoring not only people's lost connection with nature, but 
providing also crucial information about the primate family and the mysterious origin of 
man. For much of the early part of the century, language within the Western 
philosophical tradition was considered one of the defming characteristics of 
humanness.77 The failure of apes to learn human language was taken to imply a cognitive 
inability to master the complex symbolic abstractions that the use of language implies. 
From this it was deduced that as the ability to learn language is inherently human, the 
deep structures of syntax are genetically coded into human DNA.78 Yet the fascination 
with the language of animal remained, evident in the development of projects after the 
Second World War both in the area of teaching apes sign language and in studying apes' 
communications with each other in an attempt to understand animal modes of 
communication. In Kafka's story it is the 'Academy' which is the silent yet very 
present audience of the narrative. This silent presence is what defmes the possibility of 
speech because despite the narrator's evident facility with speech, he cannot tell them 
77 Cf. Hegel describing animals lives as 'separate and cut off from one another, with no universality of 
consciousness present in them' (1967: 703) does much to sum up the dominant Western tradition from 
Aristotle to Wittgenstein. 
78 This is the basic contention of the theory of Generative Grammar elaborated initially by Noam 
Chomsky in his books Syntactic Structures (1957); and Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965). 
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what they want to hear. He cannot speak to them from the position of animalness. 
The History of the Academy 
In the early part of the twentieth century, the idea of apes becoming humans, of 
occupying an actual continuity with humans (of being able to follow the evolutionary 
path within a single life time) was replaced by the idea of apes as models of natural 
human behaviour. Apes were seen to be both like humans in so far as they shared a 
similar physiology and unlike them, since they had not been deformed by culture. The 
study of apes was a study of what was natural in humans. Biologist and philosopher of 
science, Donna Haraway in her comprehensive investigation of primatology in the 
twentieth century, Primate Visions (1989), describes one of the first major primate 
research facilities in the USA, the Yale laboratories which were established in 1924 
under Robert Yerkes. 79 Yerkes states explicitly that the aim of the study of the 
psychobiology of chimpanzees is ultimately directed towards improving human 
adjustment to their environment. He asserts that 'on every hand, lack of such an 
adjustment is exhibited in physical and mental diseases ... and the discontent or 
unhappiness which exists in a large proportion of men and women in every walk of life' 
(Quoted in Haraway 1989: 72). The failure of humans to adjust to the stresses of 
complex modem society was considered to be a result of an insufficient understanding of 
their own natural drives. Primate studies provided the information to guide social 
practices, to establish a project of human engineering which would assist people's 
satisfactory adjustment to their environment. Not only did this framework of 
understanding naturalize certain social forms, such as the family, which was understood 
to be a biological norm among primates, it also shifted the responsibility for adjustment 
onto the individual and the society. Society and individuals were criticized for resisting 
the natural patterns of hierarchy and the biological division oflabour. In what Haraway 
refers to as the 'Age of Biology', nature, in the form of our next of kin in the 
evolutionary line of descent is regarded as the primary measure for human behaviour. 
But this appeal to 'nature' is unlike the earlier Romantic appeal to nature as a corrective 
to the alienating effects of industrial society and the deformation of social relations it 
imposed. For the Romantics, access to nature was immediate and personal. For Yerkes 
79 Robert Yerkes (1876-1956) taught psychology at Harvard University from 1902 to 1917 and at Yale 
University from 1924 to 1944. 
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and other primatologists, nature was something only to be revealed through rigorous 
scientific inquiry. The laws or truths of nature emerged after a complex series of tests, 
observations and repeated experiments. 
In describing his research at one of the early European primate stations at 
Tenerife, Wolfgang Kohler comments on the importance of experimental design in 
defining the meaning of animals' responses. In summing up the results of an experiment 
with a chimpanzee, Sultan, he writes: "we have performed one experiment, which, for a 
beginning, contains conditions too complicated to teach us much, and, therefore, we see 
the necessity of beginning the next examination with elementary problems in which, if 
possible, the animal's conduct can have one meaning only" (1957 [1925]: 16, my 
italics). In the experiment, which involved a basket of fruit hanging on a rope from the 
ceiling of the cage which was loosely anchored to a tree stump, Sultan always managed 
to get the fruit but never performed what Kohler suggests would be the 'best solution', 
simply removing the loop that anchored the basket and letting it drop to the floor. 
Sultan's behaviour (which involved breaking the cord) could not be translated into 
evidence for the presence or absence of particular cognitive processes. The experimental 
design had not successfully excluded the complexity of the world. Scientific research 
demanded a particular relationship with the apes, one which limited the possible 
meanings of any action until the action and meaning could have a one-to-one 
correlation.8o 
Thus, although non-human primates were seen as guides to what was natural in 
and for humans, human intervention was considered necessary. Yerkes explains in 1941 
that: 
It has always been a feature of our plan for the use of the chimpanzee as an 
experimental animal to shape it intelligently to specification instead of trying to 
preserve its natural characteristics. We believe it important to convert the animal 
into as nearly ideal a subject for biological research as is practicable. And with 
this intent has been associated the hope that eventual success might serve as an 
effective demonstration of the possibility of re-creating man himself in the image 
of a generally acceptable ideal... .(Quoted in Haraway 1989: 64) 
Evolutionary theory implied an infinitely malleable subject. If a creature could adapt to 
gO For fa scinating discussion of Kohler and of the question of the place of animals in modem culture 
morre generally see Coetzee (1999). 
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its environment, it could be adapted by a conscious intervention. It could be altered so 
that it more closely approximated 'an ideal'. The shaping of chimpanzees modelled the 
possible shaping of humans. Even in field studies, human intervention was considered 
necessary. Patterns of hierarchy and dominance were tested through 'defect 
experiments', the removal, for instance, of the dominant male to study the effects of this 
alteration on the social structure of a group. 
Haraway notes a shift in the conceptual framework which supported primate 
studies in the West after the Second World War. The nature of the war, and the way in 
which science was implicated in the war, had a profound effect on the way scientific 
research was practiced after the war. On the one hand, the war promoted the 
development of a national body for funding scientific research in the US, and showed a 
general willingness on the part of the government to invest in research. This meant that 
money was available for diverse projects (HarawayI989: 120-121). At the same time 
the potentially catastrophic results of scientific research were becoming evident for the 
first time. In The Age of Extremes, Hobsbawm suggests that: 
The idea that science equals potential catastrophe essentially belongs to the 
second half of the century; in its first phase - the nightmare of nuclear war - to 
the era of superpower confrontation after the 1945; in its later and more 
universal phase, to the era of crisis that opened in the 1970s. (1994: 534) 
As late as the 1930s, it was possible for Nobel Prize winner, Robert Millikan, to 
write confidently in defence of scientific research that: 'One may sleep in peace with the 
consciousness that the creator has put some foolproof elements into his handiwork, and 
that man is powerless to do any titanic damage' (Quoted in Hobsbawm 1994: 534). 
Despite local interferences, nature as a total system was perceived to greatly exceed the 
power of applied science. The impact of applied nuclear technology, and later in the 
1970s, the recognition of the effects ofCFCs and carbon dioxide on the structure of the 
atmosphere effectively destroyed this certainty. In different ways, postwar primatology 
responded to this recognition of nature not as an invulnerable certainty, but as part of 
the damaged life of postwar society. 
Before the Second World War, the silence of animals made them ideal surrogates 
for humans in a number of different fields medicine, sociology, psychology as well as 
evolutionary biology. They communicated only through the experimental frame 
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constructed by the scientist or the observer. The infonnation they provided was 
contained in their conduct, in their behaviour, in their responses to the problems set out 
for them or, in medical research, in the responses of their immune systems to the 
problems of infection by disease. After the Second World War, although apes continued 
to act as models for understanding human behaviour and human society, they were 
entered into a new set of relationships influenced by the ascendance of communication 
theory (Haraway 1989: 102). 
The discourse of communication theory involved reading all processes as part of 
a complex system of infonnation exchange. Haraway argues that: 
A technological relocation of the principles of semiotics has been important in 
the transition from physiological to cybernetic logics in many biologies, including 
the biology of social behaviour. In transition, the organism as living responder to 
the sign vehicle lost its privileged position. The more powerful analysis of sign 
systems, cybernetics, dispensed with the need for a biological organism, in the 
same way that ergonomics considered a human worker as a technical system 
component whose status as a living organism was interpreted in strict 
communications engineering tenns. Organisms appear in both ergonomics and 
machine theories of communication. What has gone definitively is the privileged 
status attaching to life or consciousness. Organisms become biotic components, 
highly interesting, but not onto logically special, in cybernetic systems sciences. 
(1989: 103) 
Within this new explanatory framework, apes became what Haraway refers to as 
'natural-technical objects within a number of different intersecting systems. This was 
most obvious in the space programme where apes, literally linked up to computers, 
became components of the complex system of the shuttle. But it was also evident in the 
new fascination with the language of apes. A new research emphasis focused on 
studying apes in their natural environment and recording the system of gestures and 
vocalizations understood as part of a complex system of infonnation exchange. In the 
work of researchers like Jane Goodall and Dian Fossey, apes, studied in their natural 
habitat, became not so much models for human society but intennediaries. 81 They 
promised to provide the connection with nature which had been lost in modem, 
industrialized culture. 
" American zoologist Dian Possey (1932-1988) studied the mountain gorillas of Virunga mountains in 
East Central Africa .. Her experiences are described in Gorillas in the Mist (1983). English zoologist Jane 
Goodall (b. 1934) worked with Chimpanzees in the Gombe Stream National Park. See The Chimpanzees 
of Gombe: Patterns of Behavior (Goodall 1986). 
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At the same time, progress was being made towards teaching apes human 
language. The failure of earlier attempts to teach apes language was attributed to their 
lack of cognitive capacity, but the success of the Gardners in teaching the ape, Washoe, 
American sign language suggested that the problem had been physiological and not 
related to the capacity for syntactical thinking.82 With Washoe, Koko and others 
animals were for the first time entered into the system of language previously considered 
to be the exclusive domain of humans. Haraway suggests that: 
Teaching apes human language and learning from them how they communicate 
with their own kind were both efforts to open the border inherited from the 
separation of nature and culture. Surrogates, rehabilitants, language students, and 
adopted children: apes modeled a solution to a deep cultural activity sharpened 
by the real possibility in the late twentieth century of western people's 
destruction of the earth. (1992: 132) 
The Gardner's work with Washoe began in 1966, almost fifty years after the 
publication of Kafka's story. Slightly more than ten years before Washoe began to 
express herself in human language however, Desmond Morris began his experiment into 
the ability of apes to engage in human acts of self- expression. 
Exhibiting Ape Painting 
Morris was not the first person to experiment with apes' ability to draw. As early as 
1913, Nadjeta Kohts had begun a comparative study with a chimpanzee, Joni, who was 
brought up alongside her own child for three years so that their respective cognitive 
development could be observed and documented (Lenain 1997: 61-62). Part of this 
study involved studying Joni's ability with pencil and paper. However, it was only in 
the ] 950s, largely due to the work of Morris that ape art became significant beyond 
isolated scientific experiments. Art historian, Thierry Lenain, suggests that: 
There is no doubt...that we would not be talking about the 'ape art period' if 
Desmond Morris had not synthesized all these various experiments in his work 
at the London Zoo. Not only did his work at the zoo with Congo, the 
chimpanzee, either launch or directly influence everything connected with ape art 
from the late 1950s onwards, but the acceptance of ape art in cultivated circles 
was also due to his efforts. He was also responsible for gaining international 
82 See discussion of the Gardner's work with Washoe in Linden (.1976). On research into chimpanzees 
and language see also Paul Hirst and Penny Wooley (1982: esepcially 76-84). 
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status for ape art - beyond the milieux of the laboratories and the avant-garde art 
enthusiasts - this time in a way which was far removed from the traditional idea 
of monkey as caricature of man. (1997: 76) 
The exhibition organised by Morris in 1957 displayed the paintings both of Congo, the 
chimpanzee he was working with at the London Zoo and of Betsy, a Chimpanzee 
engaged in a similar project at the Baltimore Zoo. In the exhibition catalogue, Morris 
explains the significance of his research. He writes: 'Recent research has shown that 
some chimpanzees are surprisingly ready to avail themselves of an opportunity to 
paint. Furthermore, the paintings the produce contain interesting abstract patterns. , 83 
Morris notes that these abstract patterns bore a distinct resemblance to contemporary 
modern painting, particularly to the gestural art of painters such as Jackson Pollock and 
suggests that this correspondence raises interesting questions about the existence of an 
originary or natural form of expression. 
Although the paintings were presented as 'scientific artifact,' part of a serious 
investigation into the relationship between biology and culture, they were received as 
works of art. In the book he published elaborating the findings of his research, The 
Biology of Art (1962), Morris writes: 
The Institute for Contemporary Arts was bombarded with requests to put the 
Congo paintings on sale and, in a weak moment, it agreed to do so. A rather high 
price was placed on them, so that only a few wou Id go, to the LC.A ' s most 
insistent visitors. A few days later it was decided that this was a mistake and 
that the selling of pictures would start a trend that would lead away from the 
scientific value of the work. To our horror, we found that it was too late, for, in 
those few days, practically every Congo picture in the exhibition (twenty-four 
Congos were on show) had been sold. (1962: 27) 
This public fascination with and desire to possess painting by Congo even at a 'rather 
high price' suggests that people attributed a value to these paintings which went beyond 
their value as ' scientific artifacts'. The paintings by Congo and Betsy, moved from one 
context to another, were transformed from the results of a 'scientific' experiment to 
cultural artifacts within the complex value system of modern art. The exhibition, taken 
up as a manifestation of surrealism, became less an rational exposition of a scientific 
principle than a fascinating example of a kind of ' pure psychic automatism,' pure 
'3 Morris, D. 1957. 'Paintings by Chimpanzees' Exhibition Catalogue, Tate Gallery Archives, London. 
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expression without the defonning intervention of human reason.84 
What is interesting about this confusion over the status of the paintings is that it 
suggests a moment of openness in which the ambiguities and contradictions inherent in 
the relationship between man and animal came temporarily to the surface. For a moment 
these concrete objects, 24 paintings by Congo, coexisted in two contradictory systems 
of value, as aesthetic commodities and as scientific artifacts, both objects of exchange 
and objects of knowledge. 
If the contradictoriness of this position is not immediately apparent, this is 
because at the tum of the twenty-first century this opposition no longer exists. Science, 
in the era of biotechnology, no longer regards commerce as a contamination. In 1957, 
scientific knowledge still insisted upon its independence from commerce, its 
'seriousness' as compared to the triviality of exchange. The Gallery and Morris's 
acknowledgment of that a 'mistake' has been made, indicates a recognition of the 
power of the market to reduce all objects even aesthetic ones to commodities and 
consequently to reduce their potential meaning to that which can be subsumed within 
the principle of exchange. As paintings, the fact of their singular mode of production is 
lost and they become no more than a surrealist sleight of hand. 
Morris' attempts to interpret Congo's paintings, seeing in their similarity to 
modem styles of abstract painting the suggestion that there is a biological origin to art. 
Modem art he suggest, becomes more and more abstract as it loses it function as 
communication or rather as this function is taken over by photography. Abstract art 
becomes then 'pure aesthetic experiment' and in this way comes to resemble the 
painting of primates. However the abstractness of the categories that Morris is able to 
come up with suggests that Congo's painting represent a problem for interpretation 
which cannot be solved through relying on their superficial resemblances to modem 
abstract art. After mentioning the six basic principles of artistic self-expression, 'self-
rewarding activation', 'compositional control', 'calligraphic differentiation', 'thematic 
84 In the Surrealist Manifesto, Andre Breton define surrealism as follows: ' Pure psychic automatism, by 
which it is intended to express, whether verbally or in writing, or in any other way, the real processes of 
thought. Thought's dictation, free from any control by the reason, independent of any esthetic or moral 
preoccupation' (quoted in Read 1978: 132). In an interview, Salvador Dati claimed authoritatively to 
have paintings by sea urchins: 'I now have paintings by sea urchins. I shall soon be showing some of 
their work in New York. By nature they are all artists. Only some Chimpanzees can paint, but all sea 
urchins can. they paint with their tube feet and their art is genuinely informal. The hand of the 
chimpanzee is quasi-human - the hand of Jackson Pollock is almost animal' (1961: 84). 
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variation', 'optimum heterogeneity' and 'universal imagery' he comments that: 'Any 
rules that are basic enough to apply to several related species, rather than to one species 
or (as is more often the case in art theory) to more than one epoch of one species, must 
indeed be fundamental to the activity concerned' (1962: 168). The ambiguity however 
lies in what precisely the 'activity concerned' is. In order to establish these categories, 
Morris too, has to elide one very significant aspect of their production: the fact that at 
no point do the paintings exist for Congo as product. It is up to the human facilitator 
both to provide Congo with paint, one colour at a time, and to remove the painting at a 
certain point before the painting is discarded and destroyed. The paintings are not 
abstract in the same sense as modem art is abstract because they are not a deviation 
from a previously representational form of articulation. What Congo is doing when he 
accepts the paint brush and marks the page remains enigmatic. 
Congo, like Kafka's ape is asked to express his biological or originary self for the 
academy. The paintings which are the result of this request hold a peculiar fascination. 
They promise to express not only Congo's own self, but a clue to what might be 
originary and natural in humans. Of course, unlike Red Peter, Congo is not aware of the 
request concealed in the offer of paint and brushes. 
INTER1VIEDIATE FORMS 
The Form of Canine Lives 
We do not say that possibly a dog talks to itself. Is that because we are so 
minutely acquainted with its soul? (Wittgenstein 1958: 113) 
In evolutionary biology, the phrase 'intermediate form' refers to those creatures which 
provide evidence of the transition between species. 85 The sense in which I am using it 
here is slightly different. In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein proposes a 
fundamental incommensurability between the form of life of humans and that of animals. 
He writes: 'If a lion could talk, we could not understand him' (1958: 223). Language, he 
&5 In evolutionary biology, intermediate or transitional forms fOWld in the fossil record, like the 
Archaeopteryx, appear to have a combination of the characteristics of living species suggesting the 
existence of a common ancestor . 
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suggests, does not signify independently of the practical activity of living. This is made 
clear by the preceding note: 
We also say of some people that they are completely transparent to us. It is, 
however, important as regards this observation that one human being can be a 
complete enigma to another. We learn this when we come into a strange country 
with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even given a mastery of the 
country's language. We do not understand the people. (And not because of not 
knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet with 
them. (1958: 223) 
I suggest that dogs, though animals, do not fall into the same category as lions. 
This is because they share at least partially, by virtue of proximity, the form oflife that 
humans inhabit. Dogs are intermediate forms thus not by virtue of their anatomy but 
because of their form of life which is between, from the point of view of people, the 
incomprehensibility of wild dog life and the potential understandability of human life. 
This is not necessarily a distinction that Wittgenstein would agree with. However that 
dogs are more implicated in human forms of life is clear from the fact that they appear 
far more frequently in the Philosophical Investigation than lions. Dogs are troubling 
markers on the edge of human meaning. The questions he poses around dogs have to do 
with the question of how they enter human language games and where. Dogs appear as 
those who cannot be said to simulate pain or anticipate events in the future. Yet their 
place place within human forms of life means that they share at least some of elements 
of the subjectivity of that form of life. He writes: 
One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, startled. But 
hopeful? And why not? A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also 
believe that his master will come the day after tomorrow? And what can he not 
do here? - How do I do it? How am I supposed to answer this? Can only 
those hope who can talk?' (1958: 174) 
The commonality of a shared life is not sufficient to make dogs entirely comprehensible. 
Language, for Wittgenstein, is a mode of engagement with the world from which dogs are 
excluded and this absence oflanguage has certain implications - a dog cannot be divided 
from its own immediate thoughts and intentions. Yet despite this exclusion from 
language dogs exists in relation to humans; they expect something from humans in a way 
which most other animals do not. 
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The physical marginalisation of animals from the work of living has resulted in their 
absence from everyday experience of most people in the developed world and in most 
urban centres in the developing world. The modem city is not a space designed to 
accommodate species other than humans. Although some other species thrive there, like 
rats, pigeons, cockroaches they do so without overt engagement in the lives of the 
people they cohabit with. They do not, on the whole, acknowledge people or expect to 
be acknowledged. Pets are the obvious exception to this trend towards the 
marginalization of animals. Dogs and cats multiply even in densely populated city 
environments. 
The keeping of pets represents for John Berger an extremely reduced form of the 
relationship that once existed between humans and animals in pre-industrial societies 
where animals lives and human lives were bound by necessity. He writes: 
The practice of keeping animals regardless of their usefulness, the keeping, 
exactly, of pets ... is a modem innovation, and, on the social scale on which it 
exists today, is unique. It is part of that universal but personal withdrawal into 
the private small family, decorated or furnished with mementoes from the 
outside world, which is such a distinguishing feature of consumer societies. 
(1980: 12) 
Pets, Berger suggests, enter the household as 'mementoes' of the outside world. They 
are signs of something outside, of a different form of life to that permitted by a 
consumer society but at the same time their lives are entirely circumscribed by the limits 
imposed on them by their owner's implication in just such a society. Isolated, 
frequently sexually sterilized, limited in their movements and exercise, fed with artificial 
foods, they become, Berger argues, entirely 'creatures of their owner's way oflife' 
(1980: 12). This loss of autonomy means that they enter into a particular type of 
relationship with their owners. Berger writes: 
The pet offers its owner a mirror to a part that is otherwise never reflected. But, 
since in this relationship the autonomy of both parties has been lost (the owner 
has become the-special-man-he -is-only-to-his-pet, and the animal has become 
dependent on its owner for every physical need), the parallelism of their 
separate lives has been destroyed. (1980: 13) 
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Kate Soper is equally critical of the practice of pet keeping and suggests that 
pets serve as screens onto which people project their own thoughts and desires. She 
writes: 
... it is as if we use our pets in part to mitigate the inevitable elements of 
alienation that attach to a genuinely inter-subjective engagement. They 
allow us, as it were, to escape the strains and responsibilities of dealing 
with the other's autonomy. By transferring onto our pets a personality 
that we know in a sense to be a product of our own fantasy, we allow 
ourselves a privilege we cannot in our human personal relations: to feel 
confident that we are fu lIy loved by a subject even as we gratify the urge 
for total- and necessarily objectifying - possession of the other. 
(1995:84) 
One of the reason pets are ideally suited to perform this function is, Soper 
suggests, their lack of speech. Because they do not answer back, they are 
subjects who can recognize us without in any way threatening our subjectivity. 
'For to the pet,' she writes, 'we can impute whatever understanding of ourselves 
we intend to convey' (1995 :85). 
Haraway's latest manifesto challenges this interpretation of pet keeping. 
In a surprising move, one which seems to me fundamentally implicated in the 
phenomenon I am calling the end of nature, Haraway suggests that, in the early 
twenty-first century, the figure of the companion species might prove to be a 
more useful figure than that of the cyborg for generating 'liveable politics and 
ontologies in current life worlds'. She writes: 
I appropriated cyborgs to do feminist work in Reagan's Star Wars times 
of the mid-1980s. By the end of the millennium, cyborgs could no longer 
do the work of a proper herding dog to gather up the threads needed for 
critical inquiry. So I go happily to the dogs to explore the birth of the 
kennel to help craft tools for science studies and feminist theory in the 
present time, when secondary Bushes threaten to replace the old growth 
of more liveable naturecultures in the carbon budget politics of all water-
based life on earth. (2003: 4-5) 
Haraway does not seek to deny that practices of pet keeping are frequently 
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profoundly commodifying. The idea, common in the United States (and other 
developed nations) that 'unconditional love' is what defines relations between 
dogs and people, is, she suggests, particularly dangerous since it implies 
precisely the sort of total SUbjugation that Soper describes. But she suggests that 
the idea of a 'companion species' provides an interesting way of understanding 
the complex and contradictory ways in which the lives of humans and animals 
intersect in modem North America. Her investigation is into something new 
which is emerging although many of its aspects, such as the development of 
breeds, have long histories. The California-based magazine Bark describes itself 
as a magazine of ' Modern Dog Culture' and this, perhaps, best describes the 
subject of Haraway's text - the network of institutionalized and individual 
practices and histories that link human and dog lives. Although she admits that 
many of them are commodifying and unreflective she also insists on a space for 
the autonomy of dogs and argues that reflecting on the mode of people's 
engagement with dogs could provide a useful model for re-imagining people's 
place in the complex ecology of the twenty-first century. Both Haraway's 
Companion Species Manifesto and the magazine Bark provide evidence of the 
phenomenon I am calling ' the end of nature. ' They indicate the contradictory 
ways in which dogs are valued at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
Simultaneously increasingly commodified in the world of breed shows and at the 
centre of an expanding industry of dog-related products, dogs also conversely 
acquire value as signs of what is outside consumer culture, as creatures who 
cannot be persuaded of the logic of exchange. 
Autonomous Dogs 
Dogs, at the turn of the twenty-first century are in evolutionary terms, the second most 
successful predator on the planet, second only to humans themselves. To say they are 
successful in evolutionary terms mean that they are numerous, that they at least, among 
animals, are in no danger of becoming extinct. It does not describe their quality of life, or 
their political standing, or the success of individual dogs in specific situations against 
other predators, like lions or baboons or humans. The demographic success of dogs has 
to do with their powers of adapation, their ability to exist as cohabiters with the most 
97 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
wn
Canine Portrait 
Artist: Barrie Barnett 
William Secord Gallery Pamphlet 
98 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
successful predator, to make themselves necessary, if not always useful. Even in modem 
cities, like New York, whose spaces are not designed to accommodate dogs, dogs 
persist. The William Secord Gallery, just off Madison Street, specializes in dog 
paintings, particularly from the nineteenth century. Their pamphlet also lists another 
attraction of the gallery. It explains that: 
While initially known for its antique paintings, the gallery has branched out to 
the contemporary market. "Up until recently," William Secord states, "it was 
almost impossible to fmd an artist who was capable of capturing on canvas the 
true nature of our pets." This is no longer the case, for the gallery now 
represents the work of three living artists who are modem masters of the genre: 
Barrie Barnett, Christine Merrill and Joseph H. Sulkowski. Examples of these 
artists' work are always available at the gallery and commissions may be 
arranged. 
The Gallery opened in 1990, describes itself as 'the only gallery of its kind in North 
America.' Its project and very existence is inextricably linked to the phenomena I am 
calling the end of nature. This is not because the idea of the animal portrait is new; it is 
an established part of the sentimental tradition of nineteenth century art. But in the age 
of photography, the portrait itself is something which holds an awkward place in 
modem culture. What separates the portrait from a photograph, the canine portrait from 
the snapshot of a dog? This brings me back to something I mentioned right at the 
beginning of the thesis in relation to the constellation, the difference between the 
photographic image and the likeness. A signature or sign of the end of nature is a desire 
for authenticity, for 'capturing the true nature' rather than making do with mere image. 
The canine portrait represents, as Adorno might put it, the sedimentation of a 
contradiction so that what begins as a desire for an escape from the limits of the image, 
finds itself bound not only by a tradition in painting (and part of this desire is linked to 
the authenticity of the past against the semblance of the present) but also by its place in 
the market, so that the portrait does in fact capture the 'true nature of our pets,' their 
nature as commodities. In the works of the painters mentioned above, the dogs are 
represented with a more than photographic clarity. Posed, still, displayed for the gaze 
against carefully selected backgrounds, the dogs all look toward the viewer and the 
painter, in a gesture of acknowledgment and recognition. 
Another painting of a dog, one which might appear out of place in the Secord 
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Gallery, takes me from these commodified dogs to the autonomous dogs that make their 
appearance in Russell Hoban's dystopian novel Riddley Walker ten years before the 
Secord Gallery opened its doors. I am using the term 'autonomous dog' to describe a 
dog, literal or figural, which achieves a certain level of independence from the 
administered life, one which retains it power to disturb through its connection with 
whatever is outside commodity culture. The painting is one by English painter Francis 
Bacon, and the representation is of a dog running down a road toward the viewer. The 
front part of the dog which forms the foreground of the painting is blurred and only the 
hindquarters and a section of the road behind the dog is in focus. Study for a Running 
Dog (1953y6 is in shades of gray and black and the dark urban landscape unlike the 
ordered domestic interiors or idyllic pastoral scenes of the canine portraits suggests a 
different aspect of the dog in contemporary culture. There are several reasons why it 
forms a fitting likeness for Hoban's dogs. 
One of these has to do with the landscape. The typically Baconian dark and 
indistinct, haunted urban landscape matches in some ways the post-apocalytic 
landscape of Hoban's novel. Bacon's sketches of dogs date from his experiences of 
walking through London during the Blitz. These lone dogs in the bombed city, liberated 
by the violence of war from their role as pets, are the forerunners of Hoban's dog packs 
who roam the landscape around Canterbury after the nuclear holocaust. 
Hoban's novel tells the story of Riddley Walker, an inhabitant ofa land which 
has been devastated by a nuclear explosion. Although the blast happened in the remote 
past it, it continues to shapes the lives of the inhabitants. This is not only because the 
landscape itself still bears the mark of the explosion, although the dead towns reduced to 
rubble and the sour, barren land indicate that its effects continue to dominate the 
physical environment. But what dominates the inhabitants most completely is a kind of 
bafflement about the past, an obsessive and contradictory desire to gain knowledge 
about life before the explosion from the few remnants that remain and to understand and 
regain the technology that made both that life and the destruction possible. 
Dogs enter the narrative of Hoban's novel in a number of different forms, both as 
material creatures and as contradictory figures in a number of different myths and urban 
legends. The wild dog packs literally constrain human movement, forcing people to 
86 Francis Bacon Study for a Running Dog (1953) National Gallery, Washington, D.C. 
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travel always with 'road crowd' to prevent them from getting 'dog et. ,87 Though at one 
point Riddley Walker mentions that he sometimes thinks dogs are ready to 'come 
frendy,' at the beginning of the novel this has never happened, nor has Riddley 'never 
heard of no 1 tame a pup' (1980: 20). There are also dogs who figure in myth - in the 
official Eusa story (the 'blip' or symbolic dogs 'Folleree' and 'Folleroo'), in the more 
informal stories Lorna Elswint tells Riddley such as 'Why the Dog Wont Show Its 
Eyes'; in communal mmours or superstitions (the existence of 'dog peopl' who are 
half-human and half-dog) and in children's rhymes ('Gennl men wil do it front to 
back/When they do it with the ladys of the Ful Moon pack' (1980: 16). 
In the novel, the dogs form an alliance with Riddley Walker and appear to be 
trying to guide him towards some end. For a significant part of the novel he travels with 
a pack guided by the 'black leader' flISt to an encounter with one of the Eusa folk, the 
Ardship ofCambry, then on through a series of encounters till they finally take him to 
Cambry, the site of the nuclear explosion. The Eusa folk, the descendants of those who 
suffered genetic mutation as a result of radiation are kept segregated so that their bodies 
will act as a kind of materiallink with the past. I will return to them at the end of this 
chapter as their 'crookit' bodies provide an interesting negative image against which my 
discussion of the muscular human body in the following chapter might be read. 
In an article published in 1986, Jack Branscomb suggests the following 
significance for dogs in Riddley Walker: 
This separation of the young man from his society marks the first stage of the 
Jungian process of individuation, by which he develops a personality of his own. 
He [Riddley Walker] is taken up by representatives of Nature - one of the packs 
of wild dogs that live in the burnt out cities of "Inland" (England). The dogs, 
formerly the friends and servants of man, but now vicious and uncannily 
intelligent, represent Nature alienated and ravaged by man's exploitation of 
knowledge for power. (1986: 34) 
Although the dogs are certainly autonomous and ready to attack humans when 
necessary, I would argue that they appear not so much as vicious representatives of 
alienated Nature, as beings with an alternative culture. The dogs on occasion observe a 
ritual around death as when the old leader, having chosen to die, walks onto Riddley 
Walker's spear observed by the rest of the pack. After being adopted by the pack, 
87 Hoban tells the story in a new language that resembles but does not exactly match English. To be 
'dog et' is to be eaten by dogs. 
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Riddley Walker notes that the dogs' behaviour is strategic and tactical. 
The dogs in the novel appear to have some purpose, some understanding of the 
situation that has eluded the human communities. In the story 'Why dog wont show his 
eyes' dogs are described as having '1st knowing', the kind of knowing that came before 
the 'clevverness' (which humans get from looking into the eyes of goats) related to 
counting and measuring. It is this 'clevverness' which made possible technology and 
ultimately the bomb itself, the '1 big l' which destroyed both the '1st knowing' and the 
'clevvemess'. One interesting aspect of the fable is the way it represents the 
relationship between dog and human in terms of a shifting movement between inside and 
outside. Initially man and woman are at the fire looking into the night and feeling afraid. 
The dog is in the night looking at them. When they offer it meat, it 'brung its eyes in out 
of the nite then they alllookit at the nite to gether. .. Dint have no mor fear in the nite 
they put ther self right day and nite that wer the good time' (1980: 17 -18). But after 
people have acquired clevverness, they stop roaming and become aware of property and 
the need to guard property and to put up fences. Night becomes merely darkness in 
which property might be taken and the Power Ring is built to create permanent day. 
After the explosion, it is dark for a long time and starving man and woman and dog look 
only for an opportunity to eat one another. Eventually day and night are restored but 
man and woman remain afraid of the night, without first knowing and the dog won't 
show its eyes: 'Come Ful of the Moon the sadness gets too much the dog goes mad. It 
follers on man and womans track and arga warga if it catches them' (1980:19). 
In this strange allegory of modernization and its self-destruction, dog plays the 
role of intermediary permitting man and woman access to what is described as the 
'shape of nite,' a kind of intuitive understanding of the world. The interaction between 
people and dogs enabled people to live in the world without fear of what is outside. In 
the devastated post-nuclear environment, without technology or intuition, people live in 
a profound state of dislocation. 
Branscomb suggests that one characteristic aspect of Russell Hoban's fiction is a 
quest for wholeness articulated through a complex and allusive system of temporal and 
spatial patterning often based on an actual or imaginary visual image (1986:30). In each 
the protagonist moves though the spatial and temporal domains attempting to find in the 
lines of the image an intersection between landscape and history. Hoban's interest in 
images and patterns, Branscomb asserts, is 'psychological'. He writes: 'His 
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protagonists come to recognize that they are fragmented or incomplete. They launch 
themselves or are thrust into searches for wholeness which turn out to be circular, 
leading them into the past before allowing them to escape into the present' (1986: 30). 
Yet what this reading misses is that the sense of fragmentation and 
incompleteness is less in the protagonists themselves, than a condition of the damaged 
life that the narrative as a whole reflects. Although Riddley Walker does seem to achieve 
some sort of personal resolution at the end of the novel, it is of an extremely limited 
nature. His decision to travel and to formulate stories around the found figures of Punch 
and Pooty rather than repeating the official Eusa story seems less an escape into the 
present the symbolic closure of a pattern - than a further meandering elaboration, a 
response, perhaps, to the recognition that wholeness is no longer possible. The dog 
pack accompanies him ('So we got our selfs ready and off we gone with our fit up and 
our figgers and our dog crowd.' (1986:200» but it no longer appears to be urging him 
towards a particular purpose. In fact the purpose of the dogs in the novel never becomes 
clear and the question, what do dogs want, or even, what do these particular dogs want, 
is never clearly answered. 
Instead what emerges is a kind of blurring that matches the blurred image in 
Bacon's painting. In the painting the actual confrontation between dog and viewer 
remains indistinct and opaque and it is only the hind quarters of the dog and the street 
beyond that come into focus. This blurring is matched in Hoban's novel by the language 
of the narrative itself which is recognizably English, but an English blurred by the subtle 
alteration of vocabulary and syntax, the standard written form invaded and transformed 
by the sound of the spoken form, by fragments of technological jargon and a wearing 
away of certain letters and structures (Maynor & Patterson 1984: 18-24). The 
experience of reading is one of having to follow the sound not the look of the words, to 
trust the ears rather than the eyes. This indistinctness is also present in the narrative 
itself which repeatedly offers texts and the interpretation of those texts which only 
partially match our own understanding, words and images which are familiar yet cannot 
be exactly deciphered . 
.. Imagined Endings 
Although in material terms, the kind of ending described by Hoban is very different from 
that imagined by McKibben ten years later, a response to a different political and 
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historical configuration, it contains many of the elements which I have identified as part 
of the phenomena ofthe end of Nature. Hoban's novel is a response to the Cold War 
and the threat of nuclear holocaust, McKibben's work focusses on the hyper exuberant 
consumerism of late capitalism and the futures they imagine are in some ways very 
different. Yet despite the difference between the apocalyptic destruction of nuclear 
explosion on the one hand and a more insidious and unpredictable climate-based 
transformation on the other, both articulate related anxieties about human behaviour and 
its consequences in terms of a relation with nature which is broken. 
If in McKibben's discursive writing this loss is articulated in reasoned 
metaphysical terms and in Hoban's novel it is registered as material and psychical loss, 
both express an existential concern about the loss of meaning - the impossibility and 
pain of being without nature. In Hoban's novel, of course, it is not only a matter of 
being without nature, but being without history, without either tradition or 
Enlightenment, either the ritual of established practices or the authority of scientific 
knowledge. It is almost as if in the absence of history and nature, only limited new 
cultural traditions can be established. As Riddley Walker notes in his conversation with 
Goodparley: 'Dyou mean to tel me them befor us by the time they done 1997 years 
they had boats in the air and all them things and here we are weve done 2347 years and 
mor and stil slogging in the mud?' (1980:120) Pursuit of the knowledge of the past is an 
almost desperate obsession, both in the strange contradictory fear-tinged desire to access 
knowledge of the power which caused the devastation, the' 1 big 1,' and in a desire for 
dimly apprehended technology such as 'picter in the wind.' There is a continuous 
process of searching through the debris of the past to find answers, but the artifacts and 
even the words found, in the absence of historical continuity, can only ever be misread. 
The St Eustace legend, the atom, the U.S.A., are all bound together into one story which 
tries to explain the past without either concrete evidence, texts or oral tradition to 
anchor it. 
The world Hoban's characters live in is rural, communal and focused on the 
material practices ofliving but it is a very far cry from William Morris's idyllic pastoral 
vision a century earlier. This is partly to do with the absence of historical memory. 
Although history is not given much value in Morris's community, knowledge ofa pre-
modern past is what shapes the structures and practices of his community. But it is also 
to do with the traumatic event and its effect on the present. The traumatic event, the 
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nuclear explosion, can be read as a violent and total alienation of people from nature in 
the most inclusive sense of the word, from the natural landscape, from animals, and from 
a sense of their own natures through a knowledge of history. 
Conclusion 
In one sense at least, it appears that dogs and apes follow a similar trajectory in the 
second half of the twentieth and early twenty-first century. In the cultural imaginary of 
the West they are both treated as objects, commodities in a number of different fields of 
exchange, and desired as subjects, as figures which might still be able to speak out on 
behalf of all animals, even the human animal who communicates but no longer has the 
power of expression. The language of animals appears to contain a promise - the 
expression of something which might be articulated as being in nature, or being with 
nature which humans have forgotten. 
This is particularly clear in Desmond Morris' project, although the medium he 
chooses for this expression is painting rather than language as such. Abstract painting, 
he suggests, opens a space for a kind of expression which is not dominated by the 
representation of objects, by the assigning of identities and the delimitation of 
boundaries. For Morris, being liberated from the task of representation meant that 
painting could assume a new form the expression of the experience of being itself. For 
Morris, the biologist, this being was in some fundamental way, natural, part of the 
biological inheritance of man. It was located in the physical body itself and found 
expression in the gestural art of abstract painting, which could be matched or at least 
usefully compared with the gestural marks of chimpanzee paintings. 
Like those engaged in teaching apes sign language ten years later, Morris' work 
indicates an interest in the subjectivity of animals. As Haraway suggests, this interest 
coexists with a wide range of other forms of scientific research on apes, ones in which 
they are far more firmly situated as objects. Investigative journalist, Deborah Blum, in 
her book The Monkey Wars (1994) describes in detail both kinds of research, and the 
ethical questions they raise. She notes the intractable political standoff that exists 
between scientific researchers and animal rights activists and formulates her conclusion 
in the following terms: 
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Begin with chimpanzees, our genetic next-of-kin. So much like us, they are easy 
to respect. From there it is only a short path to other apes and then to monkeys. 
With new revelations about primate abilities, the gap seems to be narrowing all 
the time. If we can come to an agreement on how to regard and care for those 
extraordinary animals, that will mark a hard-won and much-needed lesson in 
stewardship. It may with luck, carry over as we try to resolve our differences on 
the care of other animals, of the world at large. (1994: 275) 
Blum ends her book with an appeal to the notion oflikeness, the chimpanzee's 
resemblance to the human. In gesture, thought and interaction the chimpanzee is able to 
enter a human form of life, to make itself recognizable and consequently to demand the 
right to subjectivity. The chimpanzee then becomes intermediary, the one through 
whom humans can recognize their own identity as animals and their kinship with other 
species. This differentiation between animals, between species as well as between 
individual animals, is the subject of a recent article by Jacques Derrida in which he 
meditates on, among other things, his relationship with his cat. He argues against the 
philosophic tradition that takes the concept of 'the animal in general', and opposes it to 
the concept of Man. In a gesture similar to the one performed by Horkheimer and 
Adorno in 'Man and Beast', Derrida troubles the apparently clear lines separating these 
two concepts. He writes: 
Beyond the edge ofthe so-called human, beyond but by no means on a single 
opposing side, rather than 'the animal' or 'animal life; there is already a 
heterogeneous multiplicity of the living, or more precisely (since to say 'the 
living' is already to say too much or not enough) a multiplicity of organizations 
of relations between living and dead, relations of organization or lack of 
organization among realms that are more and more difficult to dissociate by 
means of the figures of the organic and the inorganic, oflife and/or death. These 
relations are at once close and abyssal, and they can never be totally objectified. 
They do not leave room for any simple exteriority of one term with respect to 
another. (2002: 399) 
As in 'Man and Beast' specific kinds of animals, literal and metaphorical, enter into the 
narrative as concrete elements to trouble the comfortable abstraction that underlies the 
concept of 'the animal'. In Horkheimer and Adorno's text, the focus of the disruption 
of the opposition lies with the introduction of the third term of 'woman' although the 
essay is not without an array of specific kinds of animals, the Pekinese, the serpent, the 
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Great Dane, the laboratory animal and the lion cub all of which serve as reminders of 
different although all vertebrate orders of animality. Derrida's argument goes further in a 
number of different directions. 
Moving in one direction he draws attention to gender not only on the side of the 
human, but also on the side of animals. The gender of animals is something which must 
always be elided in any formulation involving 'the animal.' Derrida's address 
introduces not only specific kinds of animals but one concrete animal, his own cat 
before whose gaze he becomes aware of a peculiarity in his relationship with his naked 
body, a shame which is ashamed of itself. There is not space here to discuss in detail 
Derrida's complex argument about nakedness and naming that forms the first part of his 
discussion but I would like to draw on two points that he makes. One has to do with 
the language of animals, and the philosophic tradition which not only denies animals 
language but also regards this as privation. An example of this position is evident in the 
puzzling third paragraph of Horkheimer and Adorno's 'Man and Beast' in which the 
life of animals without the concept and the word is described as 'dreary and depressive.' 
Without the ability to arrest the flux of experience, Horkheimer and Adorno argue, 
animals can have no awareness of past and future and consequently, no self. They write: 
'The animal responds to its name and has no self, it is enclosed in itself yet 
exposed ... ' (2002: 205). Derrida argues against this position, and suggests among other 
things, that only by assuming a general and abstract fissure between man and animal can 
language be assumed to be the defining possession of only one, while the other can only 
accept its name. He suggests not 'giving speech back' to animals but rather 'a thinking, 
however fabulous and chimerical it might be , that thinks the absence of the word 
otherwise, as something other than privation' (2002: 416). Instead of the difference 
between speech and silence Derrida suggest what is at stake has to do with the 
difference between a reaction and a response. The philosophic tradition which denies 
animals language sees the actions of animals, such as the action oflooking, as nothing 
more than reactions. It denies them the 'right and power to "respond" and hence many 
other things that would be the property of man' (2002: 400). Understanding what it 
means to respond, and recognizing the the response of animals which is not that of 
speaking, would mean among other things, recognizing with Bentham the possibility of 
animals' suffering. Derrida writes: 
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The two centuries I have been referring to somewhat approximately in order to 
situate the present in terms of this tradition have been those of an unequal 
struggle, a war being waged, the unequal forces of which could one day be 
reversed, between those that violate not only animal life but even and also this 
sentiment of compassion and, on the other hand, those who appeal to an 
irrefutable testimony to this pity. (2002: 397) 
Compassion, the experience of another's suffering, implies a particular relationship with 
the body and with the bodies of others. It suggests recognizing the connection between 
the body as the physical locus of pain and the subjective experience of suffering. 
From the point of view of animals then, if such a position might be imagined, 
what might separate almost all humans (perhaps not young children) from most other 
animals would be their inability to inhabit their own bodies. The 'naked' bodies of 
humans are not expressive and perhaps this is the quality of their nakedness. Popular 
psychology talks about 'body language' but such talk, the codification of certain 
gestures and postures with certain responses or reactions assumes a body already 
alienated from expression, one which can only learn to perform certain crude 
approximations of expression through the conscious learning of a code. Animals, or at 
least such animals who live in proximity with humans, such as Derrida's cats, the apes 
who learn sign language and most dogs might regard the human's relation with their body 
as a kind of aphasia, an inability to control its speech. Animals, but only those animals 
who have grown up socially in contact with other animals, might regard the bodies of 
humans mostly as noise which is almost but not quite speech although occasionally the 
odd phrase or gesture might surprisingly make sense. 
Cape Town based dog trainer, Christopher Brookin follows a method of training 
which takes into account both the body of the dog, not as a set of isolated and 
interpretable gestures but as a single expressive form, and the body of the human who 
must learn not to imitate the dogs' gestures but to remember their own bodies as 
mediums through which their intentions might be expressed. Not simply through 
gestures but through posture, through the disposition of their own body in relation to all 
the other bodies, animal and human in the vicinity, and through the direction, intensity 
and quality of the gaze. To train a dog using this method is not to create associations 
between particular actions and positive or negative reaction as the behaviourists method 
would demand, to match human behaviour to the machine-like quality assumed to be 
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found in animals, but rather to see training as a mode of engagement in which the human 
must not only learn to express himlherselfbut also to command the respect of the dog 
not, or not only, through physical strength but through social ease and confidence. 
These bodies of humans, naked or clothed in a form of expression, are the subject 
of the following chapter. To reach them, I will go by way of a return to Hoban, and the 
bodies of the Eusa folk. In a singularly Kafkaesque image the Eusa folk come together to 
hold 'some poasyum' and talk 'vansit theory.' The form this takes is curiously 
physical. 
The ardship he begun to gether with the Eusa folk they all took of ther cloths 
and tangelt ther selfs to gether all nekkit and twining like a nes of snakes which 
they callit some poasyum. Which they done trantsing with it an hy telling ... .It 
put you hy your oan self even tho you mytnt know nothing of it yet you cud 
get jus the fayntes glimmer of what it musve ben to be the Puter Leat. (1980: 
193) 
In a strange reversal ofthe concrete and the abstract, the Eusa folk hold a symposium on 
advanced theory not, or not only through, conversation but through bodily contact. The 
incomprehensible language of the dimly remembered Computer Elite is translated into 
this uncanny intertwining of bodies deformed by genetic mutation. In the complete 
dislocation of their abstract knowledge from any reality in the world they inhabit, their 
bodies become their strange and enigmatic mode of expression. 
The twisted bodies of the Eusa folk form an interesting contrast to another set of 
bodies which emerge in mainstream popular culture in the eighties - the developed, 
muscular bodies of film stars, Jean Claude Van Damme and Arnold Schwarzenegger. In 
the following chapter I investigate the movement of these other bodies as complex 
reactions to the deformations imposed on the human body in late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century culture. 
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Chapter 4 
Abstract Bodies: Popular Film at the End of Nature 
More haste, less speed. Running in the street conveys the 
impression ofterror. The victim's fall is already mimed in his 
attempt to escape it. The position of the head, trying to hold 
itself up, is that of a drowning man, and the strained face grimaces 
as if under torture. He has to look ahead, can hardly glance back 
without stumbling, as if treading the shadow of a foe whose 
features freeze the limbs. Once people ran from dangers that were 
too desperate to tum and face, and someone running for the bus 
unwittingly bears witness to past terrors. Traffic regulations no 
longer need allow for wild animals, but they have not pacified 
running. It estranges us from bourgeois walking. The truth 
becomes visible that something is amiss with security, that the 
unleashed powers of life, be they mere vehicles, have to be 
escaped. (Adorno 1978: 162) 
In the previous chapter I discussed the phenomenon I am calling 'the end of nature' in 
relation to human relations with animals the ways in which a globalizing industrial 
culture marginalizes animals, transforms them into commodities and at the same time 
attributes to them a peculiar value. As conscious yet enigmatic creatures whose species-
being sometimes resembles but never coincides with that of humans, certain kinds of 
animals become objects of desire. They are regarded as a point of contact with what 
might still be considered nature, and studied as a way of mediating people's troubled 
relationship with their environment and their own nature. 
I argued that the fascination with the language of animals misses the 
untranslatability of most forms of wild animal life and constitutes a failure of humans to 
recognize their own muteness - the muteness of their bodies. Animals in proximate 
110 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
relations with humans enter into an intermediate form of life and the portion of their 
expression which can be translated into human language can only reflect human culture. 
Yet despite the fact that these intermediate animals are subsumed within human culture 
they still represent a form of 'animate existence' and are impervious to the logic of 
exchange. In the midst of a culture dominated by communication and information, 
animals, in their animate bodies, are expressive and appear to look for, although often 
perhaps without finding it, a similar expressiveness in people. What makes them 
fascinating is less their privileged access to nature, than the way in which they do not 
accept what consumer culture takes for granted, the alienation of the human body. 
I ended with an image from Riddley Walker: the Eusa folk deformed and isolated 
practising their 'vansit theory' (advanced theory) through a strange ritual of 
intertwining, skin to skin. In Kafka's writing the human body is often bent, sometimes 
doubled-over; in Riddley Walker the bending or deformation has been written into the 
genetic material. In both the body in some way bears witness to the violence of 
modernity. 
In this chapter I look at the emergence of a new manifestation of the human 
body, one which no longer appears to register the distortion imposed on it by its 
environment. It is not only silent, it is also blank, bearing no marks of history or 
experience. This body emerges not so much as a material reality but as a fantasy and a 
goal in a number of diverse contexts, in popular culture, in advertising, in medicine, and 
in the science of genetic engineering. 
The first part of the chapter, 'Natural and Unnatural Bodies' explores some of 
contradictions which in the last two decades of the twentieth century subject the body 
to constitutive and deforming stress. I investigate the emergence of the the idea of stress 
itself, and the way in which stress, a biochemical response to social and environemental 
conditions, marks the coincidence in the body of the political, the philosophical and the 
scientific. At the same time as conditons of environmental and social crisis limit the 
possibilities of health, representations of the body, especially in film and advertising, 
become more abstract. The represented body, I argue, enacts an imagined condition of 
health, free from the body's own deforming response to the stresses of the reaL 
In the second part, 'Enter the Machine' , I analyse a selection of action films, 
exploring the ways in which the bodies of Jean Claude Van Damme and Arnold 
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Schwarzenegger exemplify this process. As heroes in particular narratives they enact a 
particular form of engagement with the violent and destructive environment they inhabit, 
one in which their bodies alone are invincible and untouched. 
NATURAL AND UNNATURAL BODIES 
Bodies in Motion 
Adorno's running man described in the quotation at the start of this chapter offers a 
interesting starting point for an investigation of the movement of the body in modernity. 
The particular focus of this chapter is the moving body in a particular genre of action 
films which emerges in the 1980s and 1990s in America. This body is set in motion by 
the movie industry. Literally, at a technical level each frame moves the body 
infinitesimally further on its trajectory. Like Muybridge's photographs of figures and 
horses in motion, taken a hundred years earlier, the movement of human body is divided 
into a series of minutely differentiated postures which the eye comprehends as motion. 88 
Figurally, the genre itselftransforms these bodies into expressions of 'action' itself. 
What is the importance of the moving body at this moment in the history of modernity? 
How does this body move through the language and images of science and popular 
culture? 
Bodies in motion follow a particular trajectory. Abstract bodies, bodies 
separated from the friction of the real, once set in motion, continue to move through 
space until acted upon by a counteracting force. Galileo's theory of inertial motion, 
discussed in Chapter Two, requires the conceptualization of this neutral space as a 
vacuum, empty even of the deforming influence of air itself. 
In the discourse of the life sciences, the human body is a biological system, and 
like the animal body, is subject to internal and external pressures. Like the body of the 
ape discussed in the previous chapter, the human body follows an evolutionary curve. It 
adapts to its environment, or fails to adapt and becomes sick. In popular culture the 
body follows a different trajectory. It becomes an ideal figure, corporeal yet two 
88 Photographer Eadweard Muybridge (1830-1904) took photographs of people, often naked, and animals 
engaged in various activities that involved movement. By taking a series of temporally consecutive 
photographs he broke down familiar movements into their component parts. See The Human Figure in 
Motion (1955). For a discussion of his work and of the collapse of 'natural' movements and the 
movements of machine more generally see Mark Seltzer's 'The Love Machine' in Boone & Cadden 
(1990: 140- 158). 
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dimensional, cut out of an increasingly standardized materiaL In both science and 
popular culture the friction of the real is missing. The human body is an object, observed 
and represented, not experienced. 
The scientific or biological body and the advertising or filmic body share certain 
qualities. Both occupy the centre of a closed narrative from which the random claims of 
experience must be ~xcluded; both are acts of translation, in which the materiality of the 
body is transformed into something transferable, something with mobility within 
systems of exchange. But these bodies, cut up and studied, or photographed and filmed 
are haunted by millions of other bodies, the bodies of those engaged in the act of cutting 
up, studying and photographing, as well as those providing the infrastructure for these 
activities, the capital, the lunches, the buildings, not to mention those who through 
consuming whatever is produced contribute to those bodies their value. 
The running body that forms the centre of Adorno's narrative segment is neither 
a biological body, although it has an element of the corporeal, nor is it the filmic body, 
although it too is caught up in the processes of mimesis. Instead it inhabits the world, 
not the authoritative representative of authentic lived experience, but a figure around 
whom some of the contradictions and complexities of embodied experience coagulate. 
Read allegorically, running for the bus articulates something of the subject's 
position in relation to modern society. The act of running for the bus enacts the urgent 
need to keep up with the impersonal demands of public systems. The transport system 
is at once the ultimate representation of the planned dimension of modem existence and 
its opposite, the random, erratic nature of its execution, since buses cannot escape the 
mysterious flows and congestions of traffic. 
The running body set alongside the movement of cars registers its own 
obsoletion, its inability to compete. From within, the car acts as a technology of 
extension, providing the body with the illusion of its own power. Running after an 
escaping bus sets the human body up against the power of technology, and reveals its 
limitations. 
Yet the frustration of a failed attempt to integrate with technology or the 
momentary triumph, when the bus is reached in time and the body measures up 
successfully to the power of technology is only one aspect of the running body - what 
registers in the consciousness of the subject of the experience. At another level the body 
represents something which is not available to the subject. The running body in the 
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midst of the familiar, controlled, modem environment recalls, in the visible signs of 
contortion which mark its surface, a material connection with the past. In bearing traces 
of the drowning man and the torture victim, the runner unknowingly enters into a 
relationship of continuity with those others whose emotions he mimes. Modem 
society's suppression of nature, alluded to in the exclusion of wild animals, does not 
pacifY the body which retains at least in its outward signs the terror that science's 
demythologization of nature was supposed to overcome.89 
In this extract, the subject divided from his or her own body confronts it as 
something external to him/herself and in the gap between the intention contained in 
running for the bus and the terror this action enacts, the body enters into a relationship 
with history. The act of running in the street becomes 'unnatural' through its relation to 
the normalization of walking. Adorno continues: 
The body's habituation to walking as normal stems from the good old days. It 
was the bourgeois form of locomotion: physical demythologization, free of the 
spell of hieratic pacing, roofless wandering, breathless flight. Human dignity 
insisted on the right to walk, a rhythm not extorted from the body by command 
or terror. The walk, the stroll were private ways of passing the time, the heritage 
of the feudal promenade in the nineteenth century. With the liberal era walking 
too is dying out, even when people do not go by car. (1978: 162) 
The right to walk, Adorno suggests perhaps somewhat mockingly, is about freeing the 
body from the spell of terror. It is achieved only temporarily, at a historical moment 
when the body of the bourgeois subject is freed from extortion - the word suggesting 
both the freedom from 
terror of arbitrary feudal power and the freedom of leisure in which the body is allowed 
to find its own rhythm outside of those demanded by physical labour. 
He ends the narrative with the following sentences: 
Perhaps the cult of technical speed as of sport conceals an impulse to master the 
terror of running by deflecting it from ones own body and at the same time 
effortlessly surpassing it. The triumph of mounting mileage ritually appeases the 
fear of the fugitive. But if someone is shouted at to 'run', from the child who has 
to fetch his mother's forgotten handbag from the first floor, to the prisoner 
ordered by his escort to flee so that they have a pretext for murdering him, the 
89 This is one of the central arguments of Dialectic of Enlightenment (Adorno & Horkheimer 2001). 
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archaic power makes itself heard that otherwise inaudibly guides our every step. 
(Adorno 1978: 162) 
Adorno shares high modernism's interest in the archaic but he understands its 
relationship with nature in different terms. Running evokes the archaic, but not simply 
as the articulation of a natural body which bourgeois culture seeks to suppress. Instead 
running reminds the subject of the body's vulnerability. The body is not freed from 
bourgeois constraint into a condition of natural exuberance. The body, in its distortions 
expresses what remains hidden from the subject, its materiality as memory. Through 
these traces which mark the body, and especially through the relationship between 
language and the body, the shouted word, something emerges of what otherwise is 
present but remains invisible. 
The notion of an archaic power which 'guides our every step' does suggest a 
level of determinism which seems at odds with the dialectical structure of most of 
Adorno's writing.90 Yet in the context of this narrative, the 'archaic power' appears less 
an ultimate biological cause in the B.O. Wilsonian sense, than a disturbance in the 
structure of the body itself. 91 The power resides not in the body but in the word to 
which the body responds, suggesting that what 'inaudibly guides our every step' is a 
kind of mute whispering, which the ear misses but the body itself registers. Implied in 
such a whispering is not a stable instinctual nature, but rather an inherent sociality 
through which the body finds its shape and gestures. 
Terror registers even when the objective conditions for terror are absent, so that 
in the moment of running for the bus, the torture victim, the escaping prisoner, even the 
child fetching his mother's handbag are momentarily present as a kind of whispering 
awareness only the body notices. Speed, the technological extension of the body, and 
sport, its physical disciplining, Adorno suggests, might be understood as ways of 
deflecting this fear engendered in the body by its connectedness. The body is pacified 
by something which mimics its own triumphant escape, not only from the imagined 
terror but from the very whispering that reminds it of its vulnerability. 
Since the 1960s and 1970s running in the street, at least in developed countries, 
90 In an essay on Walter Benjamin, Adorno writes: 'He viewed the modem world as archaic not in order 
to conserve the traces of a purportedly eternal truth but rather to escape the trancelike captivity of 
Bourgeois immanence' (1983: 236). 
91 E. O. Wilson makes the claim in Sociobiology (1975) that all human behaviour can be explained by 
referring an ultimate biological cause the need for the gene to reproduce itself. See Soper (1995: 57-59) 
for a critical discussion of sociobiology. 
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has acquired its own rhythm in organised marathons. Running or jogging finds a new 
place for the body on the street as part of the late twentieth century fascination with 
health and the reduction of stress. The entries in North American encyclopedias provide 
useful indices of the development of the idea of 'stress' in the popular imagination after 
the Second World War. 
In the Universal World Reference Encyclopedia, published in 1964, the only 
entry under the heading 'stress' relates to engineering. 'Stress and strain,' it informs us, 
'measure the changes in dimension, shape, and volume that occur with the application of 
external forces. These forces cause a deformation of the body by bending, compressing, 
or pulling apart portions ofthe body' (1964: 4721). The extension of this idea to include 
the pressure deforming the human body had already been established by the publication 
in 1956 of Hans Selye's book, The Stress of Life. Hans Selye, the doctor who pioneered 
work in this field, began his research into the physiological effects of stress in the 1930s 
but it was only in the late 60s and early 70s that the concept of stress as a medical 
condition attained popular currency 
In the World Book Encyclopedia, published in 2003, the first reference to 
'stress' relates to the medical condition. Stress, it states, 'is the body's emergency 
response to real or imagined danger. A stress reaction prepares the body for a burst of 
action to fight or flee a threat.' It adds that 'Stress aids survival, especially in cases 
when extraordinary effort can overcome real physical dangers. Stress was particularly 
useful for prehistoric people when life was filled with such stressors as defending 
shelter and hunting large animals. As civilization developed, life for most people became 
less physically dangerous. But as society became more complex, mental and emotional 
challenges increased and became common stressors.' 
Stress, defined in this way, becomes a residual chemical response, one which 
dislocates the body from its modem environment. The prehistoric body misreads 
situations as physically threatening, and responds by increasing blood sugar levels to 
prepare for physical exertion. Yet in the context of modem society, the subject cannot 
satisfactorily confront the source of its unease physically and the body suffers from a 
kind of misplaced energy which translates into symptoms and exhaustion. 
In the late 1960s medical doctors began to recommend jogging or mnning as a 
means of counteracting the effects of stress. Jogging becomes a way of pacifying the 
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body, of providing it with an ordered environment in which to exert itself. In the early 
twenty-first century, in response to the new technologies of genetic engineering, running 
acquires an added meaning. 
In Bill McKibben's critical account of the developing technologies of genetic 
manipulation and nanotechnology, Enough (2003), he begins with a description of his 
own experience of running a marathon, focusing on the way in which the intense 
physical exertion forced him into a different relationship with his body, one in which he 
was temporarily 'absolutely, utterly present.' Later he explains the significance of this 
experience: 
I began by talking about running, because it is one of the contexts I have created 
for myself, one of the things that orders my Hfe, fills it with metaphor and 
meaning. If my parents had somehow altered my body so that I could run more 
quickly, that fact would, as I have said, have robbed it of precisely that meaning 
I draw from it. The point of running, for me, is not to cover ground more 
quickly; for that, I could use a motorcycle. The point has to do with seeking out 
my limits, centering my attention: finding out who I am. (2003: 48) 
Running, for McKibben, is a means of regaining contact with his body from which 
everyday life has estranged him. This estrangement is the estrangement of leisure rather 
than the estrangement of labour. Despite the recommendation of doctors, everyday life 
in developed countries, and most notably in America where the fascination with 'labour 
saving devices' remains high, has become more and more static. A dietician in 
Mississippi, Mary Gilmore, has introduced the category of sub-sedentary to define 
those of her clients who take less than 1200 steps per day and radio reports on the 
dangers of obesity recommend 'throwing away the remote' in an effort to restore some 
mobility to an other wise inert population.92 This disused body, more completely than 
the person running after the bus, identifies the triumph of technology in defining the 
space of lived experience, so that the body itself appears as not so much inadequate as 
largely forgotten. 
McKibben's satisfaction in running is partly a response to this forcing open 
92 Mentioned in the article 'Land of the Fat' Guardian Newspapers 5 January 2002. In the same article, 
Dr Alan Penman, an epidemiologist with the Mississippi Department of Health, suggests that to use the 
word epidemic in relation to obesity is inappropriate. He is quoted as saying: 'That implies something 
that comes and goes. What we have here are normal adaptions to the kind of environment we live in. Its 
Darwinian. Everyone is at risk, if not actually affected, because we have created what some people have 
called an obesogenic environment. The Americans have done it very well, better than anyone.' 
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through his own exertion a space for the body to inhabit. But it is also an attempt to 
defend the body in its 'prehistoric' or natural form. For McKibben running allows one 
to experience the body as limit, the defining form through which life can be experienced. 
Running, he suggest, allows him to experience himself as embodied, and to formulate as 
sense of his own identy. 
Running in this context, divorced from the purpose of 'covering ground 
quickly', transforms action into abstract motion. The movement of the body becomes an 
end in itself, a way of mimicking the usefulness of the body to deceive it into health. 
This chapter explores a certain moment in the history of the body in America in 
which a particular type of body erupts into the world.ofpopular film. During the 
1980s and 1990s the muscular male bodies of Jean Claude VanDamme and Arnold 
Schwarzenegger assume a striking prominence in the popular imagination. These 
invincible and invulnerable heroic bodies come to occupy, I argue, a defining moment in 
the history of action movies at the end of the twentieth century. They enter at a 
significant moment in the trajectory of the body itself, as it is moving at once into disuse 
and at the same time into hyper visibility. The promotion of running, along with other 
sports, the development of a vast industry around maintaining the body, the extension 
of the use of gyms to the general public, all these suggest a moment of crisis, as if the 
body's maladaption suddenly becomes a national and even international concern. 
Rebuilding the body, like the renovating of a collapsing period house, becomes of utmost 
importance. These films offer a particular insight because they mark a pivotal moment 
between the nostalgia for a natural useful and used body and the uneasy visions of a new 
technologically improved body. Because if the body is to be rebuilt, perhaps technology 
can remove its lingering and irrational attachment to its historical form. 
The Pathology of Everyday Life 
For Hans Selye, the physician who first studied and defined stress as a medical 
condition, the body and its complex metabolic reactions represents the stable variable, 
the material ground on which theories of health and sickness had to be based. He writes: 
The secret of health and happiness lies in the successful adaption to the ever 
changing conditions on this globe; the penalties for failure in this great process of 
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adaption are disease and unhappiness. The evolution through endless centuries 
from the simplest oflife forms to complex human beings was the greatest 
adaptive adventure on earth. The realization of this has fundamentally influenced 
our thinking, but there is not much we can do about it. Here we are, such as we 
are; and whether or not man is pleased with the result he cannot change his own 
inherited structure. (Selye 1956: vii) 
Selye fIrst became interested in what would later be central to his investigation of stress 
while still a student. He noted that there were numerous symptoms that were not 
considered to be characteristic of any specifIc disease but rather set aside during 
diagnoses as being part ofthe 'syndrome of just being sick'. It was the reappearance of 
these non-specifIc elements during laboratory tests he undertook much later, while 
working on a project investigating the existence of hormones, that led him to theorise 
about the existence of 'a single non-specific reaction of the body to damage' (Selye 
1956: 25). 
Selye's investigations into this non-specific reaction, for which he later chose the 
term 'stress', suggested to him the importance of adaption. Each person, he argued, has 
a certain amount of adaptive energy which allows them to adjust to situations they 
encounter in life. With modesty uncharacteristic for a scientist, Selye suggests that his 
study of stress has led him to a philosophy of life which might prove useful to others, 
one based on a principle of adaption which would allow people to live in harmony with 
the biochemical responses oftheir body.93 He calls it the philosophy of gratitude. 
The philosophy of gratitude, Selye explains, allows us to avoid the stressful 
situations of competition and hostility that the unrestrained egotism of biologic 
organisms would tend towards. Gratitude, he suggests, is a human way of assuring 
security through' awakening in another person the wish that I should prosper' (Selye 
1956: 285). It is the only philosophy which, he argues, 'transforms our egotistical 
impulses into altruism without curtailing their self-protective values' (Selye 1956: 290). 
Selye's principle of adapt ion as a strategy for everyday living is based on certain 
assumptions, both about the body and about the environment to which it adapts. The 
'inherited structure' of the body is ahistorical; subject only to evolutionary time which 
is too immense to fIgure in human history. About the environment to which the body 
93 Selye writes: 'It helped me fonn my personal attitude towards stress in life, It may help you. But then, 
I realize, too, that it may not, for you might not see things my way. Here I am outside my element, the 
laboratory, where a proved fact is binding for eveyone. Here, I venture into pure philosophy: a very 
dangerous thing for a medical scientist to do .. .' (1956: 281). 
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must adapt, Selye has little to say.94 The external socio-political world is present in his 
argument only obliquely in references to his own life, the life of a successful scientist. 
His examples of unavoidable situations in which it might be necessary to manage stress 
through a form of disengagement include 'most committee meetings, solemn academic 
ceremonies, and unavoidable interviews with crackpots' (Selye 1956: 301). 
F or Adorno, adaptation to the contemporary social environment results not in 
health but in damage. The environment to which humans are asked to adapt, he suggest, 
is no longer conducive to life. He writes: 
The libidinal achievements of an individual behaving as healthy in body and 
mind, are such as can be performed only at the cost of the profoundest 
mutilation, of internalized castration in extroverts, besides which the old 
renunciation of identification with the father is the child's playas which it was 
first rehearsed. The regular guy, the popular girl, have to repress not only their 
desires and insights, but even the symptoms that in bourgeois times resulted 
from repression. Just as the old injustice is not changed by the lavish display of 
light, air and hygiene, but is in fact concealed by the gleaming transparency of 
rationalized big business, the inner health of our time has been secured by 
blocking flight into illness without in the slightest altering its 
aetiology ... Underlying the prevalent health is death. All movements of health 
resemble the reflex-movements of beings whose hearts have stopped beating. 
Scarcely ever does an unhappily furrowed brow, bearing witness to terrible and 
long~forgotten exertion, or a moment of pathetic stupidity disrupting smooth 
logic, or an awkward gesture, embarrassingly preserve a trace of vanished life. 
(Adorno 1978: 58-59) 
Adaptation in Adorno's analysis produces only the appearance of health, at the cost of 
tremendous psychic damage. To enact the role ofthe 'regular guy' or the 'popular girl' 
is to submit to the structures of a society from which any traces of life are banished. For 
Adorno, the term 'life' has a particular significance. In traces and remnants it indicates 
something which is outside the administered world, and though Adorno warns that these 
traces should not be mistaken for life itself, their abolition marks an important passing.95 
What is embarrassing, awkward or clumsy disrupts the smooth surface of commodified 
94 He writes: 'I am not competent to speak about war though these are also signs of maladapt ion' 
(1956: 275). 
95 In his lectures on metaphysics, Adorno writes about metaphysical experience in Proust that: 'It is as if 
the joy of finding that somewhere some such thing as life were possible at all- and this is the counter-
motif to reification had lured the subject of the experience into directly equating these surviving traces 
of life with the meaning of life itself.' (2001: 143). 
120 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
social interactions and reveals the contradictory nature of the exchange: the subject's 
own ambivalent relation to his actions and words, and to those of others. In Freud's 
Psychopathology of Everyday life (1960 [1901 D, he describes a class of 'bungled 
actions', in which the subject shows an unusual clumsiness. The clumsy gesture not 
only communicates something which the subject is unable to admit, it also reveals 
something of the violence society imposes on the body. 
Freud describes an incident in which a married, middle-class woman, a former 
patient of his, trips over a pile of stones in the street and in falling, does considerable, 
although temporary, injury to her face. At the moment of her fall she had been looking at 
an ornament in a shop window for her nursery which she had wanted to 'buy 
immediately' . Freud explains how the woman had described herself as troubled by guilt 
over an abortion. She and her husband had decided that they could not have another 
child 'owing to their financial circumstances' (Freud 1960: 184). Freud interprets the 
falling as an act of self-punishment and also as a way of avoiding an imaginary greater 
punishment: 'This thOUght did not become conscious; but instead of it she used the 
situation, at what I might call this psychological moment, for punishing herself 
unobtrusively with the heap of stones which seemed suitable for the purpose.' (1960: 
185) For Freud these acts of clumsiness are moments ofresolution, in which psychic 
conflicts are unconsciously managed. The practice of psychoanalysis is also a form of 
management which, through making conscious the contradictory impulses, enables the 
patient to be 'sufficiently able to cope with life' (Freud 1960: 183). It aims at a process 
of psychical adaption to the demands of particular moral and economic systems. 
The shift that Adorno notes between Freud's subjects and those Adorno himself 
describes in 1945 is a difference in the role of the body. The body no longer is allowed 
to register contradictions; no 'flight into illness' is permitted. Instead Adorno suggests 
that 'what might be called a prehistoric surgical intervention' incapacitates psychical 
conflict before neuroses are even formed, ensuring the 'triumph of collective authority' 
(1978: 58). The body he describes, an efficient mechanism for living untroubled by 
psychical disturbances brought about by adapting to the social environment, is, of 
course, only partially a material reality in advanced Western societies. More 
significantly it operates as a desire, one in which the troublingly 'natural' or resistant 
body would no longer be permitted to articulate struggle against the conditions it is 
forced to inhabit but instead would allow the subject freedom from the responsibility of 
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being a subject, of being able and required to take part in the fashioning ofthat world. 
Written in 1944, in response to the war but also to the conditions he encountered 
on the West coast of the United States, these remarks seem even more apt a description 
of societies in the late twentieth century and early twentieth-first century. 
Contemporary medical science lays claim to innumerable ways of blocking flight into 
illness, through the prescription of mood enhancing drugs, such as Prozac, or through 
the suppression of the symptoms of struggle, the signs of stress. The business of health 
has taken over from psychoanalysis the work of dealing with problems of 
maladjustment, creating a situation wherein the body's resistance is suppressed so that 
the subject is 'sufficiently able to cope with life'. It is as if the methods of 
psychoanalysis, the constitutive power of language, no longer has the purchase to enact 
psychical transformations on the scale that is required to enable adaption to modern 
society. 
Hygiene, with its claim to provide a scientific approach to maintaining health, 
has itself become big business. In innumerable advertisements, gleaming kitchen surfaces 
are revealed to contain hidden, teeming hosts of bacteria which can only be defeated 
through liberal application of antibacterial detergents of various kinds. That the toxicity 
of these products causes further ill health is something that is only recently being 
admitted96 and requires, in itself, an adjustment. The toxicity of the gleaming home, in 
which each surface has been treated against invasion by microscopic organisms, provides 
a literal extension of Adorno's argument. Adaption to the current environment is itself a 
kind of death, or at least a submission to conditions in which it is impossible to be 
properly alive. 
The immaculate house is itself matched by the ageless, unmarked body of the 
woman or man who, in the advertisements, inhabits it. That wrinkles and fine lines that 
appear on the skin are themselves unacceptable is also constantly reiterated. Andie 
MacDowell, model and actress, advertises a number of products to 'reduce the visible 
signs of aging'. The brand slogan, 'because you're worth it', suggests an interesting 
reversal. Although the advertisement ostensibly claims to affirm the value of the 
addressee, the structure of the phrase also suggests the SUbjection of human value to the 
96 See the World Health Organisation (www.who.org) on the increase in asthma being a result of 
household toxins. Also Sandra Steingt'dber's Having Faith: An Ecologist's Journey to Motherhood 
which explores, among other things, the toxicity level s in breast milk due to household cleaning 
products. 
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measurement of things. The human subject must become worthy of the commodity; it 
must enter into a relationship of commensurability in which its value can be priced in 
the same system of exchange as the cosmetic products. The furrowed brows must be 
chemically smoothed and the desirability of the resulting blankness suggests that what 
must be erased are the marks of experience itself. History may not be written on the 
body. 
This image of the body as frozen in time also suggests the fonn of the 
commodity. In the process of exchange, Alfred Sohn Rethel argues, commodities must 
occupy abstract time and space: 
The business of exchange enforces abstraction from all this [the temporal aspect 
of human life], for the objects of exchange must remain immutable for the 
duration of the transaction. This transaction takes time, including that of the 
delivery of the commodities and the act of payment upon the conclusion of the 
deal. But this time is emptied of the material realities that fonn its contents in 
the sphere of use. (Sohn-RetheI1978: 48) 
Thus desire for a body unmarked by time can be read as a fonn of adaption -
submission to the demands of a society in which value is attributed only, or most easily, 
through entering into the system of exchange. 
The fact that only a small proportion of the world can afford such blankness 
does not detract from its power as a global marker of what is desirable. The immense 
global culture industry obsessively represents bodies without marks of history. In the 
abstract time of the film or advertisement, the actor or actress must undertake to remain, 
like the commodity in the transaction of exchange, immutable. The actor's body, more 
than any other public figure, must take on the responsibility of displaying the triumph 
of adaption, of health in a social, political and physical environment of dis-ease. 
For Adorno, writing during a moment in which modernity appeared to be in 
crisis, adaption is not a sign of health but a kind of death, a submission to an 
instrumental logic which excludes any place for the uncommodified body, for the 
'awkward gesture', the moments of 'pathetic stupidity' and the 'furrowed brow'. 
Towards the end of the twentieth century a new attitude towards the possibility 
of adaption emerges. Cultural critic, Frederick Buell, suggests that the last two decades 
of the twentieth century were characterised by a 'culture of hyper exuberance' 
(2003:215). Buell defmes this hyperexuberance in relation to William Catton's notion of 
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the culture of exuberance: 
Catton's culture of exuberance was the artifact of the expansion of earth's 
carrying capacity temporarily created by the discovery and exploitation of an 
underpopulated, premodern New World and fossil-fuel energy sources. For 
Catton, the culture of exuberance lasted throughout American history from 
discovery times to the 1960s; it was a fundamental part of Western modernity. 
(Buell 2003: 215) 
The recognition, in the 1960s and 1970s, of a state of environmental crisis, suggested 
that this exuberance might be misplaced, that the conspicuous consumption of the early 
part of the second half of the century could have serious and lasting consequences. Yet 
in the last two decades of the twentieth century, Buell argues, a new culture of defiance 
emerged in direct opposition to the environmental movement. According to Buell: 
this culture of hyper exuberance had little or none of the innocence of the the 
culture of exuberance a culture that did not realize or admit that it had filled its 
limits and gone out of balance. The culture of hyper exuberance accepted as its 
foundations exactly what the environmental crisis elaboration held: that people 
were already beyond their limits, out of balance and in disequilibrium with 
nature. It accepted these premises and sought to a1chemize them into 
possibilities' (2003: 216). 
The source of these possibilities was located in the inventiveness of the human 
mind which, inspired by the crisis, it was argued, would find new solutions in radically 
altered scientific paradigms.97 One of these was defined as neoevolution or hyper 
evolution which envisaged science as taking control of the process of adapt ion so that it 
was no longer necessary to 'wait a million years' (Kevin Kelly quoted in Buell 2003: 
226). Buell quotes from Kelly's book published in 1994, Out of Control: The new 
Biology of Machines. Social Systems, and the Economic World: 
The logic of Bios (extracted from biology) is being imported into machines, the 
logic of Technos is being imported into life; ... human-made things are behaving 
more lifelike, and .... Life is becoming more engineered. The apparent veil between 
the organic and the manufactured has crumpled to reveal that the two really are, 
and always have been of one being.' (quoted in Buell 2003: 226) 
97 Buell mentions Julian Simon, Alvin Toeffler, and the author oftechnotopian internet magazine, Wired, 
as examples of this tradition. 
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One characteristic of those writing in defence of the new technologies of genetic 
manipulation is a frequently expressed distaste for the inefficiency of the human body. 
McKibben quotes several of these technological visionaries who find the human body 
troublingly insufficient. Robert Ettinger, a cryogenicist is concerned about 'the 
elimination of elimination' and the absurdity of a 'multi-purpose mouth'. Marvin 
Minsky, a pioneer in the field of Artificial Intelligence, is quoted as remarking, 'Myself, 
I don't much like how people are now. We're too shallow, slow, and ignorant' (quoted 
in McKibben 2003: 111). Minsky is also cited as expressing dissatisfaction over the fact 
that we 'seem to have reached a plateau in our intellectual development. There is no sign 
that we're getting smarter. ... Has any playwright in recent years topped Shakespeare or 
Euripides? We have learned a lot in two thousand years, yet much ancient wisdom 
seems sound, which makes me suspect that we haven't been making much progress' 
(quoted in McKibben 2003: 111). In a book titled Beyond Humanity, Gregory Paul and 
Earl Cox, ask 'Why do we have only one heart, why not two in case one fails? Or two 
livers?' and suggest that 'the erect bipedal posture of which we are so proud makes us 
so unstable that falling on flat ground can have devastating results' (quoted in McKibben 
2003: 111). 
The pathology of everyday life is at once the damaged life of late capitalist 
social and physical environments, in which, to mention simply one example, household 
cleaners cau<;e toxicity in breast milk, and the pathologised life, in which the body itself 
appears as structurally unhealthy, incapable of fulfilling the functions of a full and 
healthy life in the modem world. If, for Adorno, the environment is such that adaption 
means a kind of death, a suppression of even the traces of life that the constitutive 
conflict of being a human/social subject involves, for the theorists ofthe late twentieth 
century the possibility of adaption seems equally troubling. Yet for them, the solution 
appears technical: the material modification of humans to enable them to achieve more 
completely what Adorno condemned in 1944, the removal of all traces of resistance, all 
signs of maladaption. The health of the new body is one in which the flight into illness is 
literally blocked. The films I discuss in the section that follows thus occur at a pivotal 
moment in which the 'natural' body, already marked as obsolete, overlaps with the new 
body, still uneasily and imperfectly imagined. 
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Enacting health 
In an interview with Candian television talk show host Pierre Berton in 1971, Bruce Lee 
discusses the relationship between martial arts and acting.98 Asked about why film 
stars come to him for training, he says that they: 
ask me to teach them not so much of how to defend themselves, how to do 
somebody in. Rather they want to learn to express themselves through some 
movement be it anger, be it determination or whatsoever. So, in other words, 
what I am saying therefore he is paying me to show him in combative form the 
art of expressing the human body.' 
Martial arts, Lee suggests, involves a particular orientation toward the body, one in 
which each movement must be precisely defined. 'The ideal,' he says, ' is unnatural 
naturalness or natural unnaturalness,' a body trained but not mechanical. It involves a 
recognition that the body contains the possibility of expression. Lee describes it as 
thinking: 'here I am, a human being, how can I express myself totally and completely?' 
In trying to define the 'enigma' of health, philosopher Hans Georg Gadamer 
draws on some similar ideas. He writes that 'health is not a condition that one 
introspectively feels in oneself. Rather it is the condition of being in the world, of being 
together with one's fellow human beings, of active and rewarding engagement in one's 
everyday tasks' (1996: 113). Health, he suggests, is a state of equilibrium, a form of 
presence. He writes, 'here presence does not refer to that mysterious aspect of time in 
the narrow sense of a series of temporal points which are enumerated in their 
momentary being. Rather presence refers here to something which fully occupies a kind 
of space' (1996: 74). The example Gadamer uses is of a great actor or an outstanding 
statesman. 
What happens to the health of the body when the space it occupies becomes less 
habitable, when the space prevents or obstructs this form of enactment or engagement? 
99 In Minima Moralia, Adorno uses the idea of 'damaged life' to describe this condition. 
Among many other fragments of everyday life, he comments on the effects of 
technology. Although he is talking about a form of technology that predates the cyborg, 
his reflection on its integration into life remain usefuL 
98 'Interview with Bruce Lee' Pierre Berton Show Hong Kong, 9 December 1971. 
99 Gadamer comments that 'it is extremely significant that in today's highly developed technical 
civilization it has proved necessary to invent an expression like 'quality of life', which serves only to 
describe what has been lost in the mean time' (1996:104). 
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Adorno writes: 
Technology is making gestures precise and brutal, and with them men. It expels 
from movements all hesitations, deliberations, civility. It subjects them to the 
implacable, as it were, ahistorical demand of things. (Adorno 1978: 40) 
Technology, Adorno claims, acts on 'gestures', on the way in which the body moves in 
space. It conditions movement, the possibility of engagement with the world, and 
excludes from the body the possibility of thought (hesitations, deliberations). Gestures, 
meaningful movements of the body, are subjected to the demands ofthings. 
This seems to me to be a useful starting point for approaching the bodies of 
action film heroes, Arnold Schwarzenegger and Jean-Claude Van Damme as particular 
enactments of the human body's relationship to late twentieth century space. In a sense 
they do 'fully occupy space', mimicking the condition of health, as Gadamer describes 
it, but not as a 'great actor' or statesman might. The charismatic quality of the great 
actor or statesman, Gadamer explains, is an articulation of the 'full completion and 
realization of a living being', a mode of tot a! engagement with the space they occupy. In 
the films in which Schwarzenegger and Van Damme feature, it is no longer the living 
being as a whole that is present. Instead it is the bodies themselves which have been 
expanded to fill up the space of engagement. 
ENTER THE MACHINE 
Spectacular Bodies 
Films in which action, the representation ofborues in motion, takes precedence over 
plot or dialogue, emerge as a genre in the 1970s. Their emergence is linked to an attempt 
to repopularise film in America after the decline in film attendance in the 1950s and 60s 
due to the development and widespread distribution of television. Part of this revival of 
cinema was inspired by Hong Kong cinema and in particular by the films of Bruce Lee, 
Big Boss (1971), Fist ofFmy (1972) and Enter the Dragon (1973), which became 
perhaps the most widely recognized martial arts movies in the West. 100 For Lee, as was 
suggested earlier, acting and martial arts both articulated a particular relation to the body, 
100 See discussion in Lisa Odham Stokes & Michael Hoover (1999: 92). 
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one in which the movement of the body was an act of expression. In Enter the Dragon, 
the fight sequences focus on the body's lightness, its lithe maneuverability and its 
vulnerability. Lee's body is muscular but slight and in the act of combat it not simply 
his body which is in motion. In these fight scenes Lee's face and voice are also 
expressive and there is a sense that it is his whole being which is engaged. 
What is significant about the bodies of Schwarzenegger and Van Damme is the 
degree to which they exist as objects before their incorporation into the world of 
representation. Arnold Schwarzenegger's career as a bodybuilder predates his move to 
America from Austria, and it is his built body which permits him entry into the world of 
film. This body which in 1965 earned him a perfect score in body building competition, 
and the similarly although perhaps less extremely built body of Van Damme, generate a 
particular form of narrative. A selection of movies from their careers gives an indication 
of how these bodies as objects become visible in particular ways during this period. 
They shift from the pre modern, pre technological body of the 'barbarian', 
(Schwarzenegger in Conan 1982 & 1984), to what Paul Willemann refers to as the 'erotic 
labour power body', the celebrated body of the industrial worker, (Van Damme in Hard 
Target), to the postindustrial, cyborg body, (Schwarzenegger in Terminator 1. 1984), to 
the obsolete cyborg body (Schwarzenegger, Terminator 2 1991) and back again to the 
post-apocalytic, post technological body (Van Damme Cyborg 1989) with various 
digressions, and repetitions along the way. 101 What remains constant is the 
invulnerability of these bodies, their privileged relation to the violent world that forms 
them and through which they move. 
Language and Gesture 
Gestures, the coded movements of bodies in space, constitute the subjects in these 
films. Against this fluid movement, the choreographed violence, in which the 
represented world arranges itself around the body of the hero, language emerges as 
something awkward and difficult. 
The machine Schwarzenegger in Terminator speaks by choosing set phrases from 
a list of options or exactly mimicking speech he has overheard, but his and Van 
Damme's speech in other films seems to be marked by a similar recycling of set phrases. 
101 Willemen's notion of the 'erotic labour power body' is discussed in David Stafford's 'The Body in 
Science Fiction Film' in O'Brien (Ed.). (1999). 
128 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Film critic, Richard Ebert criticizes Cyborg for 'its actors reciting unspeakable lines' but 
in fact this quality of recitation is characteristic of all these movies. Unl ike the 
wisecracking action heroes Bruce Willis and Mel Gibson , Van Damme and 
Schwarzenegger seem to have a particu larly awkward relation to language. 
Characteristically silent, they speak as if language was something foreign to them. 
Literally true for them of English, the language of the movies they feature in, this 
foreignness of language seems also, in part, a performance. It is as if the muscled body 
resists being incorporated into the social order of language. 
In one of the most interesting Van Damme movies, Hard Target, director John 
Woo seems to exaggerate this dislocation between body and language. In the fight scene 
which occurs early on in the movie, where Van Damme as Chance Boudreaux defeats 
five would be rapists and muggers in a series of flying and apparently effortless kicks 
and throws (perhaps significantly centred around a car) the camera lingers lovingly on 
his body. In a series of camera techniques - moving into slow motion, repeating frames-
any pretense to realism is abandoned and the fight becomes pure spectacle. Immediately 
after this Van Damme speaks briefly to the woman he has just saved. The lines: ' Next 
time be more careful where you show your wallet,' spoken slowly in Van Damme' s 
accented English, have an almost painful literalness which contrasts sharply with the 
easy, fluid control of the body in motion celebrated by the camera in filming the fight. 
Even his attempt at lightness, 'You know it's a shame, this used to be such a nice part 
of town ' seems like a generic reference to another type of action movie rather than an 
integral part of this one. It is as if speech itself constrains the body, forces it into a mode 
of articulation which is alien to it. 
In Schwarzenegger's films the dislocation between the body and language takes a 
slightly different form. If Van Damme's words articulate an awkward literalness, 
Schwarzenegger, like the terminator cyborg, seems to recite the catch phrases of late 
twentieth century urban culture. In Total Recall, Schwarzenegger plays Quaid, 
ostensibly a simple manual labourer but one who has dreams about being a secret agent 
on Mars. 'I want to do something with my life, I want to be somebody.' These words, 
spoken by Quaid to the woman he believes to be his wife after she has tried to persuade 
him to forget his fantasies and dreams about Mars, are immediately recognisable as a set 
phrase for articulating generic aspiration in late twentieth century culture. 
129 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
wn
The Return of 'Natural ' Man after the Apocalypse: Jean-Claude Van Damme in Cyborg 
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Man as Machine: Arnold Schwarzenegger in Terminator 
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Fred Pfeil also notes Schwarzenegger's tendency to 'drop gruesome puns' 
(1995: 31), but what in fact, these involve is a literalisation of everyday figural speech. 
Pfeil's example is the line 'He lost his head over me' after a decapitation. In Total 
Recall, a mutant addresses him angrily with the line: 'You've got a lot of nerve showing 
your face around here' to which Schwarzenegger replies with a significant look at the 
man's distorted face, 'Look who's talking.' 
The Demands of Things 
If on the one hand the heroic body remains outside the network of communality implied 
by language, the narratives generated by these bodies also indicates the breakdown of the 
social world itself. In the post-apocalyptic future world of the Terminator movies and 
Cyborg, no stable form of human society remains, no linguistic contract can be trusted. 
In Total Recall, even the hero's own words to himself, recorded on video before his 
memory is altered are duplicitous. The body, the gesture, becomes the only reliable 
form of articulation. In a world subject to the implacable demands of things, engagement 
must take place through the rearrangement of things, through gestures and actions, not 
through language and conversation. 
The destroyed cityscapes in Cyborg, and Terminator are bleak dystopian visions 
but there is also a sense in which the total destruction of everything that is fam i liar is 
satisfying. The muscled body of the hero is I iberated into a new space uncluttered by 
the buildings, commodities and cultural debris of consumer society. Fredric Jameson 
writes that 'on a global scale, allegory allows the most random minute or isolated 
landscapes to function as a figurative machinery in which questions about the system 
and its control over the local ceaselessly rise and fall .. .' (1992: 5). These destroyed or 
threatened landscapes, read allegorically, can be seen to articulate a kind of rage against 
the system which constructs space so that the body must become a machine to operate 
efficiently. 
[n Total Recall the atmosphere of Mars, from which the inhabitants are only 
paltially protected by domes, is extremely hostile to any kind of animate life. [t is 
without air, the kind of vacuum Galileo imagined in constructing his theory of inertial 
motion. The body exposed to Mars' atmosphere bulges and writhes, the eyes stand out 
and the face distorts in an agonising death. This inhospitable landscape is what the hero 
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sets out to transfonn, as if through muscular strength alone, the entire relationship 
between body and space can be transfonned. Schwarzenegger's act of starting the alien 
machinery which will provide air for the whole planet liberates the oppressed mutant 
population from their reliance on the industrialist, Cohagen. It is as ifhis muscular body 
creates a new space in which their bodies will no longer suffer distortion and mutation. 
In a similar way, in Death Warrant, Van Damme's coherent, completed hyperbody 
stands in opposition to the body parts that the evil doctor and prison authorities sell. 
His whole body is the only thing that can prevent the other prisoners from becoming 
merely a collection of saleable parts. 
The Body as Symptom 
The machine body does not suffer or grow sick. It can only become, as in the second 
Tenninator movie, obsolete, and in the experience of this obsolescence become 
humanized. For the body of the heroes to be human they must experience pain, but this 
experience must not disrupt the integrity of the body as a whole. Part of the satisfaction 
of the movies for the viewers is their refusal to pennit the possibility in the heroic body 
of death or disfigurement. Unlike the figure of the cyborg, defmed by its participation in 
a complex inter-penetration of the world and the body, these fully defended heroic 
bodies act on the world but are not in any deep sense acted upon. The heroic bodies of 
Van Damme and Schwarzenegger are not, in these movies, sexual bodies. Their 
engagement is predominantly with the world of things, with the violent demarcations of 
the boundaries of their own bodies in relation to the world and to other hostile bodies. 
This aggressive assertion of the human body takes place at a moment when both the 
successes and failures of science are becoming acutely felt. On the one hand, research in 
genetics makes possible a whole new assault on the integrity of the body, offering a 
sophisticated programme for the redesign of the species, on the other the evidence of the 
HIV I AIDS epidemic shows the failure of scientific medicine in a cultnre which had 
assumed that it understood and could control the workings of body and could regulate 
its relations with other organisms. 
The body in contemporary cultnre appears as something unruly, which has to be 
controlled in order to fit appropriately into the social world of work and pleasure. The 
body is the raw edge, the recalcitrant materialism of the social individual which has to be 
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suppressed and confined in order for the individual to function efficiently in the world. 
In the same way, muscular strength in an era of technology and of weapons of 
mass destruction appears increasingly inadequate. Yvonne Tasker writes that for many 
critics 'the muscles of male stars seem repulsive and ridiculous precisely because they 
seem to be dysfunctional, "nothing more" than decoration, a distinctly unmanly 
designation' (1993: 239). Yet these muscles produced for display can be read in another 
way. While on the one hand they are clearly icons, developed not through use but 
through dedicated bodybuilding, and serve as 'reassuring' indicators of masculine power, 
they can also be read as symptoms of the narrowing space allowed for the body in 
postmodern culture. According to Freud: 'the symptom emerges as a many-times-
distorted derivation of the unconscious libidinal wish fulfilment, an ingeniously chosen 
piece of ambiguity with two meanings in complete mutual contradiction' (1963: 360). In 
this sense the pumped up muscles can be read as a kind of swelling indicative of an 
injury the dis-ease of the body in postmodern culture, at once the ultimate 
commodity, all surface and perfected for its role as pure spectacle and at the same time 
the violent return of the swollen body exhibiting the damage it has suffered in the 
technological culture oflate twentieth century. Van Damme and Schwarzenegger's 
enactment of health, of the body able to fully occupy space, is at the same time an 
enactment of a form of sickness, not a state of equilibrium, or a condition of engagement 
with the world but rather a position of disengagement. The repressed body returns, but 
it returns only as a sign of illness. 
Conclusion 
In 'Education after Auschwitz' Adorno discusses some of the social conditions which 
might make it possible to comprehend the violence of the twentieth century. He 
suggests that: 
One can speak of the claustrophobia of humanity in the administered world, ofa 
feeling of being incarcerated in a thoroughly societalized, closely woven, netlike 
environment. The denser the weave, the more one wants to escape it, whereas it 
is precisely its close weave that prevents any escape. This intensifies the fury 
against civilization. The revolt against it is violent and irrationaL (1998[1963]: 
193) 
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In an interesting way the film, Total Recall. seems to offer itself as an allegorical 
expression of precisely these conditions. The airless environment entirely controlled by 
the industrialist and the mutilated bodies of the inhabitants represent in a literal form the 
claustrophobic character of late twentieth century culture and its resulting distortions. 
The muscled body makes its appearance in mainstream film at a time when the body is 
perceived as extremely vulnerable. Threatened both with violence from without in a 
global culture obsessed with national and personal security, and with its own 
redundancy in an increasingly technologically-ordered work environment, the body is 
also threatened from within by the spread of a disease that destroys the body's internal 
defence mechanism. The exploding body exposed to the vacuum of Mars' atmosphere 
can be understood to represent this condition of the body, subject to the unbearable 
stresses of its own vulnerability, exposed to a social and cultural space which no longer 
has any exterior. 
While in the world of such movies, the extreme violence of the heroic protagonist 
becomes rational because it transforms the space he inhabits, outside the film world, 
such violence cannot find the source of its oppression. It explodes instead, Adorno 
suggests, in irrational acts of violence in genocides. Adorno's interest is, of course, in 
changing the environment people inhabit, or if this is not possible at least finding spaces 
of resistance, moments when you can step outside for a breath of air. 
At the end of the twentieth century, however, a new solution presents itself. 
Instead of creating an environment which might be conducive to human health and 
happiness, a utopian vision which no longer appears even as a possibility, genetic 
engineering introduces the idea that the body might be rescued from its obsolescence. 
Managed adaption, genetic engineers seem to be suggesting, might enable the body to be 
healthy despite the stresses it is exposed to in the contemporary physical but also social 
and economic environments. Or at least the body might be adjusted so that it no longer 
registered such stresses as physical symptoms. Adorno's apparently exaggerated claim 
in 1945 - that 'the inner health of our time has been secured by blocking flight into 
illness' (1978: 58) promises at the beginning of the twenty-first century to become 
true in a very literal sense. 
In 'A Cyborg Manifesto', Haraway argues that the body in the postmodern 
space constituted by the integrated circuits of information technology and genetic 
engineering can no longer be conceived of as distinct and bounded. Instead she suggests 
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that 'we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism' 
(2000: 70). The bodies of Van Damme and Schwarzenegger, ambiguously both 
embracing the machine and defending the human seem to fit, in their very awkwardness, 
this category. But the new engineered body, at least as it is imagined for us by those 
developing the technology, need bear no visible signs on its surface of its hybridity. 
Instead of the cyborg, the new figure for imagining such a future subject is the 
posthuman. 
In the following chapter I discuss this new move in the long trajectory of the 
human body. If in this chapter I have talked repeatedly of the body as if it were 
something distinct from the subject, an agent in its own right, this is because I wished to 
emphasize those ways in which it appears, both as commodity and as symptom, to 
acquire a life of its own. In the next chapter, I return to the question of sUbjectivity and 
the way in which manipulating the material body mayor may not be able to restore to 
human subjects a sense of being inside their skins, of inhabiting the world and being at 
home there. 
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Chapter 5 
Philosophy at the End of Nature 
Refuge for the homeless. - The predicament of private life 
today is shown by its arena. Dwelling, in the proper 
sense, is now impossible. The traditional residences we 
grew up in have grown intolerable: each trait of comfort in 
them is paid for with a betrayal of knowledge, each vestige 
of shelter with the musty pact of family interests. The 
functional modem habitations designed from a tabula 
rasa, are living-cases manufactured by experts for 
philistines, or factory sites that have strayed into the 
consumption sphere, devoid of all relation to the 
occupant: in them even the nostalgia for independent 
existence, defunct in any case, is sent packing. (Adorno 
1978: 38) 
In the previous chapter I discussed how a particular type of body, the extremely 
muscled body of the action hero, both manifests and contains the contradictory forces 
acting on the human body at the tum of the twenty-first century. They represent 
simultaneously the fantasy of invincibility and the reality of damage, both an extreme 
form of reification and a response to unbearable pressure. In the films, the complex 
relationship between body and the environment also indicates something else: a rage 
against the suppression of the body in the interest of efficiency and a desire that it might 
be released from its blank: and silent immobility into expressive motion. 
In this thesis, I began with nature as external - in the spaces which surround 
people, and the animals, imagined and real, with whom these spaces are shared. The 
human body, ambiguously both external and internal, acts as hinge between what is 
outside and what is inside, human nature itself. This relationship which is both between 
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the body and subjectivity, and between nature and history, is the focus of this fifth and 
final chapter of the thesis. Not this relationship in the abstract, but this relationship as 
it is articulated at a particular historical moment, when the promise and threat of re-
engineering the human subject is imminent but not yet realized. Adorno's philosophy, I 
suggest, is one that has a particular significance to the complex political and ethical 
questions which make their appearance at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of 
the twenty-first century and which I have chosen to sum up under the title of the 'end 
of nature'. 
In the first section, I take as my starting point the figure of home and 
homelessness, since it provides a moment of intersection, where the material landscape, 
the lived environment, the experience of living and its interpretation through philosophy 
come together. This section discusses the different ways in which the concept of home 
has been represented: as a way of being in the world,. a defense against the alienation of 
commercial society but also an epistemological project, the desire to make the world 
familiar and habitable. Yet in the contemporary context neither science nor philosophy 
seem able to satisfy such a desire. Instead the world appears more strange and less 
habitable, and I suggest that Freud's investigation of the concept of the uncanny might 
prove useful in understanding the place of the human subject in the context of genetic 
technologies. 
The second part of this chapter focusses more directly on Adorno's assessment 
of the predicament of philosophy. For 'the end of nature' represents not only an ethical 
and psychical problem, it also implies a crisis in interpretation. What is the role of 
philosophy in an environment where language itself, disentangled entirely from the 
materiality of the world, no longer holds the promise of revealing the truth? This 
section ofthe thesis, which I have called 'The Real and the Natural,' explores some 
ways in which these two terms interact in the formulation of a lived relation between 
subject and object. I discuss Adorno's early essays 'On the Idea of Natural History' 
(1984 [1932]) and 'The Actuality of Philosophy' (2000[1931]), as well of some of his 
later writing in order to trace the peculiar relevance of Adorno's 'critical models' for 
contemporary debates around 'the end of nature' and technologies of the posthuman. 
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THE PROBLEM OF HOME 
The Impossibility of Dwelling 
In the era of environmental disasters, Adorno's acerbic denunciation of the possibility 
of 'dwelling' in the second half of the twentieth century acquires a new intensity. lithe 
condition of exile forced on him by the war alerted Adorno to the essentially precarious 
nature of domicile in a time of global political upheaval and genocide, it also indicated 
something further: a condition of homelessness that marked the peculiar relationship of 
the subject to the emerging world order. 
Several recent trends confirm Adorno's insight. In an article in the Mail & 
Guardian 17-23 October 2003, 'An Unnatural Disaster', Andrew Simmon, the policy 
director at the New Economic Foundation, argues that the world needs to acknowledge a 
new category of refugees: environmental refugees - people displaced because of 
environmental disasters. He suggests that: 
the number of people seeking refuge as a result of environmental disaster is set to 
increase dramatically over the coming years. Ironically, given current attitudes, 
industrialised countries will resist accommodating them, and yet they will have 
become refugees as a direct result of the way the west lives. 
Global warming, he asserts, may surpass wars and political upheavals as the primary 
cause of the displacement of people from their traditional homes. A similar claim is 
made by economist John Gray, in his critique of globalisation. He argues that 
globalisation, far from improving conditions in the 'third world', will instead result in 
further impoverishment. He writes: 
The overall effect of global free markets on the world environment will be 
unchanged. It will still work world wide to unload the costs that in an earlier, 
more accountable species of capitalism were borne by enterprises. More and 
more of the world will, as a result, become less and less habitable.' (Gray 1998: 
81) 
A new terrain is being mapped wherein whole land masses are expected to 
become submerged leaving their inhabitants literally without the material locus around 
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which a nation might be imagined.102 Even if the projected sea level rise does not occur, 
much territory has already been made unlivable. In Africa, the huge unmapped areas of 
land mines, the residual remains of colonial and postcolonial wars left under the skin of 
the land, mean that certain areas can only be marked off as too dangerous to enter. And 
as writers such as Ken Saro-Wiwa bear witness to multinationals who are deliberately 
homeless, exploit their vagrant status by avoiding the responsibilities of a more 
grounded or situated version of capitalism.103 
The concept of 'dwelling' implies above all staying still. Around a dwelling there 
accrues habitual actions, reflection, hesitation, deliberations, civilities. 104 It suggests a 
relationship with time as well as with place; the soothing quality of approximately 
repeated actions through which the body gives form to the space around it. In a 
pathological form, this transforms into compulsion, the obsessional gesture which 
testifies to the impossibility of escaping the past or the brutality of the factory line in 
which the forced repetition of a constantly interrupted movement reduces gesture to 
mechanical motion. 
The condition of homeless ness, the obverse of dwelling, is, for Adorno, at once 
a physical and a psychical dislocation. Homelessness also has an ethical dimension -
being at ease in the world as it is, of accepting what is the case, can only ever be 
achieved at the expense of others. It is in one aspect the quintessence of modernity'S 
restless commitment to transformation, the glamour of perpetual motion in which 'one 
is always closer by not staying still,!05 and in another, the attrition and uncertainty of 
constant, involuntary removal, whether within cities or across state borders. 
Homelessness implies the existence of a home which one refuses to recognise or from 
which one has been banished. The end of nature suggests that what makes possible 
home, the condition of ease in relation to the body, to the land, to other creatures, 
human and otherwise, and to things themselves, may no longer exist. 
For Georg Lukacs, writing in 1914, homelessness was an unavoidable condition 
102 Andrew Simmon discusses the case of the Island of Tuvalu which is threatened by rising sea levels. 
The people there, he comments have an 'ad hoc agreement with New Zealand to be allowed phased 
relocation' Mail and C:ruardian 17-23 October 2003. 
'03 For an interesting discussion of Ken Saro-Wiwa work and conditions in the Rivers State as a result of 
oil production see 'Struggle in Ogoniland: Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Cultural Politics of Environmental 
Justice' in Adamson, Evans & Stein (2002). 
104 The concept of dwelling has particular resonances in the work ofHeidegger. See Greg Garrard's 
'Heidegger, Heany and the Problem of Dwelling' in Kerridge and Sarnmells (1998) for a discussion of 
the significance of the idea in Heidegger's writing. 
105 The line is from Thorn Gunn's 'Man You Gotta Go' (1979). 
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of modem experience. Following Hegel, he argues that ancient Greece represented the 
last 'integrated civilization'. For ages such as that of the Greeks, he maintains in the 
opening paragraphs of The Theot)' of the Novel: 
the world is wide and yet it is like a home, for the fire that bums in the soul is of 
the same essential nature as the stars; the world and the self, the light and the fire 
are sharply distinct, yet they never become permanent strangers to one another. .. 
Thus each action of the soul becomes meaningful and rounded in this duality: 
complete in meaning - in sense - and complete for the senses; rounded because 
the soul rests within itself even while it acts; rounded because its action 
separates itself from it and, having become itself, fmds a center of its own and 
draws a closed circumference round itself. "Philosophy is really homesickness," 
says Novalis: "it is the urge to be at home everywhere." , (Lukacs 1962: 29) 
In a preface added in 1962, Lukacs explains how the book, worked on in the summer of 
1914, was 'written in a mood of permanent despair over the state of the world. It was 
not until 1917 that I found an answer to the problems which, until then had seemed to 
me insoluble' (1962: 12). The 'solution', dialectical materialism, transforms 
'transcendental homelessness' into the Marxist concept of alienation or estrangement. 
The consequence of capitalist relations of production and a society based on exchange 
value, not use value, homelessness appears no longer as an unavoidable condition but is 
inextricably linked to a particular historical moment. 
Adorno's representation of homeless ness, although not antagonistic to Marx's 
theory of alienation, approaches from a different direction. What is important, he argues 
in a letter to Benjamin, is defIDing and clarifying the 'dialectical image' because it 
suggests an alternative to the more rigidly deterministic Marxian model in which class 
theory is 'conceived of as some "deus ex machina'" (Adorno 1994: 54). 106 The 
aphorism on homelessness offers not so much a theory of alienation as a juxtaposition 
of elements, in which the physical, the ideological, the ethical and aesthetic collide both 
to elucidate and to trouble the concluding assertion: that 'wrong life cannot be lived 
rightly' (Adorno 1978: 39). 
The aphorism begins with the house as a physical manifestation of the concept 
of home. In his claim, 'the house is past', Adorno registers the end of a particular 
relationship with place. Although in some senses an exaggeration houses continue to 
106 His comments concern Benjamin's Arcades project which Adorno felt was being limited by Brecht's 
influence. Brecht, insisting on atheism as the proper mode for theorisation apparently discouraged the 
theological dimension of Benjamin's project (1994: 54). 
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exist - it holds a literal truth as well, a description of the world as it is: European cities 
reduced to rubble, and cars, trailers and camps as the new spaces of habitation. The 
'period house' offers only a simulation of an earlier relationship, and the attempt to buy 
back as an individual what has been lost at the level of society - the possibility of 
dwelling. 
In Walter Benjamin's 1935 expose, Paris the Capital of the Nineteenth Centuty, 
he writes, 'to dwell is to leave traces' .107 This comment occurs in the section which 
discusses the emergence and the shattering of the interior, as a space opposed to the 
office, the domain of work and commercial interests. The interior reflects the needs of 
the private individual, a refuge from the reality of the world of work. The interior, 
Benjamin suggests, 'is liquidated in the last years of the nineteenth century' (1999: 20). 
Before this, however, the interior has a particular relation to the world of objects. He 
writes: 
The collector is the true resident of the interior. He makes his concern the 
transfiguration of things. To him falls the Sisyphean task of divesting things of 
their commodity character by taking possession of them. But he bestows on 
them only the connoisseur value, rather than use value. The collector dreams his 
way not only into a distant or bygone world but also into a better one - one in 
which, to be sure, human beings are no better provided with what they need than 
in the everyday world, but in which things are freed from the drudgery of being 
useful.' (1999: 9) 
In the nineteenth century, the collector is someone still able to insist on a different form 
of value, to resist the fonn of the commodity. Tbrough never-ending labour he is able to 
maintain within the circumscribed space of the interior, a different relation to things, one 
in which he 'takes possession' of them rather than the other way around. He creates an 
imaginary world where things are removed entirely from the circuits of use-value and 
exchange value. lo8 
The liquidation of the interior is linked for Benjamin to the Jungendstil, a style of 
architecture and design associated with a desire to restructure the human environment. 
IU7 Adorno considered this work to be very closely allied with his own project. In a letter to Benjamin in 
1934, he writes: 'You are well aware that I really regard this work [the Arcades] as part of our destined 
contribution to prima philosophia ... .' (1994: 53). 
108 For a discussion of Benjamin's Arcades PrQject see Susan Buck-Morss (1989) For a discussion of 
the relation between the work ofBenjarnin and that of Adorno see Buck-Morss (1977) ; Nicholsen (1997: 
130-225) & Bernstein (2001: 116-118). 
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Their project is similar to that of William Morris, the aethetisization of everyday life, or 
the rescue of everyday life through art. Benjamin notes they 'find expression in the 
mediumistic language of the line, in the flower as the symbol of a naked vegetal nature 
confronted by a technologically armed world' (1999: 9). For Morris, everything must 
have a use-value, nothing must be purely decorative. Yet every useful object must also 
have aesthetic value; it must bear the trace of human work, the gestural mediation 
whereby people enter into a relationship with the world around them, with nature itself 
as the material substratum with which all labour engages. 
The impossibility of home is only partly a rearrangement of space. The 
imposition of functionality on what has become the business of living means not only 
that places are transformed into neutral zones for particular forms of habitation but also 
that they no longer offer any resistance to the ordering principle of commercial interests. 
The collector at the end of the twentieth century is at least as thoroughly entangled in 
the circuit of exchange as anyone else, and if the absence of use-value remains a 
precondition, this only serves to create more intensely reified objects whose worth can 
only be established through exclusive auction houses. Outside this occupation of the 
very rich, collecting takes a new form in attempts to create or own a unique object, the 
largest ball of wool, or to undertake a singular action, to single-handedly pull a jumbo jet 
ten meters or to be able to break an unmatchable number of tiles across your forehead. 109 
Benjamin writes that 'the original form of all dwelling is existence not in the 
house but in the shell. The shell bears the impression of its occupant' (1999: 220). Yet 
dwelling, he suggests, is also a nineteenth century invention. Through habitual action, 
through the particular orientation towards things, it was possible for a particular class to 
fashion such a shell. (1999: 221) Things and spaces could still be wrested from the logic 
of commercial interest to form an environment which bore the trace, the outline of the 
occupant. The Second World War completes what at the end of the nineteenth century 
is already underway. It brings the literal and the figural together, so that in the 
excessiveness of its violence and destruction it mimics the psychical impossibility of 
private lives. In a sense, the war makes manifest what is concealed - that the subject can 
no longer leave a trace. 
Instead what marks the world is the increasing domination of technology. (much 
109 These examples are taken from the popular American television programme Riddley's Believe it or 
Not. 
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has been written about the particular technological fonn of violence represented by the 
gas chambers) What in 1943 is still unknown is the precise force of nuclear technology, 
which can demolish not only individual cities but with the refinements of the technology 
during the cold war, the world itself. In one sense nuclear technology creates the world 
as a single global unit by making possible its destruction. 
In Dialectic of the Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno argue against the idea 
of fascism as abnonnal, a rupture in the otherwise progressive history of Western 
societies towards greater equality and freedom. 110 Although few people might now 
accept the radicalness of Horkheimer and Adorno's claim that Stalinist Russia, 
consumerist America and Fascist Germany represent equivalent if diverse expressions of 
similar historical conditions, globalization, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries suggests a new relevance to their analysis. It is as if the exaggerated claims 
about the impossibility of subjectivity within the increasingly administered world 
Adorno articulates in 1945, come to have a peculiar truth fifty years later. 
At Home in the Universe 
It is perhaps ironic that at the same time as the world is being created through the 
possibility of its destruction, a new narrative of home is gaining currency. In his 
introduction to The Copernican Revolution written in 1957, Thomas Kuhn suggests that 
the uniqueness of the project of Western science is that it combines what he refers to ·as 
'the universal compUlsion for at-homeness in the universe' with a close attention to 
detail. He writes: 
The sun god, Ra, travels in his boat across the heavens each day, but there is 
nothing in Egyptian cosmology to explain either the regular recurrence of his 
journey or the seasonal variation of his boat's route. Only in our Western 
civilization has the explanation of such details been considered a function of 
cosmology. No other civilization, ancient or modem, has made a similar demand. 
The requirement that a cosmology supply both a psychologically satisfying 
world view and an explanation of observed phenomenon like the daily change in 
the position of the sunrise has vastly increased the power of cosmological 
thought. It has channeled the universal compUlsion for at-homeness in the 
universe into an unprecedented drive for the discovery of scientific explanations. 
(Kuhn 1957: 7) 
110 A similar argument has been put forward more recently by Zygmunt Bauman in Modernity and the 
Holocaust (1989). 
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The desire for 'at homeness', Kuhn suggests is a condition of all societies. Its 
satisfaction requires that a meaningful context is created for human communities to 
inhabit. Through cosmologies, explanatory narratives, the external world is drawn into 
human meaning. By associating Western science with this mythologising process, Kuhn 
suggests that it too occupies such a position within societies. Yet he also makes a careful 
distinction. Western science depends on a close observation and explanation of details in 
a way that other mythologies did not. 
Kuhn's proposes for science a role in Western societies that was previously in 
Western society the domain of philosophy - to provide individuals with the sense of 
occupying a place within a web, a network of relationships. The proliferation of popular 
science books published in the 1980s and 1990s which take as their theme 'the web of 
life' attempt to return to the reading public a sense of context which is no longer 
experienced, as if narrative can take the place of social practices, abstract knowledge 
form experience. lll People are returned to nature, not through practical engagement, 
through actions, but abstractly by taking their imaginary place in relation to the other 
animals, plants, as elements within an ecosystem. In the late twentieth century, at least 
as the concept is used within the jargon of popular science, to be at home requires a level 
of abstraction. To feel what is in effect something entirely separate from experience. To 
feel a kinship with animals that you have never encountered, to structure your 
experience of belonging through the acquisition of knowledge. 
Kuhn's comparison between science and cosmologies is interesting because it 
challenged the dominant discourse on science which tends to elide its historical and 
cultural dimension. 112 But it also misses something about cosmologies, which is that 
they are not simply knowledge. Cosmologies are part of a complex set of ritual and 
social practices. They require observances, not observations and imply a different 
relationship between the knowledge and the holder of the knowledge, between object 
and subject. Cosmologies define not simply the physical world but more importantly, 
the ethical parameters that govern interactions between people and between people and 
their surroundings. 
If as Kuhn suggests, science functions cosmologically in Western societies, and 
111 See for example Kauffinan's At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Complexity (1995). 
112 For a discussion of the work of Thomas Kuhn and the impact of his ideas see Sardar (2000). 
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extends through the powerful influence of these societies into global networks, 
developments in cloning, genetic engineering and nanotechnology bring a peculiar 
disturbance into science's framing of the world as home. In the early nineteenth 
century, the dominant understanding of alienation was religious - the loss of the 
originary home, the garden. In the late twentieth century the problem of home is 
different but the metaphor remains apt: the loss of the world as home through the 
acquisition of a particular kind of knowledge, and the practices such knowledge gives 
rise to. 
In the first chapter of this thesis I talked about the process of abstraction 
through which experience is excluded from authoritative knowledge both in the sciences 
and by analogy in the human sciences. I noted a movement, in the later part of the 
twentieth century and early part of the twenty-first century towards a 
recontextualization, re-embodiment, an interest in the sensual, the everyday, everything 
which science or empiricism sought to exclude. Although this tendency does appear 
earlier in the Romantic movement and other cultural resistances to the 'disenchantment 
of the world,' I argue that in the late twentieth century it assumes a particular intensity 
and that this intensity is linked to a crisis in confidence in the material world, articulated 
through the idea that nature has ended. It is not simply a philosophical crisis; it is the 
articulation of people's unease about their environment, about the way they live now 
and the way they can expect to live in the near future. 
But as I also suggest in the first chapter, nature has always been an ambiguous 
value in political debate. As Martin Jay has observed, the movements which insist on 
the concrete, the material against the abstraction and impersonality of scientific 
rationalism, are not necessarily on the side of freedom, as in the case of the Nazis, and 
their affirmation of tradition, garden and community.J13 
With germline genetic engineering human intervention is extended into what 
constitutes the species, and consequently what constitutes the species being. Through 
its manipulation of embryonic DNA, not simply the body, but of all physiological 
aspects of human development are subjected to the control of science, and ultimately to 
the vagaries of the marketplace. With nanotechnology, the manipUlation of the atomic 
structure of substances by miniature robotic machines, germ line genetic engineering 
III 'No State of Grace: Violence in the Garden' paper presented at conference, The Aesthetic in an Anti-
aesthetic Postmodern Culture, University of California at Berkeley, 2002. 
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extends human control, drawing into the ambit of the productive forces of society, the 
production of life and the production of matter. 
In his new book, Enough: Staying Human in an Engineered World, McKibben 
suggests these new technologies, which are on the verge of being incorporated into the 
structure of everyday life at least in the developed world, need to be resisted. 
Technological developments in the second half of the twentieth century, he suggests, 
have followed a particular trajectory. He writes: 
What is important about these changes is that they all went in the same 
direction: they traded context for individual freedom. Maybe its been a 
worthwhile bargain; without it we wouldn't have the prosperity that 
marks life in the West, and all the things that prosperity implies. Longer 
life span, for instance; endless choice. But the costs have clearly been 
real, too: we've tried hard to fill the hole left when communities 
disappeared, with "traditional values" and evangelical churches, with 
back-to~the -land communes and New Age rituals. But those frantic 
stirrings serve mostly to highlight our radical loneliness. Even the 
surrounding natural world, as I argued in The End of Nature, no longer 
serves as a ground, a context; we've reshaped it so thoroughly, now 
changing even the climate, that it reflects our habits and appetites and 
economies instead of offering us a doorway into a deeper world. 
(McKibben 2003: 45-46) 
The new technologies of germline genetic manipulation and nanotechnology, McKibben 
suggests, institute a further level of dislocation initiate a movement across a boundary 
which once crossed will have a fundamental impact on the meaning of human life. 
Enough, like McKibben's earlier, The End of Nature, attempts to return 
experience to the cosmological imaginary of science. What would be the experience of 
running, he asks, if you are aware that you have been genetically altered so as to enhance 
your physical capacity? What emerges is a kind of disquiet, an unease which, McKibben 
suggests, has to do with the possibility of meaning in a context without 'natural' limits. 
He suggests that we inhabit 'a moment when we stand precariously on the sharp ridge 
between the human past and the posthuman future, the moment when meaning might 
evaporate in a tangle of genes and chips'(McKibben 2003: 198). 
McKibben's book provides a thoughtful account of the state of the new 
technologies, their potential, and the concrete ways in which they might restructure the 
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conditions of everyday life in developed countries. Central to his disquiet is what he 
describes as the 'fragility of human meaning', the feeling of radical doubt about the 
boundaries between what is artificial, what is designed, and what is not. Although 
McKibben does not frame it in these terms, the world he describes is one in which 
SUbjectivity itself has become commodified, one in which the distinction between what 
is real, what is natural and what is produced no longer has currency. 
The kind of anxiety which surrounds these new technologies suggests that they 
might usefully be considered in relation to that class of phenomenon Sigmund Freud, in a 
very different context, describes as inducing feelings of uncanniness. 
Uncanny Technologies 
In his article on the uncanny, Freud notes the peculiar etymological relationship between 
the term 'heimlich' meaning homely or familiar and its ostensible opposite, the word 
'unheimlich' suggesting something unfamiliar or uncanny. Heimlich, from indicating a 
place friendly and intimate, free of ghostly influence, shifts towards the idea of heimlich 
as indicating something withdrawn from view, something secret and hidden. In relation 
to knowledge it comes to indicate a private knowledge linked with ideas of mysticism 
and the occult. This shift develops further to include a sense of inaccessible knowledge, 
something hidden and dangerous (Freud 1955: 377). At this point, through its 
association with ghostliness and fear, it comes to coincide with the meaning of 
unheimlich. After reviewing several examples of this progression in different 
dictionaries, he comes to the conclusion that: 'heimlich is a word the meaning of which 
develops towards an ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, 
'unheimlich' (1955: 77). 
In trying to analyse the psychical cause of the uncanny effect, Freud refers to 
the work of Jentsch, who suggests that one of the crucial elements is an intellectual 
uncertainty about what is real, about whether, in the case of B.T.A. Hoffman's story 
'The Sand Man', the doll Olympia is human or an automaton. Inanimate objects in the 
story appear too much like animate ones. 
In his list of things associated with the uncanny Freud also includes the idea of 
the double, where blurring of identities occurs between subjects and 'there is a doubling, 
dividing and interchanging of the self (1955: 234); the recurrence of situations, things or 
events and involuntary repetitions which 'forces upon us the idea of something fateful 
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and inescapable' (1960: 390); the sense of the omnipotence of thoughts; death and dead 
bodies and madness and epilepsy, 
For Freud, intellectual uncertainty is not the primary cause of the uncanny, since 
it frequently occurs without an uncanny effect. He focusses instead on the role played 
by the eyes and the threat to the eyes in the story of 'The Sandman' ,114 For Freud, the 
threat to the eyes can be linked, through the infantile Oedipus complex, to the fear of 
castration. Yet the threat to the eyes also seems to have a remarkable connection with 
intellectual uncertainty, since observation is precisely the scientific act which fixes the 
world in a stable relation to the viewer. The eyes have a literal and metaphorical value as 
perceptual organs which enable a particular kind of orientation toward the world, one in 
which the contours of the real can be defmed. 115 
Although as Freud points out children frequently imagine dolls to be real, this 
does not compare with what takes place in 'The Sand~Man' where Spalanzi and 
Coppola create an automaton, a doll who appears to be human but who is, in fact, a 
creature of their own design. This is precisely the anxiety that animates McKibben's 
rejection of germline genetic engineering. He writes: 
At the moment we still perceive sometimes dimly- the distinction between the 
real and the artificial. In fact, there are signs that more of us take it more 
seriously all the time: worried and unsatisfied by a life in front of the TV, we 
reach for some of these more fulfilling disciplines. We run; we take up 
instruments. Or at least, we yearn to do so. But how fulfilling would those focal 
practices be once the line is fully blurred ~ once we have been turned into a kind 
of tool? If you've been designed and programmed to run, what meaning can 
running hold?' (2003: 55) 
What McKibben identifies here can be read as a form of resistance, however 
inchoate, to the administered world in which the culture industry dominates all aspects 
oflife. The 'yearning' suggests an acknowledgment oflack and the 'fulfilling disciplines' 
an attempt at a personal level to work against the alienation of the body, to reanimate it 
through practices in which it is engaged at a physical level; practices in which the breath, 
the hands, legs and the muscles are required to act together reminding the body of its 
114 In the story, Nathaniel, the main protagonist, is frightened as a child by a man who visits his father 
and who threatens to put bits of hot coals in his eyes. This man, Coppelius ,is identified by Nathaniel 
with the Sand-Man, a figure who appears in tales told to frighten children into going to bed. The Sand-
Man was said to throw handfuls of sand into children's eyes. 
lIS Martin Jay discusses this in detail in his chapter on the Enlightenment in Downcast Eyes (1993). 
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own coherence, that it not merely a collection of parts. Training partially releases the 
body from disuse and inertia and awakens in it a physical memory of its own capacity 
for expression. 
The genetically modified child, like the doll Olympia, is a product of design and 
labour. Although genetic factors do not programme human behaviour, McKibben 
suggests, they do influence it, and, more importantly, having been modified in some way 
results in a profound intellectual uncertainty about to what extent you are determined 
not simply by your biology, as Freud had suggested fifty years earlier, but in a very 
fundamental sense by the market. What is familiar, the body, but also more disturbingly, 
subjectivity itself, becomes unfamiliar, estranged. 
In 'The Sand-Man' it is not only Olympia who is an automaton, in the sense 
that she is controlled by forces outside herself. Nathaniel himself appears controlled in 
some mysterious way by the sinister father figures who in their constant mocking 
reference to eyes drive him to madness and suicide. Each time Nathaniel attempt to 
establish through observation the nature of the real, (whether for instance Olympia, with 
whom he has fallen in love, is a human or a doll) these sinister father figures appear and 
his health and ability to engage with the world is destroyed. Like the subjects McKibben 
describes, who can only yearn weakly for something beyond what is offered them by 
television, Nathaniel's autonomy is weak and easily overturned. He is subject instead to 
compulsions, to involuntary repetitions of a past he cannot escape. 
If science takes over from philosophy the project of transforming the world into 
home and extends its domain to include not simply the encountered material world but 
also the imagined world of the universe, it also intervenes in structuring the relationship 
between the real and the natural. It does this abstractly through the production of 
knowledge and an insistence on the forms the natural can assume, and materially through 
technologies based on these assumptions. Although this knowledge is spread thinly over 
the world, making only fragmentary and glancing impact on most people's interpretation 
of their experiences, the material ways in which what exists in the world is altered by 
technology extends further. 
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THE REAL AND THE NATURAL 
The Real Without Nature 
McKibben presents his argument against the new technologies of genetic engineering in 
terms of a loss of meaning. Francis Fukuyama, in his recent book, Our Posthuman 
Future, is equally concerned about these new developments but approaches the 
question from a slightly different perspective. For Fukuyama, the crisis represented by 
the emergence of the 'posthuman' is a political one because it implies the end of human 
nature as an essential category and invalidates political philosophy based on 'natural 
rights'. It is necessary, he argues, to ground human rights in human nature because the 
other ways of asserting the validity of human rights, through religion or through political 
consensus, have proved too fragile a basis on which to build an ethical position. He 
writes: 'It is my view that the common understanding of the naturalistic fallacy is itself 
fallacious and that there is a desperate need for philosophy to return to the pre-Kantian 
tradition that grounds rights and morality in nature' (2002: 112).116 
What happens to the real when it cannot lean against nature? The terms 'ethics' 
and 'morals' are both derived from roots, in Greek and Latin, which have to do with 
custom and manner. They are connected with habitual actions which fashion a shell, or a 
dwelling, a place where the subject can linger onto logically. Fukuyama's anxiety about 
postmodernity or the poststructuralist turn seems be about the impossibility of 
fashioning that shell, of constituting through repeated action the network of traces 
through which custom can be formed. Nature is recalled to ground a political philosophy 
which in the face of the unreason of the world, no longer has complete faith in reason. 
The real as the domain of politics and history, without nature, is for Fukuyama 
profoundly disturbing and ungrounded. Yet there is something contradictory about 
Fukuyama's appeal to 'human nature'. Right at the end of the book he concludes with 
the following statement: 
It may be that we are somehow destined to take up this new kind of freedom, or 
that the next stage of evolution is one in which, as some have suggested, we will 
deliberately take charge of our own biological makeup rather than leaving it to the 
blind forces of natural selection. But if we do, we should do it with eyes open. 
110 Fukuyama sees Hwne not as a proto- Kantian but rather as part of an older philosophical tradition 
which derives rights from hwnan nature (2002: 231 n.16 ). 
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Many assume that the posthuman world wi11100k pretty much like our own -
free, equal, prosperous, caring, compassionate - only with better health care, 
longer lives, and perhaps more intelligence than today. (Fukuyama 2002: 218) 
Fukuyama, who teaches at the Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in 
the United States, bases his argument on a particular version of the real, one which, like 
the mode of thought of the science he is criticizing, is forced to exclude from the 
equation any real apprehension of history, of the concrete facticity of most people's 
experience ofinequality and poverty. His apparently naive reading of the world as 
prosperous and free and human nature as caring and compassionate appears to stand in 
opposition to the to the self-hatred of the technophiles discussed in chapter three but in 
fact represents merely the opposite side of the same coin. It participates in a mode of 
thinking in which what is particular and historical must be subordinated to a conception 
of nature as a general ordering principle. That the substance of this nature is open to 
dispute, that it is unclear whether human nature is sufficient and constructive or 
insufficient and destructive, suggests that posing the question in these terms leads only 
to further abstractions, to pointless disputes over the content of the real. An appeal to 
nature, as a structuring principle, only leads further away from the stable ground 
Fukuyama hopes to establish. 
What genetic technology represents, for both its opponents and its celebrants, is 
a final separation between nature and history. For Fukuyama and others, this appears as 
a loss of nature, for the technophiles, as an escape from nature. Yet the very abstraction 
of the debate suggests neither side is able to engage with the real in concrete historical 
terms. The debate itself provides each side with an escape from history, an escape from 
an apprehension of the real as complex, concrete, metabolic interaction between nature 
and history. Adorno's writing provides an interesting alternative approach to the by 
now somewhat sterile if no less urgent debate about whether genetic engineering is a 
good thing. At the moment when, fearfully or enthusiastically we appear to be 
approaching something which might be called unnatural history, or postnatural history, 
it might be useful to return to Adorno's 1932 essay 'On the Idea of Natural History'. 
Unnatural history 
In the essay 'On the Idea of Natural History' Adorno proposes a different relationship 
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between nature and history. Instead of insisting on the primacy of one or the other, he 
argues that they are inseparably interwoven. 117 His formulation of the idea of 'natural 
history' , he explains, is not concerned with the pre-scientific tradition of the 
seventeenth century or with a history of nature as an object of the natural sciences. It 
focusses rather on a mode of interpretation which permits an apprehension of concrete 
history without setting it up in opposition to a realm of static and unchanging nature. 
His discussion turns on the question of the accessibility of the real and the way in which 
different modes of understanding the existent pennit or fail to permit engagement with 
concrete history. 
At the beginning of the essay Adorno explains the two concepts which he hopes 
to overcome. The one is nature as myth, as that 'fatefully-arranged and predetermined 
being that underlies history'; the other, history as the 'mode of conduct established by 
tradition that is characterized primarily by the occurrence of the qualitatively 
new'(1984: 111). Yet he resists an attempt to define how the concept of 'natural 
history' exceeds or transfonns the terms it contains. Instead he suggests the 
juxtaposition of the tenns enables an analysis which pushes 'these concepts to a point 
where they are mediated by their apparent difference' (1984: 111). Thus he first 
approaches the question from the standpoint of neo-ontological thought, in which 
through a formulation of the concept of being, historicity itself is naturalized, and then 
shifts to a reading of the philosophy of history in which the historical being of nature is 
revealed. 
Adorno's criticism ofneo-ontological thought centres on its misrecognition of 
the real as open to a non-conceptual apprehension. Phenomenology claims, he argues, 
to replace the idealistic fonnulation that all categories of being can be grounded in 
'certain fundamental structures of subjectivity' with 'another kind of being, a region of 
being that is different in principle, a transsubjective, an ontic region of being' (Adorno 
1984: 112). This gives rise to the articulation of question ofthe meaning of being, the 
meaningfulness of the existing or the meaning of being as possibility. Adorno writes: 
Only when reason perceives reality that is in opposition to it as something 
foreign and lost to it, as a complex of things, that is, only when reality is no 
111 This speech was presented to the KantgeselischaJt in July 1932 in Frankfurt. Susan Buck-Morss 
comments that it represented 'Adorno's contribution to the debate on historicism which had been going 
on at the university since Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim taught there in the twenties and worked to 
establish a sociology of knowledge' (1977: 53). 
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longer immediately accessible and reality and reason have no common meaning, 
only then can the question of the meaning of being be asked at alL (1984:112) 
The loss of the real, the impression of the existent as something foreign, which for 
Adorno constitutes a specific historical condition, becomes the basis for a philosophical 
position. The meaninglessness of the real is translated into its resistance to meaning and 
this opacity becomes the domain of being itself. Adorno writes: 
I mean nothing else than that the attempt of neo-ontological thought to come to 
terms with the unreachability ofthe empirical continually operates according to 
one schema: precisely where an element fails to dissolve into determinations of 
thought and cannot be made transparent, but rather retains pure thereness, 
precisely at this point the resistance of the phenomenon is transformed into a 
universal concept and there resistance as such is endowed with ontological value. 
(1984: 115) 
Despite the incorporation of historicity as the structure of being, ontological thought 
remains dependent on a concept of autonomous reason. Although the real is no longer 
conceived of as a systematic whole, it nevertheless is susceptible to the imposition of a 
structural unity, which implies, Adorno suggests, that 'he who combines everything 
existing under this structure has the right and the power to know adequately the existing 
in itself and to absorb it into the form' (1984: 116).The impossibility of this 
epistemological task makes it necessary to find a new way of formulating the question. 
Shifting to the perspective of the philosophy of history, Adorno locates the source of 
the concept of natural history in Lukacs work on aesthetic material in the Theory of the 
NoveL For Lukacs the lost world of the real constitutes what he refers to as second 
nature, the world of conventions. He writes that: 
Where no aims are directly given, in the process of becoming-man, the structures 
which the soul encounters as the arena and sub-stratum of its activity among 
men lose their obvious roots in supre-personal ideal necessities; ... They form the 
world of conventions, a world from whose all-embracing power only the 
innermost recesses of the soul are exempt, a world which is present everywhere 
in a multiplicity of forms too complex for understanding. Its strict laws, both in 
becoming and in being, are necessarily evident to the cognisant subject, but 
despite its regularity, it is a world that does not offer itself either as meaning to 
the aim-seeking subject or as matter, in its sensuous immediacy, to the active 
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subject. It is second nature, and like nature (first nature) it is determinable only 
as the embodiment of recognised but senseless necessities and therefore is 
incomprehensible, unknowable in its real substance. (Lukacs 1978: 62) 
Adorno quotes this section in some detail, inserting into it a reminder that for Lukacs 
first nature is also alienated nature, 'nature in the sense ofthe natural sciences' (Adorno 
1984: 118), not something sensuous and immediate. 
Confronted by the world of second nature, Adorno writes, 'the problem of 
natural history presents itself in the first place as the question of how it is possible to 
know and interpret this alienated, reified, dead world' (1984: 118). For Lukacs, at this 
stage of his thinking, the problem of awakening this world is conceived in metaphysical 
terms, as a form of 'theological resurrection'. For Benjamin, the project of awakening is 
part of the task of philosophical interpretation and can best be understood through the 
mode of allegory. Adorno writes: 
Allegory is usually taken to mean the presentation of a concept as an image and 
therefore it is labelled abstract and accidental. The relationship of allegory to its 
meaning is not accidental signification, but the playing out of a particularity; it is 
expression. What is expressed in the allegorical sphere is nothing but a historical 
relationship. (1984: 119) 
Allegory as Benjamin defmes it, Adorno suggests provides 'a presentiment of the 
procedure that could succeed in interpreting concrete history' ( 1984: 121). This 
procedure, which is the project of natural history, involves a different conceptual 
approach to that which is based on a project whose foundation is constituted by a 
general conceptual structure' (1984: 120). What Adorno is describing here is, of course, 
the 'constellation'. 
As I have already mentioned in Chapter one, the constellation does not aim at 
the definition and clarification of terms but rather places a form which holds them in a 
particular relation to one another. Constellations become the mode of illuminating not 
fixed coordinates but the ever shifting ground of historical facticity so that in the 
moment of their juxtaposition, they are temporarily released from their solidification in 
second nature. Nature in its transience constantly invokes the historical and thus works 
against the seemingly fixed character of second nature. 
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Adorno writes: 
For radical natural-historical thought however, everything transforms itself into 
ruins and fragments, into just such a charnel house where signification is 
discovered, in which nature and history interweave and the philosophy of 
history is assigned the task of their intentional interpretation. (1984: 121) 
The charnel house, an image taken from Lukacs, becomes the figure for understanding 
the reified world, not as a totality but as a collection of fragments ceremoniously housed 
together but constantly in a process of decay. I 18 Philosophy, confronted with the world 
as charnel house, finds its own impulse, 'the urge to be at home everywhere in the 
world' turned against itself. To be at home in a charnel house is to belong there, to be 
one of the dead. The task of philosophy thus needs, Adorno suggests, to be redefined so 
that it does not become merely the legitimation of the given - the task of making the 
charnel house more homely. 
The Task of Philosophy 
In the political philosophy of Fukuyama, the 'real' offers itself to the autonomous 
subject without any interruption. Surveying the events of the twentieth century, he 
claims, can lead to only one conclusion: that socialism and other 'utopian political 
projects' are untenable. The 'failure' of socialist revolutions in Russia, China, Cuba and 
elsewhere, he argues, indicates that such projects are incompatible with human nature. 
He writes: 
Political institutions cannot abolish either nature or nurture altogether and 
succeed. The history of the twentieth century was defined by two opposite 
horrors, the Nazi regime, which said biology was everything, and communism, 
which maintained that it counted for nothing. Liberal democracy has emerged as 
the only viable and legitimate political system for modern societies because it 
avoids either extreme, shaping politics according to historically created norms of 
justice while not interfering excessively with natural patterns of behaviour. 
(Fukuyama 2002: 14) 
The figure Fukuyama uses to apprehend to the world is the pattern. Historical 
iiS The image of the chamal house appears in Lukacs' discussion of first and second nature in The 
Theory of the Novel. He writes: 'This second nature is not dumb sensuous and yet senseless like the first: 
it is a complex of senses-meanings-which has become rigid and strange, and which no longer awakens 
interiority; it is a charnel house of long dead interiorities' ( Lukacs 1978: 64). 
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events arrange themselves into patterns; human behaviour follows natural patterns. 
According to his reading, one socialist revolution after another cannot be sustained and a 
pattern is formed. In a pattern certain forms are repeated and the regularity of this 
repetition, however complex the individual forms, makes possible prediction. The word 
'pattern' or 'patron' begins by designating an ideal form, something worthy of imitation 
and from there shifts to include the idea of something typical, an example and also the 
idea of a plan or design. 
As a method of interpretation, it implies the discovery of repetitions which 
allows particularities to be subsumed under general structures. Seeing patterns involves 
recognising typical examples, fmding what is exemplary, excluding everything that is 
random and contingent, and identitying interruptions which cause deviations and 
irregularities. It also implies that everything is within grasp, that the material from which 
the pattern emerges, whether it is history or nature, is entirely available to the organising 
subject. 
Leaving aside the validity of the particular patterns Fukuyama identifies and the 
conclusions he draws from them for the moment, this method provides a useful contrast 
to that proposed by Adorno in the idea of the constellation. The constellation is also an 
arrangement but the figure to be found in it is enigmatic and contingent. The 
constellation represents for Adorno the temporary configuration of elements in such a 
way as to create a momentary yet powerful and trans formative illumination. Unlike the 
pattern, the constellation draws things into a relationship which does not assume 
repetition and regularity. It is not about abstracting from the everyday a supposed 
order. Rather it wishes to bring into interpretation, into thinking, the 'density of 
experience' that the act of abstraction, inherent in the identification of patterns, 
excludes. 
Philosophy, Adorno argues, cannot operate according to the same principles as 
the natural sciences. He writes: 
the central difference (between science and philosophy) lies .. .in that the 
separate sciences accept their findings, at least their fmal and deepest fmdings, as 
indestructible and static, whereas philosophy perceives the first findings which 
it lights upon as a sign that needs unriddling. Plainly put, the idea of science 
(Wissenschafl) is that of research; that of philosophy is interpretation. It remains 
the great, perhaps the everlasting paradox: philosophy persistently and with the 
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claim to truth, must proceed interpretatively without ever possessing a sure key 
to interpretation; nothing more is given to it than fleeting, disappearing traces 
within the riddle figure of that which exists and their astonishing entertwinings. 
(Adorno 2000 [1931]: 31) 
The real for Adorno is not self-evidently present to the subject but occurs only 
as a 'riddle figure', a collection of traces. The task of philosophy is to interpret these 
fragments, not so as to reconstruct something that has been lost, but to purposefully 
bring things into a proximate relation so that each element reveals something about the 
others, and in the form that they temporarily create, something becomes apparent which 
was previously invisible. The affinity of this form of philosophic interpretation with a 
materialist approach, Adorno explains, is precisely that it refuses to accept or justify 
the real but rather, following the example of psychoanalysis, turns to the 'refuse of the 
world' (2000: 32) in order to find traces oflife, elements in the riddle of the existing, 
which in other places have been ordered out of existence by the standardizing effects of 
the culture industry. 
The form of the riddle acknowledges the contradictory nature of its material, the 
existing world, and represents these contradictions in the form of a partial figure, to be 
interpreted. It does not assume one form would serve as a pattern or model for all such 
acts of interpretation. Adorno writes: 'The idea of philosophic interpretation does not 
shrink back from that liquidation of philosophy which seems to me signalled by the 
collapse of the last philosophic claims to totality' (2000: 34). 
For Fukuyama, nature still provides the ground for the establishment of a 
totality, a system or structure which could sustain interpretation and promise ultimately 
to deliver a complete knowledge of the world. Nature needs to be defended against 
interference by genetic engineering precisely because in the form of a model it allows the 
world, abstractly at least, to exist as a totality. And this totality provides the basis for 
way of judging human behaviour. Fukuyama's argument against what he calls 'cultural 
relativism' is precisely its undermining of this totality and the way this impacts on 
questions of ethics and morality, on the potential limits and forms of the 'patterns of 
human behaviour' he wishes to establish. Cultural relativism, he argues, as a mode of 
interpreting human behaviour, in its refusal of nature as an authoritative structure, loses 
its ability to make convincing claims about human behaviour. 
What is at stake for Fukuyama is what he sees as the uncertainty of modes of 
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interpretation which resist the singular authorising narrative that 'nature' might provide. 
His attitude reflects a familiar conservative response to poststructuralism's challenge to 
the hegemony of scientific rationalism. Yet the context in which his argument occurs 
introduces a new element. His defense of an older form of science, the speculative 
theories of evolution against the new, the technologies of genetic modification, reveals 
the contradictions of his position. Confronted with the logical conclusion of the 
scientific project to control nature in all its aspects, nature appears suddenly as 
something to be saved from science. 
Nature's hypervisibility, its sudden inflation of value, appears at the moment 
when what science has made homely suddenly becomes unhomely, where what was 
experienced as familiar and habitual becomes something strange and compulsive. Genetic 
engineering, in the name of freedom of choice, finally threatens to dispel the illusion of 
the autonomous individual, and to reveal the hidden truth of the world as it is, that what 
appears animate is actually dead, and what appears autonomous is actually automated 
or controlled. Fukuyama's anxiety about authority is about confronting what has 
already been lost: the subject's own ability to act autonomously in the world, to be a 
subject and not, like the doll Olympia, simply to resemble one. 
In response to the question of relativism, Adorno comments that: 
Ever since puberty, when it is customary to get excited about such questions, I 
have never again really understood the so-called problem of relativism. My 
experience was that whoever gave himself over in earnest to the discipline of a 
particular subject learned to distinguish very precisely between true and false, 
and in contrast to that experience the assertion of general insecurity as to what is 
known had something abstract and unconvincing about it. Let it be that 
confronted with the ideal of the absolute, everything human stands under the 
shadow of the conditional and temporary - what happens when the boundary is 
reached at which thought must recognize that it is not identical to being, not only 
allows the most convincing insights, but forces them. (Quoted in Buck-Morss, 
1977: 53) 
The difference lies in the orientation of the perceiving subject to the material 
he/she engages with. For Adorno, what makes impossible the vertigo of relativism is a 
refusal of abstraction. The person who gives 'himself over in earnest to the discipline of 
a particular subject' would in the act of giving up himself find a relation to the material 
world which a commitment to abstraction forecloses. Instead ofthe identification of 
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patterns, Adorno proposes the idea of an 'exact fantasy' in which 'the demands to 
answer the questions of a pre-given reality each time, through a fantasy which rearranges 
the elements of the question without going beyond the circumference of the elements, 
the exactitude of which has its control in the disappearance ofthe question' (2000: 37). 
What is exact are the dimensions of the engagement through which the subject 
realises the limitation of thought and its inexact relation to being. The constellation is a 
model for a philosophic project which recognises, even before the environmental crisis 
and the technologies of genetic engineering made visible the end of nature as totality, the 
end of the illusion 'that earlier philosophical enteprises began with: that the power of 
thought is sufficient to grasp the totality of the real' (Adorno 2000: 24). 
It is only when approached in this way that the existent can be apprehended 
exactly, without the kinds of reduction at work in thinking that insists on unequivocal 
identities and precise definition. Giving yourself over to the subject means accepting the 
fonn it takes, and the form of the world as it exists today is irreducibly contradictory. 
Conclusion - The Riddle of Living 
The problem with both McKibben and Fukuyama's critique of the posthuman is that 
they are unable to confront the world as it is. Each can only extrapolate from their own 
experience, the experience of the First World. If McKibben is more critical of the 
conspicuous consumption that marks American culture and less inclined to accept a 
reading of it as predominantly 'free, equal, prosperous, caring and compassionate' 
(2002: 18), he nevertheless participates in the debate from the standpoint of 
comparative security. His concern with the loss of 'meaning' reveals, as Adorno 
suggests in relation to the concerns of ontology, just how completely the real has been 
lost. A sign of its absence is the persistent reiteration of the autonomy of the subject. 
Against an industry which promotes itself on the basis of the free market, of extending 
the choice ofthe individual, a rejection of technology appears always as a rejection of 
freedom. Fully apprehending that it is in fact the opposite, the penetration of the market 
into the very cells of body, means acknowledging the unfreedom that already exists. 
There is no room in either McKibben's or Fukuyama's account for those who already 
are without choices. 
In his segment on homelessness, Adorno writes: 'the hardest hit, as everywhere, 
are those who have no choice. They live, if not in slums, in bungalows that by tomorrow 
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may be leaf-huts, trailers, cars, camps, or the open air' (1978: 39). As elements within 
the constellation whose configuration illuminates the global as a necessary concept not 
of totality, grasping the world as a whole, but of the impossibility of totality, those who 
have no choice, for whom the house is literall y past, are brought into proximity with 
those who are exiled and those who in the face of such homelessness must consider their 
own ethical position. Such an ethics should not be based on some abstraction, the idea of 
human nature, but rather on the experience of living, of confronting the real in all its 
impossibility . 
In the essay 'Walking in the City' (1984), Michel de Certeau talks about the 
contrast between the city viewed from above and the experience of walking. In the city, 
he suggests, the proper names which formerly allowed people to negotiate a relationship 
with spaces, which formed a 'foggy geography of meaning', are gradually disappearing. 
Furthermore: 
The same is true of the stories and legends that haunt urban space like 
superfluous or additional inhabitants ... But their extermination (like the 
extermination of trees, forests and hidden places in which such legends lives 
makes the city 'a suspended symbolic order'. The habitable city is thereby 
annulled. Thus, as a woman from Rouen put it, no, here 'there isn't any place 
special, except for my own home, that's all...There isn't anything.' Nothing 
'special': nothing that is marked, opened up by a memory or a story, signed by 
something or someone else. Only the cave of the home remains believable, still 
open for a certain time to legends, still full of shadows. Except for that, according 
to another city dweller, there are only 'places in which one can no longer believe 
in anything'. (1993: 159) 
In the absence of stories even the habitable spaces of the first world become less 
habitable so that in the end it is only the limited domain of the home that contains the 
possibility of engagement. The subject is driven out of the spaces of communality, the 
city streets, the open air, into a smaller and smaller space, and at last find themselves 
locked up in the house, unable to leave a trace beyond the that of ownership. 
What interests me is the way De Certeau's description of the annullment of the 
habitable city echoes Adorno's earlier comment on homelessness. If in the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first century, cities in Europe are not reduced to rubble, their designs 
just as surely, although more subtly and insidiously, displace the living subject. The 
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unmarked city offers no point of subjective engagement for its inhabitants. 
In his description of the American landscape in Paysage , the extract from 
Minima Moralia quoted at the start of Chapter two, Adorno comments on a similar 
blankness. He notes the expressionlessness of the roads which appear to have no 
relation to the country-side they pass through. Neither the road nor the natural 
landscape, he suggests, bear any traces of human engagement. He writes that 'it is as if 
no one has ever passed their hands over the landscape's hair' (1978: 48). This missing 
gesture, this gentle yet expressive touch, seems a fitting metaphor for Adorno's 
interpetative project, one which involves not a rigid separation of subject and object but 
rather a yielding to the object. 
In Negative Dialectics, he writes: 'dialectics is the consistent sense of non-
identity. It does not begin by taking a standpoint' (Adorno 2000: 5). The dialectical 
method does not impose on the object its own form. Instead it permits precisely the 
delicate gesture suggested by running your hand over something and fmding in the 
roughness of the texture all those aspects which are not apparent to identity-thinking, 
those things which 'to classifying procedure are considered either a matter of 
indifference or a burden' (2000: 162 ). This act of apprehending the world is also not 
indifferent. In the expressive gesture of running a hand over the landscapes hair, both 
subject and object are, momentarily, comforted. 
This does not mean finding a condition of ease, a way of being at home in the 
world. Instead it recognizes the painfulness of such limited contact. Adorno's 
philosophy offers a means of engagement with precisely what appears to refuse 
engagement, the world of the existent, not through an abstract apprehension of it as 
system, but rather through a process of giving yourself up to the contradictions of the 
real, to inhabit them in a way the world itself can no longer be inhabited. 
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Conclusion 
I began this thesis by asking what elements might be drawn into a constellation of nature 
at the end of the twentieth and early twenty-first century. I suggested that one way in 
which this configuration could be imagined spatially was through the concepts of 
outside and inside and the way in which elements associated with nature are arrayed 
across this apparent opposition. 
The image which emerges from the configuration of elements which constitute 
the phenomenon I have been calling 'the end of nature' is not a photographic image, one 
in which what is natural is revealed as a self-evident truth. Instead, like Bacon's 
painting of the running dog the moment of confrontation is blurred. The elements are all 
in motion, in history, shifting within their own domains and in relation to each other. 
Yet a likeness does emerge. In similar though not identical way, in relation to external 
nature, in relation to animals and in relation to the human body nature emerges as that 
which holds and conceals the irredicible contradictions of living in consumer culture. 
This likeness makes visible the way things like landscapes, animals and human bodies, 
become marginalized andlor reduced to commodities sometimes even in the very act of 
trying to conserve them from the violence and degradation of the practices ofa 
globalizing industrial culture. But to say only that would be to miss something 
important. 
What also becomes evident in the phenomenon I am calling the end of nature is 
not only the physical degradation and reification but also an inflation in the value of the 
concept of nature. If in some ways, the new value acquired by nature seems simply to 
repeat an earlier movement, in which reified nature becomes the desired alternative to the 
degraded landscape of industrial production, this interpretation does not sufficiently 
account for the extent and intensity of recent interest in nature. This new visibility of 
nature indicates also, I argue, an absence or an inadequacy in the way in which theories 
of the postmodern have apprehended the real. Nature returns as a sign ofloss not only 
because of real environmental concerns, but also because, in a lived condition of 
increasing abstraction, it contains the promise of something outside. 
The inflation in the value of nature is not only a tum away from history. It does 
not necessarily mean screening offlived experience, poverty, the friction of the real. It 
also involves recognizing something about the agency of what is not human. There is a 
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very material way in which certain elements of what is called nature enter human culture 
awkwardly and resist the pressure to be subsumed under the logic of exchange. If dogs 
as pets are unmistakeably commodified, as subjects they show a baffled disregard for 
the principles of consumer culture. Instead in their enquiring gaze might be read a 
reminder of what it might mean for humans to have a different relationship with their 
bodies, one in which they are not condemned to inertia or random, meaningless motion. 
If in the world of representation, the model of the desirable human body grows 
increasingly blank and expressionless, even there it does not accept this erasure quietly 
and in its excesses displays to world its damage. 
Perhaps this is one way of understanding Adorno's somewhat enigmatic claim at 
the end of 'Man and Beast: 'What threatens the prevailing praxis and its inescapable 
alternatives is not nature, with which that practice coincides but the remembrance of 
nature' (2000: 211-212). The concept of nature with which 'the prevailing praxis' 
coincides is that of mythic nature. It is this idea of nature as the 'fatefully arranged 
predetermined being' which 'underlies history' that Adorno seeks to overcome. It is the 
idea of nature as rational or mythic system which determines human activity. The 
remembrance of nature, on the other hand, contains no such pretention to systematised 
knowledge. It indicates instead what might be considered outside the administered world 
- those moment in which human bodies or animals or natural beauty recall something 
which does not fit into the smooth world of equivalence. 
In the context of a single globalizing industrial culture, what might still be 
considered outside becomes critical. To be outside in this context contains the promise 
not of an altogether different mode of existence, a utopia, but of a margin of resistance, a 
breath of air in the claustrophobic atmosphere of the administered world. 
Adorno suggests that the usefulness of the notion of the constellation lies not 
with its ability to reveal the secret intentions of reality but rather with its capacity to 
'interpet unintentional reality' in such a way that the combination of elements makes 
possible the negation of the initial question. Perhaps one of the questions which is 
negated by the image which emerges from this thesis is the question: 'Has nature 
ended?' or 'Is nature ending?' This is not to dispute the extent and significance of the 
environmental degradation McKibben describes or to take issue with his sense that the 
possibility of stepping outside is increasingly limited. But as a rhetorical move the 
notion of the end of nature shuts down precisely what should be opened up the 
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particular and irreducible contradictions of the real's uneasy relationship with the 
natural. 
This brings us to a second question which might vanish in solving the riddle of 
this configuration, the question: 'Are humans natural.' This is the question at the heart 
of the debate over the posthuman, as it is articulated by writers such as Fukuyama and 
McKibben. For them, the term 'human' has come to stand for something natural and 
the prefix 'post' for a border which would divide us forever from that past. 
I maintain that this thesis negates these questions because what emerges in the 
elements I have combined is that nature in that sense, as an identity, nowhere coincides 
with itself. Instead it moves away every time the gaze is directed at it, shifting always 
from foreground into background without ever releasing it hold over the imagination. 
Finding the identity of nature, asking the question which lurks behind the earlier 
ones, the question 'What is nature?' helps to defme certain language games in which it is 
used but it does not help to release nature from its ambitious role as universal. Instead, 
along with the Habermasian idea of autonomous spheres, it simple removes what is 
contradictory by placing the conflicting elements in different systems. 
Perhaps this spatial configuration makes it possible to ask a new question, 
'where is nature?' Such a question might free the concept of nature from its identity as a 
totalizing system which conceals its own abstractness through a consoling attachment to 
the material - the exuberance of green trees, mountainous lanscapes, the smell of apples, 
the sound of the sea and all of those things which give incontrovertible sensory 
confirmation of its existence. This new question might permit the recognition both of 
the fragmented quality of nature, its dispersal across and between moments of its 
reification, and of its elusiveness. 
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